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NOTES
Administrative Law-Evidence-Hearsay and the Right of
Confrontation in Administrative Hearings
The United States Court of Claims in Peters v. United States1
recently rendered an opinion that significantly affects the character of
administrative evidence and the right of cross-examination in a federal
hearing. If the decision is widely accepted, the result will be that hearsay
evidence can form the sole basis of an administrative adjudication, and
the right of cross-examination will be reduced, at most, to a limited privi-
lege.
Sergeant Peters was a placement assistant in the United States Air
Force with the responsibility for placing applicants in the Air Force
Reserve program. Upon notification that he was being removed for accept-
ing bribes for preferential placements, Peters appealed to the Civil Service
Commission, an administrative right available to him as a career airman.2
Prior to the hearing, the Commission made available to Peters the affi-
davits of the four persons charging him with bribery and certain other
correspondence between the Air Force and the accusers. Several weeks
before the hearing Peters' counsel requested that the Air Force produce
the four affiants at the hearing, but the Air Force refused because it
had no jurisdiction over these men except on training weekends.
At the hearing the Government introduced the four apparent affi-
davits' of the four declarants over Peters' objection and also produced two
officers as witnesses. One had taken the four statements, and the other had
talked to three of the men. Both corroborated the taking of the statements
2408 F.2d 719 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
2 Veterans' Preference Act § 14, 5 U.S.C. § 863 (1964). This act provides such
special procedural protections for veterans as thirty days advance notice of proposed
discharge, information about the reasons for proposed discharge, a reasonable time
for answering charges, and the right to appeal to the full Civil Service Commission.
'There is some question whether these four typed statements were actually
affidavits in the formal sense. The officer before whom the statements were taken
testified that because his stenographer was having difficulty, he supplemented her
work with his own notes. The two products were later typed together as the
formal statements made by the four declarants. 408 F.2d at 722. This procedure
raises some doubt as to the accuracy of the statements. The affidavits were written
in the third person rather than in the usual first person form, bore no jurat or
seal, and were not signed by anyone authorized to administer an oath.
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contained in the affidavits. These corroborated statements were the full
extent of the Government's evidence presented to the Commission. Peters
himself testified as to his innocence and directly contradicted the Govern-
ment's evidence. On the basis of the four corroborated affidavits, the
Commission upheld the Government's action in removing Peters. Alleging
that his procedural rights had been violated and that the Commission's
decision was contrary to law,4 Peters brought an action for back pay.
The Court of Claims in a four-to-one decision affirmed the Com-
mission's actions in dismissing Peters. The court held that because the
affidavits were corroborated and were declarations against interest, they
were reliable, probative, and substantial evidence upon which the decision
could rest.' The court also held that Peters' procedural rights in regard to
cross-examination of the four declarants had not been violated because the
burden was upon him to produce them for cross-examination." Each of
these determinations appears to be contrary to precedent and raises serious
questions regarding the sufficiency of evidence and the right to confront
accusers before a federal administrative agency.
Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), decisions of federal
agencies must be based upon reliable, probative, and substantial evidence ;7
however, rules of evidence need not be strictly followed.' It has been con-
sistently recognized that the hearsay rule is not applicable to bar the
introduction of statements or testimony before a federal agency.9 Even
with this liberal policy of admission of evidence, a safeguard against arbi-
trary and capricious decisions was established by the substantial-evidence
test.
This test was formulated by the United States Supreme Court over
thirty years ago, before the passage of the APA, in Consolidated Edison
Co. v. NLRB.1 The Court held that a federal administrative agency must
base its decisions on substantial evidence and said: "Substantial evidence




75 U.S.C. §556(d) (1968).
'See, e.g., 5 C.F.R. § 77 2.30 5 (c) (4) (1969) (Civil Service Commission); 20
C.F.R. §404.928 (1969) (Health, Education and Welfare).
0 Cohen v. Perales, 412 F.2d 44, 51 (5th Cir. 1969) ; Rocker v. Celebrezze, 358
F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1966); Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676,
690-91 (9th Cir. 1949).
1o305 U.S. 197 (1938).
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able mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." The Court
then proceeded to state that "mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does
not constitute substantial evidence."' 2 The pre-APA substantial-evidence
test of Consolidated Edison was cited by the Court with approval and
without modification in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,'8 a post-APA
case, and clearly remains the law under the APA. In addition, numerous
lower courts, including the Court of Claims, have cited the statement
from Consolidated Edison as controlling on the question of hearsay as
substantial evidence.' Clearly, then, mere uncorroborated hearsay does
not constitute substantial evidence under the APA.
There is authority, however, for the proposition that hearsay may be
relevant and have probative value in an administrative finding.' A close
examination of the major cases in which hearsay evidence was deemed
to be relevant reveals that the decisions were based on something more
than hearsay alone; in each case there was, in addition to the hearsay evi-
dence, direct and substantial evidence upon which the decisions were ulti-
mately rested.' Aside from Peters, the correct and accepted rule has been
that while uncorroborated hearsay may be admitted into evidence, the
ultimate decision must be supported by other legal and substantial evi-
dence.
The Court of Claims in Peters, though citing the substantial-evidence
test of Consolidated Edison with approval, attached little significance to
the Supreme Court's statement that "uncorroborated hearsay or rumor
does not constitute substantial evidence."'' The Court of Claims thought
that this statement was "obviously dictum,"' s but overlooked the extent
11 Id. at 229.12Id. at 230.
'*340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951).
NLRB v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 202 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1953);
Montana Power Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 185 F.2d 491, 498 (D.C. Cir. 1950) ;
Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676, 690 (9th Cir. 1949); United
States v. Krumsiek, 111 F.2d 74, 78 (1st Cir. 1940); Hill v. Fleming, 169 F.
Supp. 240, 245 (W.D. Pa. 1958); Conn v. United States, 376 F.2d 878, 883 (Ct.
Cl. 1967); Camero v. United States, 345 F.2d 798, 800 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
" Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1949); Morelli v.
United States, 177 Ct. Cl. 848 (1966).
"8Montana Power Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 185 F.2d 491 (D.C. Cir.
1950); Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1949); Hill v.
Fleming, 169 F. Supp. 240 (W.D. Pa. 1958); Morelli v. United States, 177 Ct. Cl.
848 (1966) ; Camero v. United States, 345 F.2d 798 (Ct. Cl. 1965). But see United
States v. Costello, 221 F.2d 668 (2d Cir. 1955) (indictment based solely upon
hearsay sustained).
17 305 U.S. at 230.
18408 F.2d at 723.
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to which the principle has been adopted in the cases'" after Consolidated
Edison.
Corroboration by the Government's witnesses of the accuracy of the
statements contained in the four affidavits did not add any probative value
to the evidence in Peters, for the corroboration was itself hearsay.20
Thus the court in effect allowed hearsay upon hearsay-pyramided hearsay
-which is no more reliable than single hearsay to sustain a decision.2 '
Judge Skelton in an able and revealing dissent in Peters aptly described
what results from such corroboration: "Adding hearsay to hearsay is like
adding zero to zero which still equals zero."22
In a further attempt to justify the Commission's decision based solely
upon the four affidavits, the Court of Claims held that they contained
declarations against interest because the declarants could be subjected to
criminal liability for the crimes alleged.2" By applying this label to the
statements, the court was able to satisfy itself that an exception to the
hearsay rule formed the basis of the Commission's decision; declarations
against interest are recognized as possessing trustworthiness and pro-
bative value because the declarant would not intentionally make a statement
against his interest unless it was true.' The court reasoned that since
the hearsay had probative and reliable value, a decision resting upon it
could be said to be based upon substantial evidence.
This reasoning significantly diluted the substantial-evidence test. Even
if the declarations could be labeled as exceptions to the hearsay rule, the
statements contained in the affidavits were still hearsay. They could be
introduced and accorded some weight in an administrative hearing, but they
were in fact the only evidence used to sustain the decision.
Moreover, it is doubtful that these statements against penal interest
were traditional hearsay exceptions under federal law.23 And there is doubt
"o See note 14 supra.2 See Neal v. United States, 22 F.2d 52, 55 (4th Cir. 1927) ; Royal Ins. Co. v.
Taylor, 254 F. 805, 809 (4th Cir. 1918).
91 See United States v. Grayson, 166 F.2d 863, 869 (2d Cir. 1948). But see
2 K. DAVIs, ADmINIsTRATIvE LAW TREATISE §§ 14.10-.12 (1958).
2 408 F.2d at 738 (dissenting opinion).
Id. at 724.2 'C. McCoR ICx, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 253 (1954).
'"In Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913), the Supreme Court de-
clared that a statement against penml interest was not within the exception to the
hearsay rule. The holding in Donnelly is the overwhelming majority rule today. 5
J. WIG MOE, EVIDENCE § 1476 (3d ed. 1940). A minority of jurisdictions reject
the rule in Donnelly and hold that a statement against penal interest is within
the exception. See, e.g., People v. Spriggs, 60 Cal. 2d 868, 389 P.2d 377, 36 Cal.
Rptr. 841 (1964); Brady v. State, 226 Md. 422, 174 A.2d 167 (1961); Sutter v.
19701
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that these statements were actually against penal interest, for as the dissent
in Peters pointed out,28 none of these affiants was ever punished in any way.
One can infer that the Government promised immunity in return for the
affiants' signing the statements. Thus the reliability and probative value
of these statements are diminished even further, and they should be entitled
to no more consideration than any other hearsay.
The final aspect of Peters that is significant is the Court of Claims'
holding with regard to the right to confrontation at an administrative
hearing. In denying Peters' contention that his procedural right of cross-
examination had been violated, the court held that the initial burden of
producing the opposing witnesses was upon Peters. The court said that
because he failed to attempt to procure their attendance at the hearing,
it was his own inaction that prevented his opportunity to confront."
Administrative discharge of civilian employees and career servicemen
without the safeguard of the right to confrontation has become an in-
creasing concern. Attack under the due process clause of the fifth
amendment has been futile because of the established doctrine that an
individual has no constitutional right to governmental employment29 or
military status." A constitutional right of confrontation in deportation
hearings has been found,31 but confrontation has not been accorded the
status of a right in ordinary administrative hearings. It is particularly un-
Easterly, 354 Mo. 282, 189 S.W.2d 284 (1945); Blocker v. State, 55 Tex. Crim.
30, 114 S.W. 814 (1908); Hines v. Commonwealth, 136 Va. 728, 117 S.E. 843
(1923). It should also be noted that those jurisdictions recognizing statements
against penal interest as a proper exception to the hearsay rule do so only to
exculpate the accused. In Peters the declarations were used to incriminate the
accused. But see State v. Alcorn, 7 Idaho 599, 64 P. 1014 (1901) ; State v. Voges,
197 Minn. 85, 90, 266 N.W. 265, 267 (1936) (dissenting opinion).
28 408 F.2d at 733 (dissenting opinion).
2 Id. at 725.
28 See Dougherty & Lynch, The Administrative Discharge: Military Justice?,
33 Gzo. WAsr. L. REv. 498 (1964); Susskind, Military Administrative Discharge
Boards: The Right to Confrontation and Cross-Examination, 44 Micr. ST. B.f.
25 (1965); Note, Confrontation and Cross-Examination in Hearings for the
Administrative Separation of Military Officers, 20 STAN. L. REv. 360 (1968); 12
Am. U.L. REv. 205 (1963).2 See, e.g., Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
"0See, e.g., Reaves v. Ainsworth, 219 U.S. 296, 304 (1911); Beard v. Stahr,
200 F. Supp. 766 (D.D.C. 1961). However, there is authority for the proposition
that lack of a substantive due-process right should not defeat the right to procedural
due process. See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction
in Constitutional Law, 81 HIv. L. REV. 1439, 1452 (1968).
"1 Maltez v. Nagle, 27 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1928); Ex parte Radivoeff, 278 F.
227 (D.C. Mont. 1922).
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fortunate that safeguards have not been extended to hearings on discharge
of governmental employees and servicemen, for many times these proceed-
ings are almost criminal in nature and result in unemployment and loss of
reputation. While the courts have departed from the traditional reluctance
to inquire into an agency's action in cases in which the outcome "stig-
matizes" the governmental employee 2 or serviceman,' these inquiries have
been restricted almost entirely to interpretation of the statutory procedural
rights provided."4 An exception is some dictum in the case of Greene v.
McElroy.5
In Greene an employee of a private manufacturer was discharged solely
as a result of revocation by the Department of Defense of his clearance
to handle classified information.8 Greene was provided a hearing, but
was denied the opportunity to confront witnesses whose statements were
adverse to his interests.. The Supreme Court reversed the revocation
of Greene's clearance on the basis that neither Congress nor the President
had authorized such a procedure. In significant dictum, Chief Justice
Warren, writing for the majority, stated that the Court has adamantly
protected the right of confrontation with one's accusers "not only in crim-
inal cases ... but also in cases where administrative and regulatory action
was under scrutiny."' s Such language indicates that the Court is cognizant
that due process is a necessity if the administrative action threatens serious
injury to the individual. 9
But in Williams v. Zuckert" the Court again avoided squarely facing
the constitutional issue of the right to confrontation. Williams was dis-
charged on the basis of three affidavits admitted at an administrative hear-
ing. At the hearing Williams requested for the first time the appearance
of the affiants for cross-examination. Williams had made no prior attempt
" See Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 555 (1956); Wieman
v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952); cf. Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 333
(1955).
"8Bland v. Connelly, 293 F.2d 852, 858-59 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Covington v.
Schwartz, 230 F. Supp. 249 (N.D. Cal. 1961).
"See, e.g., Williams v. Zuckert, 371 U.S. 531 (1963), noted in 12 AM. U.L.
REV. 205 (1963) ; Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959).
S360 U.S. 474 (1959).
00 Id. at 475.
87 Id. at 479.
s Id. at 497.
"See 1 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATIsE § 7.05, at 162 (Supp.
1965).
"0 371 U.S. 531 (1963). The question whether hearsay constitutes substantial
evidence was not raised.
1970]
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to arrange privately for their appearances, and the Supreme Court dis-
missed certiorari on the basis that the then applicable Commission's regu-
lation41 required that he nust make his own arrangements for the presence
of witnesses by at least assuming the initial burden of attempting to pro-
duce them. By not assuming this burden, Williams lost his right to
confrontation. justices Black and Douglas, dissenting, reached the consti-
tutional issue:
[Pletitioner has been branded with a stigma and discharged on the
strength of three affidavits. Though he asked that these affiants be
produced at his hearing, none was called to confront him. The Court
says that petitioner's request came too late to conform with the
applicable regulation. Due process dictates a different result. We have
heretofore analogized these administrative proceedings that cast the
citizen into the outer darkness to proceedings that "involve the im-
position of criminal sanctions"; and we have looked to "deeply rooted"
principles of criminal law for guidance in construing regulations of
this character .... The requirements of due process provided by the
Fifth Amendment should protect him . . .by giving him the same
right to confront his accusers as he would have in a criminal trial.42
In Hanifan v. United States43 the Court of Claims modified somewhat
this initial burden of production of witnesses by the accused in admin-
istrative hearings. The petitioner in Hanifan had made numerous re-
quests over a period of several months prior to the hearing for the
production as witnesses of employees of the Internal Revenue Service.
Hanifan, however, did not attempt to arrange privately for their attendance.
The court held that Hanifan was excused for his failure to attempt to
arrange privately for their appearance because the conclusion was in-
escapable that the witnesses would not have accepted his invitation if
tendered.4
It can be argued that Peters involved a situation in which the applica-
tion of the Hanifan principle would have been appropriate to overcome the
lack of greater initiative on Peters' behalf. Because the affiants may have
been granted immunity, their presence would have been undesirable to the
" 20 Fed. Reg. 2699 (1955), provided: "The Commission is not authorized to
subpoena witnesses. The employee and his designated representative, and the
employing agency must make their own arrangements for the appearance of wit-
nesses."
1371 U.S. at 533-34 (dissenting opinion) (footnotes omitted).




Government; it appears unlikely that an invitation from Peters to appear
at the hearing would have been accepted.
In Peters, the Court of Claims relied entirely upon Williams and
analogized the regulations45 involved in each case. The court concluded
that since Peters had not taken the initiative in securing the witnesses' at-
tendance, he was estopped from claiming a denial of the right to confronta-
tion. The analogy between the regulation involved in Peters and the one
involved in Williams is clear, but the Court of Claims failed to realize
that the cases are easily distinguishable. In the latter, the Supreme Court
placed great reliance upon the fact that Williams' first request for the
appearance of the witnesses came at the hearing;46 however, in Peters the
plaintiff had made a request prior to the hearing date-in conformity with
the regulation. It can also be argued that in Peters the right to confronta-
tion was particularly important, for dismissal for a crime such as accepting
bribes results in a stigma attaching to the discharged individual.
Peters is the result of a reviewing court's strained attempt to conform
the evidence to meet the standards of the substantial-evidence test. This
decision has produced, in effect, a new and less stringent test that treats
hearsay as any other substantive evidence and reduces confrontation to
an even lesser privilege than it has been accorded in the past. Probably
worried about shackling administrative agencies with the bonds of a jury-
trial system of evidence, the Court of Claims retreated into a position based
upon unsound reasoning.
One possible solution is to require direct evidence when the discharge
of government employees or servicemen is in issue before an administrative
agency. This solution would also eliminate most confrontation problems
inherent whenever hearsay evidence forms the basis of a decision. Perhaps
application of a direct-evidence rule to administrative agencies should de-
pend upon the nature of the hearing and the consequences of an adverse
decision against the individual so that hearsay evidence alone would not
be held sufficient to support a decision in a proceeding that is virtually
criminal in nature. Action by Congress is necessary to enact such pro-
cedural safeguards for the accused in administrative hearings; neverthe-
" 28 Fed. Reg. 10089 (1963), in effect when the hearing in Peters took place,
provided: "Both parties are entitled to produce witnesses but as the commission
is not authorized to subpoena witnesses the parties are required to make their
own arrangements for the appearance of witnesses." The current regulation is not
significantly different. See 5 C.F.R. § 772.305(c) (2) (1969). See note 41 supra
for the regulation involved in Williams.
"1 371 U.S. at 532.
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less, if Congress fails to act, it is not improbable that the Supreme Court
may intervene to provide the much-needed protection.
ODEs L. STROUPE, JR.
Civil Procedure-Constitutionality of Constructive Service of Process
on Missing Defendants
With the advent of far-reaching long-arm statutes1 allowing a basis
for in personam jurisdiction with only minimal contacts' in a state, courts
in the future will be faced increasingly with the problem of what manner
of service of process is to be allowed as a sufficient giving of notice to the
defendant. It is only logical that as the geographical-power concept of
jurisdiction diminishes and in personam jurisdiciton can be had over a
greater number of nonresidents,8 courts must give more attention and
primary concern to notice requirements.
The purpose of service of process is to give the defendant notice of
a suit pending against him so that he may come in and defend.4 But what
happens when the plaintiff has a basis for in personam jurisdiction and
the defendant cannot be found so that he can be served with process?
'See N.C. GEN. STAT. §1-75.4 (1969); Wis. STAT. ANN. §262.05 (Supp.
1969). For a thorough discussion of these statutes, see Revision Notes to Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 262.05 (Supp. 1969); Hinson, Jurisdiction Over Persons and Prop-
erty, in NORTH CAROLINA BAR ASSOCIATION FOUNDATION, INSTITUTE ON JURIS-
DICTION, JOINDER AND PLEADING UNDER NORTH CAROLINA'S NEW RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 1I-I (1968).
" There is extensive judicial development in the area of the minimal-contact
theory. E.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. International
Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310 (1945). See generally Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court JuTris-
diction, 1965 SuP. CT. REV. 241; von Mehren & Trautman, JTurisdiction to Adjudi-
cate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121 (1966); Developments in the
Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REv. 909 (1960).
In all the problematic situations dealt with in this note, it is assumed that the
applicable state long-arm statute has provided the plaintiff with a basis for in
personam jurisdiction. The only question for discussion is whether the plaintiff has
achieved satisfactory service upon the defendant.
'In early American law, jurisdiction and service of process were approached
as two aspects of the same thing. E.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
However, with the modern view of service as notice-giving, the two have become
separate questions. No longer is the manner of notice that is to be given clearly
defined by the type of jurisdiction acquired. No matter what type of jurisdiction is
acquired, plaintiff is required to give defendant the best notice possible. See
Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); Walker v. City of Hutchin-
son, 352 U.S. 112 (1956).
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The most common situation in which the problem of the missing de-
fendant will arise is an automobile injury case. Plaintiff, a resident
of state A, is injured in an automobile accident occurring in state A. At
the scene of the accident, defendant, resident of state A or any other
state, gives plaintiff his address. However, when plaintiff later files suit
and attempts to serve defendant personally,5 he cannot be found. An
attempt is made to serve defendant by registered mail, but the letter is
returned. May plaintiff, consistent with the constitutional standards of
procedural due process, then serve defendant by publication and/or mailing
to his last known address ?' If there is no reason to believe that publica-
tion in a local newspaper or mailing a letter to defendant's last known
address will in fact come to defendant's attention, is such service con-
sonant with the present test for procedural due process-"notice reason-
ably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties
of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present
their objections" ?
Although the United States Supreme Court has yet to directly pass on
the question, dictum in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.'
indicates that such service in some instances would be constitutional. For
"persons missing or unknown, employment of an indirect and even a prob-
ably futile means of notification is all that the situation permits and
creates no constituional bar to a final decree foreclosing their rights."
9
Recently, the New York Court of Appeals in Dobkin v. Chapman1
0
Most statutes dealing with service of process provide for a preferred order of
methods. Personal service is always the most desirable. Generally, the method
favored next is leaving the summons at defendant's residence with a person of
suitable age. Statutes then provide such alternatives as registered mail with
return receipt requested and ordinary mailing along with nailing a copy of the
summons to the door of defendant's residence. Certainly one, if not all, of these
methods should be attempted before resorting to constructive service. See, e.g.,
FED. R. CIv. P. 4(d); N.Y. Civ. PRc. LAW § 308 (McKinney 1963); N.C.R.
Civ. P. 4(j).
I The new North Carolina service statute provides for such constructive service:
A party subject to service of process under this subsection (9) may be
served by publication whenever the party's address, whereabouts, dwelling
house or usual place of abode is unknown and cannot with due diligence
be ascertained, or there has been a diligent but unsuccessful attempt to
serve the party under either paragraph a [personal service] or under para-
graph b [registered mail] ....
N.C.R. Civ. P. 4(j).
'Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
8339 U.S. 306 (1950).
Id. at 317.
o 21 N.Y.2d 490, 236 N.E.2d 451, 289 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1968).
1970]
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squarely faced the issue of the validity of an in personam judgment on
a missing defendant when notice was given by constructive service.
Consolidating three different lower court cases'" then on appeal, the court
held that constructive service on a defendant who could not be found
is not violative of due process.
In the first' of these three cases, the plaintiff, a resident of New
York, was injured in an accident in New York. At the scene of the
accident, the defendant produced a license with a Pennsylvania address.
The plaintiff's attorney attempted to contact the defendant by ordinary
mail, but his letters were neither answered nor returned. An unsuccessful
attempt was made at personal service, and a registered letter containing
the summons and complaint was returned marked "Moved, Left No Ad-
dress." The court granted an ex parte order 1 permitting service by ordi-
nary mail to the address given at the scene of the accident. A motion in the
cause was thereafter filed by the Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification
Corporation 4 to vacate the ex parte order as being violative of the due
process clause. This attack was rejected by the lower court's holding that
service by ordinary mail in this instance was reasonably calculated to give
notice to the defendant.
In the second case, Sellars v. Raye,'5 both the plaintiff and defendant
were residents of New York. Again, the plaintiff could not effect service
of process in a preferred manner at the address given by the defendant.
The court ordered service upon the Secretary of State in addition to the
sending of a copy of the summons and complaint by registered mail, with-
" Dobkin v. Chapman, 46 Misc. 2d 260, 259 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. 1965),
aff'd, 25 App. Div. 2d 745, 269 N.Y.S.2d 49 (Sup. Ct. 1966), aff'd, 21 N.Y.2d 490,
236 N.E.2d 451, 289 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1968); Sellars v. Raye, 45 Misc. 2d 859, 258
N.Y.S.2d 62 (Sup. Ct. 1965), aff'd, 25 App. Div. 2d 757, 269 N.Y.S.2d 7 (Sup. Ct.
1966), aff'd sub norm. Dobkin v. Chapman, 21 N.Y.2d 490, 236 N.E.2d 451, 289
N.Y.S.2d 161 (1968); Keller v. Rappoport, 28 App. Div. 2d 560, 282 N.Y.S.2d
664 (Sup. Ct. 1967), aff'd sub wm. Dobkin v. Chapman, 21 N.Y.2d 490, 236
N.E.2d 451, 289 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1968).
" Dobkin v. Chapman, 21 N.Y.2d 490, 236 N.E.2d 451, 289 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1968).
" The New York service-of-process statute allows plaintiff to come into court
and have the court direct the manner of service when it is impractical under the
preferred methods. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 308 (McKinney 1963).
"The Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation is a public liability
insurer. The corporation was set up by the New York Legislature to provide a
source of recovery for the plaintiff who is injured by an uninsured or unknown
motorist. The corporation's attorneys may enter an appearance in any suit in
which it might be held financially liable. N.Y. Ixs. LAW §§ 600-26 (McKinney
1963).
- 21 N.Y.2d 490, 236 N.E.2d 451, 289 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1968).
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out the filing of a return receipt, and the publication in the local newspaper
circulated in the vicinity of the defendant's last known residence.
In Keller v. Rappoport,1" the third case, the defendant was a resident
of New York at the time of the accident. Upon inquiry of the defendant's
insurer, the plaintiff was informed that the defendant had moved to
California. Attempted service by registered mail to California was re-
turned marked "Moved-left no address." The court issued an order
for service by mailing to defendant's last known New York address and
delivery of copies of the complaint to the insurance carrier.
The New York Court of Appeals, relying on the dictum in Mul-
lane, upheld service in all three cases and noted that "due process is
not . . . a mechanical formula or a rigid set of rules. Increasingly in
modern jurisprudence, the term has come to represent a realistic and
reasonable evaluation of the ... circumstances of the particular case."
17
Courts in the future faced with the problem of constructive service on
defendants whose actual whereabouts are unknown and unknowable by
any ordinary means must carefully evaluate and balance a series of factors
before determining whether constructive service meets the due process
standard. None of these factors are conclusive in themselves, but a reading
of the cases already decided by various state courts discloses the ones that
are usually of determinative importance in automobile-accident cases.
The remainder of this note will examine those factors.
I. PLAINTIFF'S INTEREST
The plaintiff's need for an opportunity to recover was recognized by
the United States Supreme Court when it observed that "the potentialities
of damage by a motorist, in a population as mobile as ours, are such
that those whom he injures must have opportunities of redress against
[the defendant] provided only that he is afforded an opportunity to defend
himself."' If the courts deny a chance for recovery in instances in which
the defendant cannot be personally served, many an injured plaintiff will
go without recompense, and the courts would, as a practical matter,
be rewarding the defendant who absented himself.
Recognizing that it is all too easy for a defendant to escape liability
by secreting himself, many states have enacted statutes providing for
service by publication when a resident defendant fraudulently conceals
'16Id.
Id. at 502, 236 N.E.2d at 457-58, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 170.
180lberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 346 U.S. 338, 341 (1953).
19701
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
himself to avoid service of process.' However, under most of these
statutes, the plaintiff must prove fraudulent concealment. In Harrison v.
Hanvey,2 ° the North Carolina Supreme Court succinctly stated the prob-
lem:
If a defendant . . . successfully keeps himself concealed . . . , a
plaintiff with a good cause of action may be greatly disadvantaged and
the defendant will profit from his fraud unless the plaintiff can serve
him with process by publication. Of necessity, often no better notice
can be given. No . . .resident of a state should be allowed, by . * ,
concealment, to escape his legal obligations and thwart the efforts of
the courts of his state to enforce the rights of others against him.
21
A California district court of appeals22 recently upheld service by publica-
tion on an absent defendant without requiring proof by the plaintiff that
the defendant was fraudulently concealing himself to avoid process.
Noting that, as far as the plaintiff was concerned, it did not matter why
the defendant disappeared, the court held that the availability of relief
should not depend upon the motive of the defendant.2 3 "The careless as
well as the scoundrel owe equal responsibility to answer for their obliga-
tions.' '2
It might be argued that the plaintiff's interest would be protected
adequately by the tolling of the statute of limitations so that the plaintiff
would be allowed to file his complaint when he discovers the whereabouts
of the defendant. This remedy is certainly not an attractive one for
the plaintiff. It is quite likely that by the time he finds the defendant,
if he ever does, his claim will be difficult to prove because the necessary
witnesses may be unavailable, and even the available witnesses will have
the inevitable lapse of memory from the passage of time. If the defendant
"'E.g., CAL. CIv. PRo. CODE §§ 412, 413, 417 (West 1954); ch. 553, [1957]
N.C. Sess. L. 501 (repealed 1967). See Skala v. Brockman, 109 Neb. 259, 190
N.W. 860 (1922).
20265 N.C. 243, 143 S.E.2d 593 (1965).
2 Id. at 251, 143 S.E.2d at 599.
22 Craddock v. Financial Indem. Co., 242 Cal. App. 2d 850, 52 Cal. Rptr. 90
(Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
2 It is true that a defendant who is secreting himself is in a morally inferior
position to one who cannot be found after due diligence. It does not follow
that only the former is vulnerable to a personal judgment after published sum-
mons. Due process requires no more than "fair notice." Whatever his
reason, Cervantes has disappeared .... It it [sic] obvious that no notice
other than that which was given could have been given.
Td. at -, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 96-97.
2 Note, Service by Publication on a Defendant Who Cannot Be Located in
California, 3 U. SAN FRANCISco L. REv. 320, 326 (1969).
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cannot be found, even with a judgment the plaintiff may not be able
to collect immediately. But, at least, by having the opportunity to
secure an immediate judgment, plaintiff may be able to get at defendant's
assets, including insurance; and he can avoid the problems of delay in
having his claims heard. Clearly, granting the plaintiff an immediate right
to a judgment is a compelling reason for upholding constructive service.
II. THE STATE'S INTEREST IN PROVIDING PLAINTIFF RELIEF
The second factor is closely related to the plaintiff's interest in re-
covery. Obviously the state wants to protect its citizens who are victims
of automobile accidents by providing them with an adequate remedy.
Not only does the state want to protect its citizens, but it also wants to
protect itself from having its citizens become a financial burden upon the
state. This dual interest was made apparent early in this century by the
passage of nonresident motor vehicle statutes.25 Such statutes allow the
resident plaintiff to secure in personam jurisdiction over the nonresident
defendant by the legal fiction of statutorily asserting that any nonresident
motorist using the state's highways is thereby consenting to in personam
jurisdiction over himself in an action arising out of any accident on those
highways. Most such statutes provide for service on an instate agent with
notice then being sent to the defendant by registered mail, return receipt
requested.2
The states' interest in providing automobile-accident victims with an
immediate and adequate remedy is also shown by laws requiring evidence
of an automobile owner's financial responsibility. Some states have even
set up agencies that provide a source of recovery for those injured by un-
insured or missing drivers.'
III. REASONABLENESS AND DILIGENCE OF EFFORTS TAKEN
BY THE PLAINTIFF To INFORM DEFENDANT OF THE SUIT
It is clear that, at the very least, the plaintiff must make a diligent at-
tempt to notify the defendant by the preferred methods of service before he
" For a comprehensive discussion of nonresident motor vehicle statutes, see Jox,
Non-Resident Motorists Service of Process Acts: Notice Requirements-A Plea
for Realism, 33 F.R.D. 151 (1963).
2 Some states have held that good service is effected even if the signed receipt
is not returned. See, e.g., Powell v. Knight, 74 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Va. 1947);
Williams v. Egan, 308 P.2d 273 (Okla. 1957); cf. Kelso v. Bush, 191 Ark. 1044,
89 S.W.2d 594 (1935) ; Sorenson v. Stowers, 251 Wis. 398, 29 N.W.2d 512 (1947).
See also 34 MicH. L. REv. 1227 (1936).
" See note 14 supra.
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undertakes publication and/or mailing to the last known address in order
for such constructive service to withstand constitutional attack. Service
of process statutes that permit constructive service generally require the
plaintiff to file an affidavit with the court showing that despite due
diligence the defendant cannot be found.28 It is, however, unclear just how
extensive an investigation to find the defendant will be required before
constructive service may be undertaken. In Mullane the Supreme Court
stated that "impracticable and extended searches are not required in the
name of due process.) 29 The Supreme Court probably will require greater
diligence to discover the whereabouts of the defendant in a tort suit than
was held essential on the facts of Mullane."
In Gribsby v. Wopschall,"1 the South Dakota Supreme Court, inter-
preting the phrase "due diligence," stated that it is incumbent upon
the plaintiff to ascertain if the defendant left any relatives, business asso-
ciates, or friends in the vicinity. If so, inquiry would have to be made of
them as to the defendant's whereabouts.82 Moreover, exercise of due
diligence ought to require that the plaintiff inquire as to defendant's
present address at the post office83 and from the Department of Motor
Vehicles.34 If the defendant's insurer is known, inquiry should be made
of it.3 5
The ultimate limit of due diligence that can be required of the plain-
tiff is that he hire a private investigator to make an extensive search for
the defendant. In two California cases38 such searches were undertaken
E.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 308 (McKinney 1963); N.C.R. Civ. P. 4(j).
' Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317-18 (1950).8 0The facts in Midlane are easily distinguished from the automobile-accident
case and would therefore seem to require a different approach. In Mudlane the
court was considering contingent and unknown beneficiaries of a common trust
fund. The court required notice by ordinary mail to those beneficiaries whose ad-
dresses were known. Significantly, in an action for the settlement of accounting of
a trust fund, the group of present beneficiaries will adequately represent the interests
of those beneficiaries who are absent.
25 S.D. 564, 127 N.W. 605 (1910). For a general discussion of due diligence
see Annot, 21 A.L.R.2d 929 (1952).
8 Grigsby v. Wopschall, 25 S.D. 564, 570, 127 N.W. 605, 607 (1910).
I31d.
Cf. Hayes v. Risk, 255 Cal. App. 2d 613, -, 64 Cal. Rptr. 36, 39 (Ct. App.
1967); Dobkin v. Chapman, 21 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 497, 236 N.E.2d 451, 453, 454,
289 N.Y.S.2d 161, 164, 166 (1968).
" Cf. Dobkin v. Chapman, 21 N.Y.2d 490, 497, 236 N.E.2d 451, 454, 289
N.Y.S.2d 161, 166 (1968).
" Hayes v. Risk, 255 Cal. App. 2d 613, 64 Cal. Rptr. 36 (Ct. App. 1967) ; Crad-
duck v. Financial Indem. Co., 242 Cal. App. 2d 850, 52 Cal. Rptr. 90 (Dist. Ct. App.
1966).
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before defendants were served by publication. However, since the
hiring of a private detective would be such an expensive outlay for
the plaintiff, it does not seem desirable to make private investigations
essential to the validity of constructive service. To uphold such a require-
ment would be to greatly burden the impecunious plaintiff, perhaps to the
point of foreclosing his remedy of suit altogether.3
7
IV. THE AVAILABILITY OF OTHER SAFEGUARDS FOR THE
DEFENDANT'S INTERESTS
Although some courts have held that a judgment based on con-
structive service can stand without provision for allowing the absent
defendant to come in and have the judgment set aside at a later time,
88
it seems that procedural due process would require such a safeguard. It
must be remembered that in tort actions judgments against defendants
may run into the tens of thousands and even hundreds of thousands of
dollars. No interests of the plaintiff or the state compel the result that
a judgment may stand without provision for a previously unaware
defendant with a meritorious defense to have the judgment set aside
and the case re-opened for a contested trial on the merits within a certain
time limit. Some states have statutes that specifically provide this safe-
guard for the absent defendant."9
Such relief for defendants is also available under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. A motion for relief from a judgment may be brought
by the defendant under rule 60(b) (1)40 on the ground that he never
received actual notice.4 ' Generally rule 60(b) is construed liberally and
the courts are prone to resolve the controversy in favor of a trial on the
merits. Therefore, if the defendant can meet the requirements of rule
" Since the test is reasonableness of the plaintiff's search, perhaps the dollar-
value of the case and the plaintiff's resources should be factors in measuring how
much effort is required. As the value of the case rises, the courts might lean
toward requiring the plaintiff to hire a private detective.
" Cradduck v. Financial Indem. Co., 242 Cal. App. 2d 850, 52 Cal. Rptr. 90
(Dist. Ct. App. 1966). But see Dobkin v. Chapman, 21 N.Y.2d 490, 236 N.E.2d
451, 289 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1968).
" N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 317 (McKinney 1963) allows defendant to come in
within one year after learning of the judgment but in no event more than five years
after entry of the judgment.
4' FED. R. Civ. P. 60(h) (1) states: "[T]he court may relieve a party . . .
from a final judgment . . . for . . . (1) mistake, inadvertance, surprise, or ex-
cusable neglect . . . ." Accord, N.C.R. Civ. P. 60(b) (1).
"See Ellington v. Milne, 14 F.R.D. 241 (E.D.N.C. 1953); Huntington Cab
Co. v. American Fidelity & Cas. Co., 4 F.R.D. 496 (S.D. W. Va. 1945).
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60(b) (1) and also can show a meritorious defense, the likelihood that the
requested relief will be granted is great. There is, however, one serious
drawback to using rule 60(b) (1)-a motion under it must be brought
within one year after the judgment was entered.
In order to avoid the one-year limitation, there has been at least one
attempt42 to use rule 60(b) (6),"' under which a motion may be filed
within a reasonable time. This approach probably would not be very
satisfactory since federal courts have regarded rules 60(b) (1) and
60(b) (6) as mutually exclusive.44 Rule 60(b) provides for a more
reliable approach to avoid the one-year limitation; when equitable prin-
ciples warrant relief, the rule allows the defendant to bring an independent
action, as distinct from a motion for relief from a judgment, even if the
time for relief under 60(b) (1) has run. 5
V. OTHER FACTORS WEIGHING IN PLAINTIFF'S FAVOR
There are several other aspects of an automobile-injury case that
would make it easier for courts to uphold constructive service on the
defendant who cannot be located. Unlike many other actions, "in an
automobile case, no defendant need be without notice unless he chooses
and wants to be."'46 It is perfectly clear that one involved in such an
accident should be aware of the likelihood of a suit arising from it. Since
a suit should come as no surprise, it is reasonable for the courts to place
the responsibility on him to make and keep his presence known.
" See Tozer v. Charles A. Krause Milling Co., 189 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1951).
"'FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) states: "[T]he court may relieve a party . . .
from a final judgment... for .. . (6) any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment." Accord, N.C.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). For a general
discussion of the rule, see Note, Federal Ride 60(b): Relief from Civil Judgments,
61 YALE L.J. 76 (1952).
"E.g., Davis v. Wadsworth, 27 F.R.D. 1 (E.D. Pa. 1961). But see Klapprott
v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 613-14 (1949) (Black, J.) (although rules 60(b) (1)
and 60(b) (6) are normally exclusive, a motion permissible under 60(b) (6) if
more than excusable neglect is shown).
"FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) states: "This rule does not limit the power of a court
to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment . .. .
Accord, N.C.R. Civ. P. 60(b). See, e.g., West Virginia Oil & Gas Co. v. George
E. Breece Lumber Co., 213 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1954). There is another advantage
to the use of the independent action. Granting a rule 60(b) motion is in the
discretion of the trial judge, and, therefore, no appeal may be taken unless there
is an abuse of discretion. However, the independent action is a separate equity
action from which an appeal may be taken as of right.
" Dobkin v. Chapman, 21 N.Y.2d 490, 504, 236 N.E.2d 451, 459, 289 N.Y.S.2d
161, 173 (1968).
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In almost all automobile-accident cases, the courts are dealing with
an insured interest. In those cases in which the defendant's insurer is
known to the plaintiff, notice should be given to the insurance company
so that it can come in and defend on behalf of the missing insured.1 If
the insurer is present,48 the absent defendant's interest should be adequately
protected. It is, of course, advantageous to the plaintiff to have the
insurer present because it will be liable up to the monetary limits of the
defendant's policy, and the plaintiff will have immediately available a
source of recovery for his injuries. 9
VI. CONCLUSION
Certainly the problem of the constitutionality of constructive service
on the missing defendant must be decided by the Supreme Court in the
near future. It is probable that, in balancing all of the factors involved,
the Court will hold that any time the defendant cannot be found after a
diligent effort on the part of the plaintiff, constructive service will be
sufficient to meet a due process challenge so long as there is a reasonable
time limit in which the defendant can set aside the judgment. In fact,
it is possible that if a private detective is hired and defendant's insurer
came in to defend, the Supreme Court might properly go so far as to
not require an opportunity for the judgment to be set aside. Under such
circumstances the Court might find that the defendant's interests were
,7Id. at 497, 236 N.E.2d at 454, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 166. A few states have direct-
action statutes that provide for direct suit against the insurer. E.g., LA. Rnv.
STAT. ANN. § 22:655 (1959). For an extremely interesting holding that the in-
surer's obligation to defend is an attachable debt allowing the complaint to be filed
wherever insurer is located, see Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312,
269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
"If the disappearance of the insured were found to be a violation of the
cooperation clause of the insurance policy, the insurer would have no duty to
defend. However, since the main purpose of the cooperation clause is to prevent
collusion between the injured and the insured, it seems apparent that in the situation
of the insured who has disappeared, the courts will not find non-cooperation. Public
policy would seem to indicate a decision in favor of the innocent plaintiff rather than
the innocent insurer; at least the insurer has received some payment for his duty
to defend. Cf. Lane v. Mutual Ins. Co., 258 N.C. 318, 128 S.E.2d 398 (1962);
Swain v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 253 N.C. 120, 116 S.E.2d 482 (1960).
"'In North Carolina the law is unclear as to the liability of the insurer when
the insured has disappeared. There is some authority to indicate that when the
insured is not present, the insurer will only be liable up to the statutory minimum
insurance requirements rather than the policy limits. See Swain v. Nationwide
Ins. Co., 253 N.C. 120, 127, 116 S.E.2d 482, 487-88 (1960). Cf. Muncie v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 253 N.C. 74, 116 S.E.2d 474 (1960). These two cases are based on an
interpretation of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-309 (1965) and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-
279.21(f) (1965).
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adequately protected in the initial proceeding. 0 If every possible means
of reaching the defendant have been exhausted, it would be unreasonable
for the court not to sustain the validity of constructive service. If it
were impossible to get a valid personal judgment under these circum-
stances, "it would seem that the plaintiff would be unduly burdened and
the defendant pemitted the advantage of a windfall gained through his
own undesirable conduct." 5'
JOAN G. BRANNON
Civil Procedure-Finality of Determinations under
Federal Rule 23(c) (1)
On January 11, 1966, two indictments alleging a criminal conspiracy
to monopolize the low pressure pipe industry were returned in the federal
District Court for New Jersey.- The defendants pled nolo contendere
and were sentenced on April 29, 1966.2 On April 28, 1967, the City of
New York, alleging the identical conspiracy, brought an antitrust action
against some of the defendants in the New Jersey criminal action." New
York City filed the complaint as representative for a Federal Rule
23(b) (3)4 class alleged to include "all state and municipal governments,
government agencies, authorities and subdivisions in the United States."'
This action was begun within one year following the end of a federal crim-
inal antitrust prosecution during which the running of the statute of
limitations is suspended.' The defendants moved to strike allegations of
r' For a similar conclusion reached by a state court, see Cradduck v. Financial
Indem. Co., 242 Cal. App. 2d 850, 52 Cal. Rptr. 90 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966). But,
of course, the insured is his own best witness, and therefore it can be forcefully
argued that his interests can never be adequately protected without his presence.
" Comment, Personal J1trisdiction Over Absent Natural Persons, 44 CAL. L.
REv. 737, 742 (1956).
'United States v. International Pipe & Ceramics Corp., Criminal No. 9-66
(D.N.J., Apr. 29, 1966); United States v. International Pipe & Ceramics Corp.,
Criminal No. 10-66 (D.N.J., Apr. 29, 1966).
'See City of New York v. International Pipe & Ceramics Corp., 410 F.2d 295,
296-97 (2d Cir. 1969).
'City of New York v. International Pipe & Ceramics Corp., 67 Civil No. 1698
(S.D.N.Y., filed Apr. 28, 1967).
'FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3).
'City of New York v. International Pipe & Ceramics Corp., 410 F.2d 295, 296
(2d Cir. 1969).
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15b, 16(b) (1964).
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class action by requesting the court to make a rule 23 (c) (1)' determina-
tion that the action could not be maintained in a representative capacity.
After a delay of several months to permit further discovery, the court
concluded that "treatment of this suit as a class action would not be
'superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication
of the controversy.' "8 From this order, interlocutory on its face, appeal
was taken to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.9
The appellate court dismissed the appeal in City of New York v.
International Pipe & Ceramics Corp.'0 It held that a determination
under rule 23 (c) (1) is not ordinarily a final judgment from which appeal
may be taken under section 1291 of title 28 of the United States Code."1
The court found that the parties would be able to urge their respective
positions on a later appeal and would be unhindered by the denial of class
action. Nor did this denial effectively determine any collateral rights of
parties to the action. 2
The decision reiterated the fundamental principle that only an order
that is final as to parties, subject matter, and claims for relief is appeal-
able."s This principle-the final-judgment rule-is meant to increase the
efficiency and over-all fairness of both the trial and appellate courts.' 4
The rule eliminates not only disruptive appeals from interlocutory orders
that may be intended by one party to harass the opponent and to delay the
proceedings, but also unnecessary appeals on both procedural and sub-
stantive rulings that may be adverse to the eventual winner. The review
only of complete judgments provides appellate courts with an overview
I "As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a
class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained.
An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or amended
before the decision on the merits." FED. R. Cry. P. 23(c) (1).
'City of New York v. International Pipe & Ceramics Corp., 410 F.2d 295, 297
(2d Cir. 1969).
'The district judge did not make the certification of a controlling question of
law, permitted by 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1964), that would have allowed immediate
appeal of the rule 23(c) (1) order. City of New York v. International Pipe &
Ceramics Corp., 410 F.2d 295, 298 (2d Cir. 1969).10410 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1969).
' "The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final de-
cisions of the district courts of the United States, ...." 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1964).
"410 F.2d at 295. The interlocutory nature of affirmative rule 23(c)(1)
orders has not been questioned.
12Arnold v. United States ex rel. W. B. Guimarin & Co., 263 U.S. 427 (1923).
14See American Express Warehousing, Ltd. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 380 F.2d
277, 280 (2d Cir. 1967); Frank, Requiem for the Final Judgment Rule, 45 TEXAS
L. REv. 292 (1966); Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41
MixN. L. REv. 751 (1957).
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of the entire proceedings rather than a limited look at a portion of them."6
However, because the requirement of finality is to be construed in a
reasonable and liberal manner rather than a technical one, orders, other-
wise interlocutory, have been treated as final when they have effectively
decided the outcome of a case.1
In Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,'7 the Supreme Court
created an exception to the final-judgment rule. A New Jersey statute
provided defendants in certain types of stockholders' derivative suits
the right to a security bond for defense expenses. A federal court, exer-
cising diversity jurisdiction, denied a request for such a bond. The
defendants' appeal from this order was allowed. The Court held that this
order was one of a
... small class which finally determines claims of right, separable
from and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to
be denied review, and too independent of the cause itself to require that
appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudi-
cated.1
8
This small class of appealable collateral orders was significantly en-
larged by Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp.,'9 in which the Court
held that the compelling considerations in deciding whether to accept an
appeal from an interlocutory order were "the inconvenience and costs of
review on the one hand and the danger of denying justice on the other."20
The Court based its decision upon the the merits of the case, rather
than a detached consideration of the finality of the order or the complete-
ness of the proceedings. A desire to do justice as the Court saw fit pre-
vailed over any question of jurisdictional niceties.
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline2' first took up the finality and consequent
appealability of determinations under rule 23(c) (1). Eisen brought a
private antitrust action alleging a conspiracy to monopolize odd-lot trading
on the New York Stock Exchange. Eisen's personal damages amounted
to seventy dollars, but he filed his action as representative for a rule
5 Frank, Requiem for the Final Judgment Ride, 45 TEXAS L. REv. 292 (1966).
'" E.g., Kelly v. Greer, 354 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1965) ; United States v. Cefaratti,
202 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
"337 U.S. 541 (1949).
'B Id. at 546.
10379 U.S. 148 (1964).
201d. at 152.
"' 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir.), denying motion to dismiss appeal from 41 F.R.D.
147 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967).
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23(b) (3) class numbering several million people. Upon defendants'
motion, the allegation of class action was dismissed although the indi-
vidual claim (for seventy dollars) was allowed to stand.2 From this
order Eisen appealed. The court held that the dismissal of the allegation
of class action ended the lawsuit "for all practical purposes"-' and thus
was a final order, appealable as such. It found that "no lawyer of com-
petence is going to undertake this complex and costly case to recover $70
for Mr. Eisen."24 Disallowance of the suit as a class action would prevent
not only the adjudication of Eisen's substantive claims, but also any
review of the 23(c) (1) determination that decided the outcome of the
suit.25 The ruling of the trial court in Eisen was not a final determination
of a collateral issue, but was, in effect, a termination of the whole case. It
appears that the appeal was allowed because of the traditional construction
of the final-judgment rule in a "practical," "liberal," and "reasonable"
manner, not because the trial court's decision fell into the category of orders
excepted from the general rule by Cohen and Gillespie.
In City of New York v. International Pipe and Ceramics Corp.,26 the
court distinguished the fact situation from that in Eisen because the denial
of class-action status would not end the litigation. New York City had
alleged enough damages to warrant complete prosecution of the case
individually.27 It also had sufficient financial resources so that the loss of
class-action status would not influence the decision whether to continue
the suit.-2  Review of the rule 23(c) (1) determination would not be
prevented by failure to consider it immediately, but could be raised, if the
City should so desire, upon a later appeal. The only resulting harm to
New York City would be a loss of the bargaining power belonging to a
representative in a class action; however, a class action is not to be a
device by which bargaining power is increased. 9 The facts of Eisen are
not comparable; the city as plaintiff would continue the fight.
The holding in Eisen apparently will apply only if some purported
"2Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline, 41 F.R.D. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
' 2 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline, 370 F.2d 119, 120 (2d Cir. 1966).
2& Id.
2Id.
20410 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1969).
27 New York City alleged damages in excess of 520,000 dollars. Memorandum in
Support of Motion to Dismiss Appeals for Martin Marietta Corporation, at 2,
City of New York v. International Pipe & Ceramics Corp., 410 F.2d 295 (2d Cir.
1969).
28 410 F.2d at 301.21 Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 42 F.R.D. 324, 328
(E.D. Pa. 1967).
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party is found who cannot assert his rights because of the denial of class
action. One day before the end of the one-year suspension of the statute
of limitations, New York City filed its suit as a class action. The bringing
of a sustainable class action tolls the statute for all members of the alleged
class. 30 Thirty-seven members of that class intervened in the suit after
the year was up.31 While such passage of time certainly puts a burden upon
the intervenors to rebut the effect of the statute of limitations, it can
hardly be said that the court's denial of class-action status to the suit
amounted to a final judgment as to their rights.
Conceivably some of the intervenors may have relied to their detriment
upon the class action by the city to toll the statute of limitations. There
was only one day between the filing of the class action and the end of
the year of grace in which other parties might have filed actions of their
own. Nevertheless, any equitable considerations-such as detrimental
reliance--on behalf of an intervening or non-intervening member of the
alleged class should be used as a defense against the statute of limitations
rather than as grounds to lower the requirements for a class action.
Other than by way of detrimental reliance, it would seem that no
intervenor could claim that his rights in the action were in any way
decided by the dismissal of the class allegations. This class was not the
type for which an aggregation of claims wvas necessary because each
member was as financially capable as New York City to continue the
suit and each of them had alleged substantial damages.2 3 If the statute
of limitations is held to bar their actions, they may take up the negative
rule 23(c) (1) determination on an appeal of the limitations holding.
Review will not be prevented, as it was in Eisen, by a dismissal of the
immediate appeal. The rule 23 (c) (1) determination cannot be considered
" Escott v. Bachris Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied
sub nor., Drexel & Co. v. Hall, 382 U.S. 816 (1966).
3" 410 F.2d at 297.
""[I]t may well be that ... an opportunity should be presented for proof of
reliance upon the pendency of the purported class action sufficient to toll the statute
of limitations. Any other approach would make it virtually mandatory for every
class member to file a cautionary separate action within the limitations period."
Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 460 (E.D. Pa.
1968).
" The intervenor-plaintiffs included the states of Alaska, Ohio, and Wisconsin;
the cities of Detroit, Philadelphia, and Cleveland; and the Port of New York
Authority. Memorandum in Opposition to Motion of Defendant Kerr Concrete
Pipe Company for an Order Determining that this Action is Not to be Maintained
as a Class Action by the City of New York, at 6-7, City of New York v. Inter-
national Pipe & Ceramics Corp., 410 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1969).
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to be a final judgment, in either a practical or a technical sense, for any
of the named parties in the case.
In order to find the rule 23(c) (1) order a final judgment, there
must be discovered among the non-intervening, unnamed class members
at least one that had some right cut off. The Second Circuit had held
earlier that unnamed class members do not have a practical or legally
cognizable existence. In dismissing an appeal from a denial of a "spuri-
ous" class-action status, the court pointed out:
The defendants quite certainly aided the process of hypostasis of
these nameless and as yet disembodied spirits by christening them
"related defendants" . . . and treating them thereafter as persons, who,
as urged on this appeal, may forever forfeit their rights to review
unless now [the right is] claimed. 4
Judge Hays, in his dissent in International Pipe, suggested that the
rule 23(c) (1) determination was a final judgment for some of the un-
named class members, whose existence he seemed to accept. 5 He pointed
out that if New York City is individually successful on the merits, it will
have no reason to appeal the dismissal of class-action status. If the
intervenors prevail over a statute-of-limitations defense, they also will
have no cause to appeal the adverse decision under rule 23(c) (1). If
these two contingencies are realized, the unnamed class members will
lose any review of the denial of class-action status. Furthermore, if they
commence separate actions, they will have to prevail over the statute of
limitations. According to Judge Hays, the possibility will still remain
that some of the unnamed plaintiffs will have neither the financial resources
nor the damages at stake to justify individual litigation; class-action
status alone will permit them to litigate their rights. 6 Such unnamed
plaintiffs are the only parties whose rights may have been decided by the
rule 23(c) (1) order. Whether the representative plaintiffs ought to be
able to appeal this determination upon their behalf is the crucial issue.
New York City filed its complaint as representative for a Federal Rule
23(b) (3) class." An action under this provision is the successor of the
"All American Airways v. Eldred, 209 F.2d 247, 249 (2d Cir. 1954) (Clark,
C. J.).
" 410 F.2d at 300, 301 (Hays, J., dissenting).
"Id. at 301.
' Class Actions Maiwtainable. An action may be maintained as a class action
if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the
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so-called "spurious" class action, authorized under the old rule 23.8 The
essence of both the new and the old rules is that although the claims are
separate and distinct, there are issues of fact or law common to all
members of the alleged class.
Under the Federal Rules, there are procedures other than rule 23
(b) (3) class actions by which claims having common issues of fact or
law may be consolidated. An example is permissive intervention under
Federal Rule 24(b)," which permits a party having such claims to
prosecute them in the same proceedings with an action filed earlier by
a different litigant. Denial of permissive intervention often has been held
unappealable.40 Another procedure, permissive joinder under Federal
Rule 20, is most similar to those actions in which the class is the
defendant.4" However, the finality and consequent appealability of the
denial of consolidation under its aegis has apparently not been con-
sidered by any court.
The class action under rule 23(b) (3) was established for the con-
venience of the court and the benefit of the public.4" The courts have
permitted the use of the rule 23(b) (3) action and its predecessor in
order to dispose of any issue of fact or law for which an adequate repre-
sentative has come forward. The courts have pointed out that consolida-
tion of such claims relieves overcrowded calendars and helps to achieve
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only indi-
vidual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods
for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters
pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of the members of the
class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate
actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the con-
troversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in
the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the
management of a class action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (emphasis added).
" [a class action may be maintained] . . . when the character of the right
sought to be enforced for or against the class is
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the
several rights and a common relief is sought.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (3), 39 F.R.D. 69, 95 (1966) (emphasis added).
" FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(2).
" Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 331 U.S. 519 (1947);
Kennedy, Let's All Join In: Intervention Under Federal Ride 24, 57 KY. L.J. 329,
368 nn.129 & 130 (1968).
"'FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a).
" Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 202 (1950).
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a fair adjudication of all claims.4 There is no right to maintain an action
as a representative of a rule 23(b) (3) type of class.44 Each claim to
be consolidated under authority of rule 23 (b) (3) is separate and distinct
and otherwise could be prosecuted to a complete and effective judgment.45
No party's rights are necessarily affected by exclusion from a 23 (b) (3)
class or by a refusal to recognize such a class. No party should be able
to claim a right to a procedure established for the convenience and
efficiency of the courts, especially when the procedure is found both in-
convenient and inefficient by the trial court itself, for whose particular
benefit it was created.
Another and more compelling purpose for the rule 23(b) (3) action
and its predecessor, the "spurious" class action, is that by permitting the
aggregation of many claims otherwise too small to justify individual
litigation, claimants are enabled collectively to enforce their rights.46
This procedure is especially useful in private enforcement of antitrust
legislation, a field in which the parties often have damages far too small
for litigation individually. Private enforcement of these semi-public
rights, induced by the provisions for treble damages and for adequate
attorney's fees, was contemplated as the chief means of carrying out the
policies of such legislation.47 Such considerations suggest that in anti-
trust cases, the public interest may best be served by permitting plaintiffs
to bring rule 23(b) (3) class actions as a matter of right.
This approach would, indeed, serve to facilitate private prosecutions.
However, there is a significant difference between consolidating cases
such as International Pipe and those such as Eisen. As noted previously,
in a case such as Eisen denial of class-action status will serve to terminate
the entire litigation because of the insignificance of the individual plain-
tiffs' damages. The same factors that cause the class action to be
necessary to induce private antitrust suits also require that denial of
this status be immediately appealable. The opposite is true with cases
48 Cf. Kainz v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 194 F.2d 737, 740-41 (7th Cir. 1952).
"There may be a right to maintain a representative suit with regard to a rule
23(b) (1) type of class, and possibly with regard to a rule 23(b) (2) type of
class. In these types of classes no effective judgment can be given unless parties too
numerous to join are bound. This is not the case with the rule 23(b) (3) category.
" Cf. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
"Welsh, Class Actions Under New Rile 23 and Federal Statutes of Limita-
tion: A Study of Conflicting Rationale, 13 Vii.. L. REv. 370, 385 (1968).
" Kalven & Rosenfeld, The Contemporary Function of a Class Suit, 8 U. CHI.
L. REv. 684, 717 (1941).
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like International Pipe. Any governmental agency or subdivision is likely
to be financially able to sustain protracted litigation. Since low pressure
and sewage pipes are used for large projects, any agency using them will
sustain substantial damages for excessive prices, easily enough damages
to warrant an individual suit.
The class action was not meant to be a device by which the statute
of limitations may be extended and the defendant confronted with a horde
of stale claims. "The theory [of the statute of limitations] is that even
if one has a just cause, it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice
to defend within the period of limitations and the right to be free from
stale claims comes in time to prevail over the right to prosecute them. ' 48
Any class action, however, fails to give the defendant notice that a par-
ticular claim will be prosecuted. Rather, a general warning of the type
of claim to be advanced by both named and unnamed parties is given.
The complex and protracted nature of antitrust litigation intensifies this
objection.49 Nevertheless, the statute is tolled for all members of the
class at the time of the filing of the class suit. 0 The tolling of the statute
in this manner thwarts in large part its purpose by allowing the resur-
rection of claims impossible in many circumstances to refute. To lower
the requirements for class actions in order to facilitate their use in tolling
the statute of limitations would further undermine the rationale of the
statute. The inability to toll the statute's running certainly hinders un-
named plaintiffs, and perhaps bars their claims, but these results should
not create a right to toll the statute by use of Federal Rule 23.
The trial court's determination under rule 2 3(c) (1), with regard to
an alleged rule 23(b) (3) class, is both discretionary and tentative.51
Significant discretion is given to the trial judge in making the decision.
The criteria for deciding whether a class action is superior to individual
actions are based in part upon subjective determinations by the judge of
questions of the difficulty of management of a class action and the de-
sirability of the concentration of litigation on the claims. The issues of
"8 Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348-
49 (1944) (emphasis added).
' Welsh, Class Actions Under New Ride 23 and Federal Statutes of Limita-
tions: A Study of Conflicting Rationale, 13 VILL. L. REV. 370, 387 (1968).
" Escort v. Bachris Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731, 733 (2d Cir. 1965). Judge
Friendly dissented vigorously from this part of the decision. Id. at 735.




fact and law will often be ready for trial on the merits before any con-
clusion as to the superiority of the class action can be made.52 Yet,
because of notice requirements and the inherent difference between liti-
gating as an individual plaintiff and as a class representative, some tenta-
tive decision must be reached early in the proceedings.53 Rule 23(c) (1)
provides that the determination may be altered or amended and may be
subject to such conditions as the intervention of additional representative
plaintiffs.
The judge's decision is by both its tentativeness and discretionary
nature excluded from immediate appeal. Except for abuse, discretionary
orders may not be appealed at any time.5 In International Pipe, the
issue of abuse of discretion was not raised. Orders subject to reconsidera-
tion and correction at the trial level also cannot be appealed. 5 The tenta-
tive nature of such orders is lost by appellate review unless the higher
court order is amendable by the trial court. A rule 23(c) (1) order is
correctable at the trial level up until trial on the merits. Only at that
point, even if there has been an abuse of discretion, does the trial
court lose its power to correct the order. By that time, however, allowing
an appeal no longer serves the purpose outlined in Gillespie v. United
States Steel Corp.56 No cost is saved, and no denial of justice threatened.
57
The same decision that will make binding the rule 23 (c) (1) determina-
tion will make the whole case immediately appealable as a final judgment
on the merits.
The order at issue in International Pipe was made upon the trial
judge's discretion with regard to the convenience and efficiency of his
own court. To subject a procedural order, especially one of so dis-
cretionary a nature as the rule 23 (c) (1) determination, to appellate super-
vision, as suggested by Judge Hays, is not in the public interest.58 Per-
mitting the appeal of such orders would subvert the authority and impair
the public respect for the trial courts, centralize legal power in the ap-
"Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Ride 23, 43 F.R.D.
39, 41-42 (1967).
Id. at 40-41.
"Cf., e.g., Stadin v. Union Elec. Co., 309 F.2d 912 (8th Cir. 1962).
"Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 547 (1949); Frank,
Requiem for the Final Judginent Rile, 45 TEXAs L. REv. 292, 296 (1966).
"379 U.S. 148 (1964).
"See p. 628 supra.
"Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of the Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REv.
751, 781-82 (1957).
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pellate bench, and multiply requests for ordinary and extraordinary
review beyond the capacity of appellate judges to consider them properly.59
HUGH J. BEARD, JR.
Civil Procedure-Specificity in Pleading under North Carolina
Rule 8(a) (1)
A problem now1 facing the North Carolina practitioner desiring
to bring an action is drafting a complaint 2 that will satisfy the require-
ments of rule 8(a) (1) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure
(NCRCP). The drafter is no longer required to set out "[a] plain and
concise statement of the facts constituting a cause of action . . . ."4 but
rather is supposed to draft "[a] short and plain statement of the claim
sufficiently particular to give the court and parties notice of the trans-
actions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, intended to
be proved showing that the pleader is entitled to relief .... -i
Since the new North Carolina rules are based almost entirely on
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure0 (FRCP), from which have de-
veloped a sizable body of case law, the North Carolina pleader could
rapidly determine the standard that he is required to meet in his complaint
were it not for the phrase "sufficiently particular to give the court and
the parties notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions
" Id. at 779. The Second Circuit reiterated its limitation of the applicability of
Eisen in Carceres v. International Air Transport Ass'n, Civil Nos. 33433-39 (2d
Cir., Jan. 13, 1970), in which a similar appeal from a negative rul 23(c) (1)
determination was dismissed. Upon the authority of International Pipe, Judge Hays
reluctantly concurred.
'The North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted by the General
Assembly during the 1967 session and were to become effective July 1, 1969. Ch.
954, § 10, [1967] N.C. Sess. L. 1354. The 1969 session of the General Assembly
postponed the effective date until January 1, 1970. Ch. 895, § 21, [1969] N.C. Sess.
L. -.
Throughout this note, in the interest of simplicity, the pleading alleging a
claim will be called a complaint; the pleading party, plaintiff; and the party attack-
ing the complaint, defendant.
'N.C.R. Civ. P. 1-84, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-I (1969). The North Carolina rules
are basically the same as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; most of the differ-
ences between the two sets of rules are discussed herein.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. 1-122 (1953) (repealed Jan. 1, 1970). This statute was
originally enacted August 18, 1868, as § 93 of the 1868 Code of Civil Procedure.
5 N.C.R. Civ. P. 8(a) (1).
FED. R. Civ. P. 1-86, 28 U.S.C., app., Rules of Civil Procedure for the United
States District Courts (1964).
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or occurrences intended to be proved .... ,,7 This language makes federal
precedent construing the specificity requirement of FRCP 8(a) (2)8
inconclusive at best.
In attempting to determine the degree of specificity required by
NCRCP 8(a) (1), the first step must be an analysis of the words used.
It could be argued that the added language is merely surplusage since
the federal rule also purports to give the court and parties notice of the
transaction or occurrence that the plaintiff intends to prove.9 This argu-
ment ignores the simple fact that the drafters did in fact add the language
to the North Carolina rule and must have had some reason in so doing:
their only possible purpose would seem to be requiring a more specific
complaint than is acceptable under the federal rule.1" However, use of
the word "notice" leads to the conclusion that the plaintiff need not be
as specific as was required when "facts" had to be included in the com-
plaint." The "notice" concept, at least under the federal rule, simply
requires describing the event claimed as a wrong with enough particularity
"to enable the adverse party to answer and prepare for trial, to allow for
the application of the doctrine of res judicata, and to show the type of
case brought, so that it may be assigned to the proper form of trial.""
While the aim of the drafters of the North Carolina rules no doubt in-
cluded these same ends, they presumably must be accomplished in a
more specific manner than simply providing "a generalized summary
of the case."' 3 In sum, the complaint required by the new North Carolina
rule need not be as specific as that under the former practice, but must
be to some degree more specific than the federal complaint. The added
degree of specificity is not readily determinable from the language of the
rule itself.
Since the language of NCRCP 8(a) (1) is essentially the same as that
of the New York statute controlling specificity in pleading, Civil Practice
7 N.C.R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1).
The federal rule requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim show-
ing that the pleader is entitled to relief . .. ."
'Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957) ; 2A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
8.02 (2d ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as MooRE].
"
0This conclusion is buttressed by noting that the negligence forms provided
by the NCR are more specific than the corresponding federal forms. See pp. 642-43
& notes 42 & 44 infra.
" Phillips, Pleading-Part I in NORTHi CAROLINA BAR ASSoCIATIoN, INSTITUTE
ON JURISDICTION, JOINDER, AND PLEADING UNDER NORTH CAROLINA'S NEW RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE V-1, V-15 (1968).
' 2A MooRE 8.13.
18Id. 8.03.
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Law and Rules § 301314 (CPLR), inquiry into the judicial gloss placed
on the latter, at least before 1967, will be fruitful.1 However, there
are three differences between the North Carolina and New York rules
that must be noted.
First, CPLR 3013 requires the plaintiff to include "the material ele-
ments of each cause of action . . . "'0 in his complaint. Because neither
the terms17 nor the judicial interpretation18 of FRCP 8(a) (2) requires
that the "material elements" of the plaintiff's claim be pleaded, it can be
argued that the North Carolina drafters, by leaving this phrase out of
NCRCP 8(a) (1), intended to lean toward the federal result rather than
" N.Y. Cxv. PmRc. LAw § 3013 (McKinney 1963) states:
Statements in a pleading shall be sufficiently particular to give the court
and parties notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions
or occurrences intended to be proved and the material elements of each cause
of action or defense.
" Although there is no legislative history so indicating, the language of NCRCP
8(a) (1) is probably taken from CPLR 3013. The words "notice of the trans-
actions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences . . . ." appear in
NCRCP 8(a) (1) and NCRCP 15(c) and in both cases this language represents
a change from the corresponding federal rule. The comment following NCRCP 15
states that the new language in that rule is taken from CPLR 3025, the New York
analogue to NCRCP 15 (c). It seems very unlikely that the North Carolina drafters
intended to use the language of a New York rule in NCRCP 15(c) while adopting
language in NCRCP 8(a) (1) identical to that in CPLR 3013 without having
meant to follow it as well. Thus it can be presumed that NCRCP 8(a) (1) is taken
directly from CPLR 3013. Construction of CPLR 3013 by New York courts then
becomes all important since the North Carolina Supreme Court has held that it
would be bound by such interpretation. In Ledford v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
179 N.C. 63, 101 S.E. 533 (1919), in which construction of a North Carolina
procedural statute adopted from New York was in question, the court said that
"'[w]here the legislature enacts a provision taken from a statute of another State
• . . in which the language of the act has received a settled construction, it is
presumed to have intended such provision should be understood and applied in
accordance with that construction.'" Id. at 66, 101 S.E. at 534. See also M'Kinnon
v. M'Lean, 19 N.C. 79, 84 (1836). This rule of statutory interpretation doubtless
would include construction by courts in New York as of the time the North Caro-
lina rules were adopted (1967) and probably should apply to decisions from New
York prior to January 1, 1970.
" N.Y. Cxv. PRAc. LAW § 3013 (McKinney 1963).
"T See note 8 supra.
"8 A claim under the federal rule will surely be dismissed (with leave to amend)
if a major material element is totally omitted. F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.11
(1965). However, for purposes of a motion to dismiss, the federal courts will infer
or assume some elements of a claim. Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir.
1944); Garcia v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 5 (D.P.R. 1951). See also
Siegel, Introducing: A Biannual Survey of New York Practice, 38 ST. JoHN's L.
REv. 190, 207 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Siegel], in which the writer argues




risk a possible strict interpretation that could be obtained from the
language of CPLR 3013. Even if this was not the intent of the drafters,
there is no reasonable argument that the lack of a "material elements"
requirement demands more specificity under NCRCP 8(a) (1) than
under CPLR 3013.
CPLR 3013 retains the older "cause of action" language rather than
adopting the federal term "claim for relief" as was done in the North
Carolina rules. This variation in terms probably makes no difference in
comparing the two rules since both the comments to the North Carolina
rules19 and commentators on those of New York recognize that "the
difference between 'cause of action' and 'claim for relief' is more semantic
than real."' 20 If any difference in result could accrue from the difference
in terminology, it would again seem that CPLR 3013, by retaining the
"cause of action" language, would require more specificity than the
more modern terminology "claim for relief" in NCRCP 8(a) (1).
Finally, CPLR 3026 provides that "[p]leadings shall be liberally
construed. Defects shall be ignored if a substantial right of a party is
not prejudiced."2 Since this rule has been literally applied in New York
to demand that defendant must show prejudice2 2 to a substantial right
before he can successfully attack a complaint,' the New York judge has
a more clearly-defined mandate upon which he can rely in denying a motion
to dismiss than does his North Carolina counterpart. The closest thing
to CPLR 3026 in the North Carolina rules is rule 8(f), which states that
"[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice."'
Essentially the same result as that reached by the New York courts under
CPLR 3026 should be reached by the North Carolina courts under
NCRCP 8(f). The language of FRCP 8(f)," which is identical to
NCRCP 8(f), was considered in DeLoach v. Crowley's, Inc.,26 and the
10 N.C.R. Civ. P. 8, comment (a)(2).
"Weinstein, Trends in Civil Practice, 62 CoLum. L. REv. 1431, 1439 (1960);
Siegel 206."N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 3026 (McKinney 1963).
The New York courts find the defendant to be prejudiced when the complaint
fails to give him sufficient notice of the historical facts or the theory relied upon
to enable him to intelligently answer and proceed with discovery. E.g., Meltzer v.
Klien, 29 App. Div. 2d 548, -, 285 N.Y.S.2d 920, 922 (1967) ; Household Coal &
Oil Distrib., Inc. v. Sage, 57 Misc. 2d 428, -, 292 N.Y.S.2d 800, 802 (Civ. Ct.
N.Y. City 1968).
" Foley v. D'Agostino, 12 App. Div. 2d 60, -, 248 N.Y.S.2d 121, 127 (1964).
"N.C.R. Civ. P. 8(f).
"FED. R. Civ. P. 8(f).
" 128 F.2d 3,78 (5th Cir. 1942). This case is cited in the comment to N.C.R.
Civ. P. 12 as an example of the application of that rule in the federal courts.
1970]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
court said, "[j]ust what this means is not clear, but it excludes requiring
technical exactness, or the making of refined inferences against the pleader,
and requires an effort to fairly understand what he attempts to set forth."'2 7
Although some commentators feared that New York courts could not
reach even an approximation of the federal result under CPLR 3013 be-
cause of the inclusion of the phrase "sufficiently particular,"2 8 these mis-
givings soon proved groundless. The trend toward liberal interpretation of
pleadings under CPLR 3013 began with Hewitt v. Maass2 0 in which the
court said:
The requirement now is "Statements ... sufficiently particular to give
the court and the parties notice. . . ." (CPLR § 3013). This change
is reflective of the decisional trend previously and points to not only
less formalized pleadings but also to the elimination of obscure dis-
tinctions inherent in words such as "conclusions," "ultimate (and
other kinds of) facts," and similar others. These classifications and
their status and effect as or in pleadings have been eliminated. Now,
if notice, or literally comprehension, can be had from a pleading the
method of attaining the communicable pattern becomes secondary. 0
The Appellate Division rapidly followed with the decision in Foley
v. D'Agostino,3 1 which has become the standard for measuring sufficiency
of pleadings in New York."' The complaint in Foley, which had been
dismissed by the trial court, consisted of three causes of action alleging
breach of fiduciary obligations and unfair competition by half of the
stockholders and the officers of a family corporation. Reversing the dis-
missal below, the Appellate Division stated its position in the following
manner: .t I
Upon a Rule 3211 (a) (7)3 motion to dismiss a cause of action .
we look to the substance rather than to the form. Such a motion is
27 128 F.2d at 380.
21 Clark, Two Decades of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 COLum. L. REv. 435, 450
(1958); Siegel 198-202." 41 Misc. 2d 894, 246 N.Y.S.2d 670 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
30 Id. at -, 246 N.Y.S.2d at 672.
"1 12 App. Div. 2d 60, 248 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1964).
2 The New York courts apparently view Foley and CPLR 3013 as synonomous
in considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. See, e.g.,
Buljanovic v. Grace Lines, Inc., 31 App. Div. 2d 614, 295 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1968);
Richardson v. Coy, 28 App. Div. 2d 640, 280 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1967); Pope v.
Zeckendorf Hotels Corp., 22 App. Div. 2d 647, 252 N.Y.S.2d 975 (1964); In-
fusino v. Pelnik, 45 Misc. 2d 333, 256 N.Y.S.2d 815 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
" N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 3211 (a) (7) (McKinney 1963) is the New York ana-
logue of N.C.R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6) (footnote added).
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solely directed to the inquiry of whether or not the pleading, considered
as a whole, "fails to state a cause of action." Looseness, verbosity and
excursiveness, must be overlooked on such a motion, if any cause of
action can be spelled out from the four corners of the pleading. 4
The proper promotion of the general CPLR objective requires
more than mere token observance of or lip service to its mandate for
liberal construction of the pleadings. To achieve such objective, we
must literally apply the mandate as directed and thus make the test
of prejudice one of primary importance. Thereby, we would in-
variably disregard pleading irregularities, defects, or omissions which
are not such as to reasonably mislead one as to the identity of the
transactions or occurrences sought to be litigated or as to the nature
and elements of the alleged cause of action or defense.8 5
The court then considered the complaint in question and found that even
though the first cause of action did not show with specificity the manner
and extent of the competition, or to what extent the family corporation
had been or would be damaged, the complaint nonetheless gave "notice
of the plaintiffs' claims ... and of the elements of plaintiffs' alleged cause
of action; and furthermore, the defendants [were not] prejudiced in any
manner by the alleged deficiencies therein." 6
Having established a liberal pleading rule, the New York courts then
continued the trend by completely abandoning the "theory of the plead-
ings" standard in Lane v. Mercury Record Corp.,7 an action for an
accounting of royalties. On a motion to dismiss, the trial court found
that the equitable cause of action was sufficiently stated, and the defendant
appealed. The Appellate Division held that no equitable cause of action
was stated, but affirmed the trial court's refusal to dismiss on the ground
that a legal cause of action for breach of contract appeared in the com-
" 12 App. Div. 2d at -, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 126.
35 Id. at - 248 N.Y.S.2d at 127.TM Id. at -, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 129. Complaints will, however, be dismissed if
they fail to meet the standard of Foley. E.g., Cushman & Wakefield, Inc. v. John
David, Inc., 23 App. Div. 2d 827, 259 N.Y.S.2d 158 (1965) (allegations that
defendant "wrongfully" and "maliciously" induced another to breach a contract
are insufficient); Shapolsky v. Shapolsky, 22 App. Div. 2d 91, 253 N.Y.S.2d 816
(1964) (complaint jumbled actions in individual and representative capacities,
demanded accounting without pleading the basis therefor, demanded delivery of
stock certificates without pleading entitlement). See also Loudin v. Mohawk
Airlines, Inc., 24 App. Div. 2d 447, 260 N.Y.S.2d 899 (1965) (complaint alleging
malicious interference with right to employment and conspiracy dismissed for
failure to state "evidentiary facts" sufficient to support the claim).
" 21 App. Div. 2d 602, 252 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (1964).
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plaint. Lane was affirmed unanimously by the Court of Appeals in a one
line memorandum opinion,3" and the "theory of the pleadings" rule dis-
appeared from New York practice. 9 Thus, although the plaintiff always
should and usually will clearly outline the theory he has selected and be
correct in his selection, the court may not grant a motion to dismiss if
any theory of recovery can be found in the pleading, regardless of the relief
requested.40
The dire predictions precipitated by the additional language in
CPLR 3013 not found in the federal rules were averted by early and
strong judicial action. Before an intent to reach the same or a more liberal
result can be ascribed to the drafters of the North Carolina rules, however,
additional features of those rules must be considered. In addition to the
language of rule 8(a) (1), the North Carolina drafters retained pre-
complaint discovery 41 from the former practice and included specifications
of negligent acts in the official forms42 accompanying the new rules.
The comments to the rules give no clue why the drafters thought that
the retention of pre-complaint discovery in NCRCP 27(b) was necessary
or desirable. Whatever the drafters intended, one possible effect of this
provision is that a defendant attacking a complaint for insufficiency can
argue that plaintiff had an opportunity through use of rule 27 (b) to obtain
enough information to plead in detail and that, having failed to take ad-
vantage of this provision, he should be dismissed without leave to amend,
particularly when plaintiff asserts that he cannot amend without discovery.
8 Lane v. Mercury Record Corp., 18 N.Y.2d 889, 233 N.E.2d 35, 276 N.Y.S.2d
626 (1966).
" In a case such as Lane, if the parties have not previously sought a jury
trial, CPLR 4103 allows the adverse party to request a jury when the issues appear.
NCRCP 38 allows demand for jury trial of right until ten days after the service
of the last pleading directed to the issue. Thus, if the court finds a legal issue
when construing the complaint pursuant to a motion to dismiss, the defendant will
not have answered; and, assuming the complaint is not dismissed, the plaintiff
still has until ten days after the defendant's answer to demand jury trial. See 5
MooRE 7 38.39[2].
"E.g., Buljanovic v. Grace Lines, Inc., 31 App. Div. 2d 614, 295 N.Y.S.2d 552
(1968) (complaint alleging unseaworthiness should not have been dismissed by
trial court in any case because it stated a cause of action for failure to provide a
safe place to work); Richardson v. Coy, 28 App. Div. 2d 640, -, 280 N.Y.S.2d
623, 624 (1967); Sheehan v. Amity Estates, Inc., 27 App. Div. 2d 594, 275
N.Y.S.2d 644 (1966) (allegation of fraud insufficient, but cause of action stated
in unilateral mistake); Barrick v. Barrick, 24 App. Div. 2d 895, 264 N.Y.S.2d 888
(1965) (complaint requesting reformation insufficient, but cause of action stated
in breach of contract).
"4 Ch. 760, § 1, [1951] N.C. Sess. L. 734-41. (N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-568.1 to
-568.27, repealed Jan. 1, 1970).
' N.C.R. Civ. P. 84, forms (3) & (4).
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If this argument is attempted, the courts should immediately reject it
because (1) if the complaint is interpreted liberally, there is no need for
pre-complaint discovery; (2) pre-complaint discovery is more awkward
than pre-trial discovery;4 and (3) pre-trial discovery will satisfy any
demand of defendant for facts without creating problems concerning
statutes of limitations or the relation-back theory, which often result from
dismissal and amendment.
The North Carolina drafters also altered the complaints for negligence
from the conclusory style of the federal44 and New York45 forms to forms
complete with specifications of negligent acts. Since NCRCP 8446 states
not only that the forms provided are sufficient, but are also guides to the
simplicity and brevity intended in the rules, it may be, as one commentator
suggests, that specific, factual complaints are limited to situations involving
negligence in operation of autmobiles.4 7  It seems more plausible to
assume that North Carolina forms (3) and (4) will become the standard
and that the other forms will be limited to the particular claim for relief
that they illustrate.4 In any event, the drafters have indicated that at
least in some cases the North Carolina rules require a more specific com-
plaint than the rules of either federal or New York procedure.49
Even granting, however, that more specific complaints are required in
certain cases under the new rules, the North Carolina courts should still
be very reluctant to grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted under rule 12(b) (6). 50 The 12(b) (6)
motion-unlike a demurrer-when sustained is considered an adjudication
on the merits and the plaintiff's claim, if leave to amend is requested
and denied, is res judicata.51 This harsh result can be defended only if
"Compare N.C.R. Civ. P. 26(a) with N.C.R. Civ. P. 27(b).
"FED. R. Civ. P. forms 9 & 10.
2 McKINNEY's FORMS, CIVIL PRACTICE LAw & RULEs §§ 4:48, 4:49 (Supp.
1969).
,oN.C.R. Civ. P. 84.
"Sizemore, Iiztroduction in NORTH CAROLINA BAR ASSocIATIoN FOUNDATION,
INSTITUTE ON JURISDICTION, JOINDER AND PLEADING UNDER NORTH CAROLINA'S
NEW RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE I-1, 1-13 (1968).
"' Since all the forms provided are copies of common law common counts except
forms (3) and (4), it would appear that when the drafters had the opportunity to
create their own forms, they opted for specificity.
"See N.C.R. Civ. P. 8, comment (a)(3).
This motion is analogous to a demurrer for failure to state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action. In application it is similar to the demurrer to a state-
ment of a defective cause of action. See N.C.R. Cxv. P. 12, comment.
" The demurrer to a statement of a defective cause of action, when sustained,
made plaintiff's claim res judicata. Davis v. Anderson Indus, 266 N.C. 610, 146
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the procedural system insures the plaintiff that he will not be dismissed
when there is any possibility whatsoever that he can recover.52 The motion
should only be granted when, as in the federal system, an affirmative
defense appears on the face of the complaint,"s the complaint itself nega-
tives any right to recover," or it is clear beyond doubt that "the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him
to relief."55 Dismissal at the pleading stage, at least dismissal without
leave to amend, for any other reason does not give the plaintiff adequate
assurance that he will be afforded an opportunity to avoid the effect of
res judicata.
That this analysis is correct can be seen by exploring the alternatives
and their effects on the parties. If the motion to dismiss is denied, the
defendant still has three options open to him: he may answer and take
discovery ;56 he may answer, take discovery and move for summary judg-
ment ;57 or, assuming that he includes the motion with his motion to
dismiss, he may move for a more definite statement.5" If defendant chooses
the first course, he has presumably gathered all the information needed
for trial preparation from discovery and has in no way been injured.
If it appears from the information obtained in discovery that plaintiff
does not have a valid claim under any state of the facts, defendant can
move for summary judgment and should prevail.5 In this situation
S.E.2d 817 (1966); 1 MCINTOsH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1189 & n.5.7 (Supp. 1969). The demurrer to a defective statement of a good
cause of action generally had no such effect. Id. § 1200 (2d ed. 1956) & § 1200
(Supp. 1969). Under the federal rules, the granting of a 12(b) (6) motion always
results in the application of res judicata. Arrowsmith v. U.P.I., 320 F.2d 219,
221 (2d Cir. 1963).
1 See Louis, The Sufficiency of a Complaint, Res Jiedicata, and the Statute of
Limitations-A Study Occasioned by Recent Changes in the North Carolina Code,
45 N.C.L. REv. 659, 673 (1967).
" L. Singer & Sons v. Union Pac. R.R., 109 F.2d 493 (8th Cir.), aff'd, 311 U.S.
295 (1940) (plaintiff's lack of capacity to sue evident on the face of the com-
plaint).
" Leggett v. Montgomery Ward, 178 F.2d 436 (10th Cir. 1949) (in an action
for malicious prosecution, plaintiff pleaded that probable cause was found).
" Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
" N.C.R. Civ. P. 12(a) (1) & Article 5, Depositions and Discovery.
r7 N.C.R. Civ. P. 56. This motion may be made at any time.
N.C.R. Civ. P. 12(e).
Summary judgment is the device for determining whether there is any
genuine issue as to a material fact. 6 MooRE 56.04. If plaintiff stated con-
clusory allegations in his complaint, discovery should inform defendant whether
plaintiff has facts to support the conclusions. Obviously, a better determination as
to the merits can be made following discovery than can be made at the pleading
stage. Judgment on the pleadings is also available under N.C.R. Civ. P. 12(c);
for the relationship of this rule to summary judgement see 6 MOORE 1 56.09.
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defendant has not been prejudiced except to the extent of writing and
mailing interrogatories or taking depositions; plaintiff has had an oppor-
tunity to establish the factual validity of his claim; and if the claim fails
here, it can properly be dismissed on the merits.6" It should be noted that
summary judgment is the fact-interception device provided by the new
rules, and there is no longer a necessity for fact-interception at the plead-
ing stage as there was under prior practice.
Finally, defendant may press a motion for a more definite statement. 61
This motion, because of the waiver provision of rule 12 (g),'2 must be
included with the 12(b) (6) motion. If the court determines that the
complaint is lacking in specificity, it can then grant the motion for a
more definite statement 3 rather than the motion to dismiss and thus
avoid problems of dismissal and relation back and possible res judicata
consequences of dismissal while assuring that the defendant is provided
with the specificity to which he is entitled. This course is preferable
to dismissal, but still not always desirable because it will often violate the
function of the motion for a more definite statement. Assuming that the
defendant does not obtain all the facts that he would like from a complaint,
he can still use the provision in rule 8 (b) allowing denial without sufficient
knowledge 4 and thus avoid being faced with a complaint "so vague and
ambiguous" that he cannot respond.
The danger of the motion for a more definite statement under rule
12 (e) is that it will become, in effect, a bill of particulars and a dilatory
pleading. 5 If it is allowed to become a bill of particulars and plaintiff
cannot satisfy the order, then his pleading may be struck or other action
taken.16 The argument could then be made that plaintiff is not prejudiced
6 MooRE 56.03.N.C.R. Civ. P. 12(e).
N.C.R. Civ. P. 12(g) requires all motions, with a few exceptions, to be made
together; otherwise they are waived.
es N.C.R. Civ. P. 12(e) refers to a compliant "so vague or ambiguous that a
party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading...."
" N.C.R. Civ. P. 8(b) allows defendant to answer that "he is without knowl-
edge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the averment...."
and states that this form of answer will be treated as a denial. See 2A Mooi
8.22.
" See Comment, The Revival of the Bill of Particulars under the Federal Civil
Rules, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1473 (1958) ; Comment, Federal Riles of Civil Procedure
-Federal Rifle 12(e): Motion for More Definite Statement-History, Operation
and Efficacy, 61 MIcHr. L. REv. 1126 (1963).
N.C.R. Civ. P. 12(e). Cf. Lodge 743, International Ass'n of Machinists
v. United Aircraft Corp., 30 F.R.D. 142 (D. Conn. 1962). The court in this case
granted the 12(e) motion, but deferred plaintiff's addition to the pleading until
after plaintiff's discovery. The case seems wrongly decided.
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because he could have taken pre-complaint discovery and avoided the
entire problem. But pleading under the new rules would thus become a
mere extension of code practice. The only apparent method of avoiding
this result is for the court to grant the 12(e) motion only when it would
be granted in federal practice. An exception should be made for complaints
following North Carolina forms (3) and (4). When these forms are used,
the 12(e) motion should be granted in preference to a motion under
12(b) (6).
If a motion to dismiss is granted, there still exists the possibility of
amendment (and relation back) under rule 15." NCRCP 15 (a) allows
one amendment of right before service of the responsive pleading or, if
there is no responsive pleading, within thirty days of service of the plead-
ing to be amended.6" Even though a motion to dismiss is not a responsive
pleading, 9 amendment of right is generally cut off when the motion is
granted.7" The dismissed party must then request leave to amend from
the court.71 The standard for granting leave to amend under NCRCP
15 (a) is that it shall be "freely given when justice so requires."
In any case in which a complaint is dismissed because it lacks spe-
cificity under NCRCP 8(a) (1), justice does require that leave be
granted; indeed, the federal courts interpret FRCP 15 (a) to require the
granting of leave to amend unless the plaintiff clearly can never amend to
plead any state of facts upon which, if proven, relief might be granted.72
Even with free amendment, however, the best solution is to give the re-
quirement of "notice" greater weight than the words "sufficiently par-
ticular" in new rule 8(a) (1). If this suggestion is followed, the complaint
would not be dismissed in the first instance, and plaintiff would not be put
to the uncertainty of requesting leave to amend and the expense of writing
and filing the amendment. Yet dismissal with leave to amend is still
preferable to the res judicata consequences of judgment of dismissal.
67 N.C.R. Civ. P. 15.
61 N.C.R. Civ. P. 15(a).
" 3 MooRE 15.07(2).
"Swan v. Board of Higher Educ., 319 F.2d 56 (2d Cir. 1963); Cassell v.
Michaux, 240 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1956). But some cases hold that plaintiff may
amend as a matter of right after a motion to dismiss has been granted. E.g., Brieir
v. Northern Calif. Bowling Proprietors Ass'n, 316 F.2d 787 (9th Cir. 1963);
Fuhrer v. Fuhrer, 292 F.2d 140 (7th Cir. 1961).
• Swan v. Board of Higher Educ., 319 F.2d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 1963).
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). The test is stated in Alexander
v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 314 F.2d 690, 694 (9th Cir. 1963) to be whether




If, however, a complaint is dismissed and leave to amend denied, the
appellate courts should closely examine the trial judg&s reasons for the
denial7" to determine if he has abused his discretion.74 Only in this way
can the appellate courts truly chart the course of the new North Carolina
rules and insure that justice is done.
When plaintiff is granted leave to amend, the amendment will relate
back to the time of the filing of the original pleading if the amended com-
plaint gives "notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of trans-
actions or occurrences... ." that are to be proved pursuant to the amended
pleading." This phraseology is intentionally designed to avoid dis-
tinctions between pleading a new cause of action and amplifying an old
one.76 Thus, even if the complaint is dismissed, but leave to amend is
granted, plaintiff can amend with a new theory based on the same set of
historical facts, and the amended complaint will relate back. Since de-
fendant was already on notice from the first pleading as to what facts
that the plaintiff was claiming as a wrong, he should not be surprised
by the presentation of that same transaction or occurrence in a new
form.7 7
Since no reasons exist for not following the liberal precedent of the
federal and New York courts, except in situations involving negligent
operation of automobiles that are governed by specific forms in the new
rules and since there is no compelling purpose in requiring specificity in
pleading when other fact-interception and issue-formulation devices are
provided, NCRCP 8(a) (1) should be interpreted to require no more
specificity than FRCP 8(a) (2). Similarly, motions under 12(b) (6)
should be granted in the same circumstances as they are in the federal
"' North Carolina trial judges will be required to articulate reasons for refusing
leave to amend under the amendment to N.C.R. Civ. P. 52(a). Ch. 895, § 12,
[1969] N.C. Sess. L. -.
"' Under North Carolina Code practice a trial judge has never been found to
have abused his discretion in denying leave to amend. Louis, The Sufficiency of a
Complaint, Res .udicata and the Statute of Limitations-A Study Occasioned by
Recent Changes in the North Carolina Code, 45 N.C.L. REv. 659, 674 & nn.83-84
(1967). The federal trial courts are closely regulated by the appellate courts on
this point. The Supreme Court has stated:
Of course, the grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is within the
discretion of the District Court, but outright refusal to grant the leave
without any justifying reason appearing for the denial is not an exercise
of discretion; it is merely an abuse of that discretion ....
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
"N.C.R. Civ. P. 15(c).
"Id., comment (c).
"Id.; see also F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 5.9 (1965).
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courts. If, however, the courts of North Carolina determine that greater
specificity is required by NCRCP 8(a) (1) than by FRCP 8(a) (2), the
use of the 12(e) motion in place of the one under 12(b) (6) and the
liberal allowance of amendments are recommended as methods of insuring
a balanced and equitable system.
ROGER GROOT
Constitutional Law-Illegality of Police Program To Gather
Information on Civil Disorders
In Anderson v. Sills1 a New Jersey Superior Court held that a state-
sponsored program of information-gathering about civil disorders and
the participating groups and individuals was an unconstitutional infringe-
ment of the plaintiffs' rights of free speech and assembly. The state
attorney general had ordered preparation of two forms for use by local
police departments.
One, the "Security Incident Report Form," was designed to gather
information on any "civil disturbance, riot, rally, protest, demonstration,
march or confrontation," including "the names of organizations or groups
involved, leaders, and the type of organization. ' 2 The "Security Sum-
106 N.J. Super. 545, 256 A.2d 298 (Super. Ct. 1969).
Id. at 548, 256 A.2d at 300. An excerpt from the report's "instructions for
preparation" illustrates its breadth:
9. TYPE OF INCIDENT-Enter the type of incident. EXAMPLES: Civil
disturbance, riot, rally, protest, demonstration, march, confrontation, etc.
10. LOCATION-Type the location of the incident. If business or residence,
the number and name of street, road, lane or avenue. If open area, give
approximate distance to a known geographic location.
11. REASON OR PURPOSE OF INCIDENT-Enter reason for incident
or alleged purpose.
12. NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS-List estimated or announced number
of participants or anticipated participants.
13. ORGANIZATIONS AND/OR GROUPS INVOLVED-Give full
names and addresses of organizations and/or groups involved. If more
space is needed, use Narrative.
14. LEADERS-Enter names, addresses and titles, if any, of leaders of
organizations and/or groups involved. Include nicknames, aliases, and
other identifying data.
17. NARRATIVE
a. Information previously included elsewhere on this report need not be
repeated in the Narrative.
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mary Report" recorded the "date and place of birth, marital status, name
of spouse, age, race, physical description, occupation and employer, motor
vehicle record ' and other characteristics of participants in the activity who
might therefore be suspected of involvement in future civil disorders. A
result of the apprehension induced by recent racial upheavals, the avowed
purpose for the reports was prediction and control of potential disorders.4
The court, taking judicial notice that some of the individual plain-
tiffs5 had been involved in sit-ins and civil rights activities, did not require
them to allege that they had actually been subjected to any surveillance or
reporting, but followed the federal "concepts of standing in First Amend-
ment cases [that] have had the effect of constituting individual litigants
quasi-attorneys general for large classes of citizens whose rights might
otherwise be oppressed." 6 The plaintiffs sought and obtained a judgment
declaring the reporting system unconstitutional per se and ordering that
the reports be discontinued and that all forms and files be destroyed.
The court found
"that the directive in question, and Forms 420 [Security Incident
Report] and 421 [Security Summary Report] as used therewith,
are violative of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution
in that they overreach in their attempt to achieve what is probably
a legitimate governmental goal . . . . The exercise of power which
deters individuals from exercising First Amendment rights is denied
to government."8
b. If an organization and/or group is involved in the incident reported,
include type and how involved.
EXAMPLES OF TYPES: Left wing, Right wing, Civil Rights,
Militant, Nationalistic, Pacifist, Religious, Black Power, Klu [sic] Klux
Klan, Extremist, etc.
EXAMPLES OF HOW INVOLVED: Sponsor, co-sponsor, sup-
porter, assembled group, etc.
Id. at 559-60, 256 A.2d at 306-07.
8 Id. at 552-53, 256 A.2d at 302.
'Id. at 551-52, 256 A.2d at 301-02. The Attorney General introduced excerpts
from the report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders urging
improvements in police intelligence procedures as valuable aids in preventing
and controlling disorders to justify the reporting procedure. See Momboisse, Riot
Prevention and Survival, 45 CHI.-KENT L. Rav. 143 (1969), in which the need for
adequate police intelligence activity is stressed.
" Plaintiffs in this case were the local NAACP chapter and individual members
of the chapter who had been involved in civil rights activities. 106 N.J. Super.
at 545, 550-51, 256 A.2d at 298, 301.
0 Id. at 551, 256 A.2d at 301.
Id. at 557-58, 256 A.2d at 305. This case was an action under the New Jersey
declaratory judgment statute.8 Id. at 556-57, 256 A.2d at 304.
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It is useful to review briefly the more important precedent cited by
the court in support of its decision. Such analysis will reveal an implicit
extension of first-amendment freedoms in the New Jersey court's holding.
Dombrowski v. Pfister,' cited by the court to support its decision on
standing as well as its determination on the merits, involved an attempt
by Louisiana to apply state anti-sedition statutes to individuals and
associations working for equal rights for Negroes.1" The Supreme Court,
deciding that the federal district court should not abstain from hearing
the complaint, held that the Louisiana statutes under which the plaintiffs
had been arrested and indicted were unconstitutionally vague and overly
broad since they created a zone "within which protected expression may
be inhibited.""
In Lamont v. Postmaster General,'2 the Supreme Court held that a
statute requiring potential recipients of "communist political propaganda"
to request its delivery in writing unduly limited first-amendment freedom
to receive mail."3 Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, concluded
that the statute was "unconstitutional because it requires an official act
(viz., returning the reply card) as a limitation on the unfettered exercise
of the addressee's First Amendment rights."' 4
The state court's contempt conviction of the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People for failing to produce a list of its
members was reversed in NAACP v. Alabama.", The Supreme Court,
noting the possibility of private reprisal and threats, held that the forced
disclosure would impair the ability of members to pursue their legitimate
aims and dissuade other individuals from joining the organization in
contravention of the first-amendment right to freedom of association.10
NAACP v. Button involved an attempt by Virginia to expand its
definition of solicitation of legal business to preclude the plaintiffs from
encouraging and supporting litigation aimed at eliminating racial dis-
- 380 U.S. 479 (1965).'0 id. at 482.
11Id. at 494.
12381 U.S. 301 (1965).
'8 The right to receive mail was considered an integral part of freedom of
speech. Id. at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring)."Id. at 305.
12357 U.S. 449 (1958).
"Id. at 462-63, 466. The Court derived a freedom of association from the
related freedoms of speech and assembly specifically granted by the first amend-
ment. Id. at 460. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430-31 (1963).
"371 U.S. 415 (1963).
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crimination. The Supreme Court found that plaintiff's conduct was a
form of speech protected by the first amendment and that the state's
attempt to make it unlawful could not be sustained.' 8
The Supreme Court was fundamentally concerned in each of the above
cases with examining the chilling effect the governmental action had on
the exercise of first-amendment rights; once a sufficient inhibition was
demonstrated, the state's interest yielded. Considered in this light, the
cases cited by the New Jersey court provide a sound basis for its holding
in Anderson: there can be no doubt that the attorney general's reporting
system was a form of state action having the potential effect of dis-
couraging individuals from a constitutionally-protected pursuit of legiti-
mate aims. But by not requiring the plaintiffs to show an actual threat
giving rise to a chilling effect on first-amendment rights, the court in
Anderson reached beyond any of these cases. In both Dombrowski and
Button it was the existence of criminal statutes, likely to be invoked against
plaintiffs for their exercise of protected rights, that gave rise to an actual
threat. In Lamont, the most recent of the cases, the majority of the
Supreme Court went to some lengths in its opinion to point out the
affirmative obligation that the statute imposed on the addressee before he
could receive certain mail."9 Even in NAACP v. Alabama, in which there
was no claim that the state statutes involved were unconstitutional on their
face, the Court relied in part on the demonstrated probability of "economic
reprisal, loss of employment .. . [and] physical coercion '" if the state
were permitted to force disclosure of membership lists through contempt
proceedings.
In contrast to Dombrowski and Button there was no real threat of
prosecution for engaging in protected activities in Anderson, for while
the investigation of activities such as sit-ins and protest marches was
the medium for obtaining information, the purported uses of that informa-
tion were limited to preventing riots and civil disorders,2 which are
surely not protected speech and assembly. Unlike Lamont and NAACP v.
Alabama, there was no affirmative action required of the plaintiffs before
they could carry out protected activities. Moreover, it does not appear in
Anderson that there was any showing of possible intimidation or har-
11 Id. at 437. Virginia argued without success that the restraint was only
incidental to the legitimate pursuit of the state's goal of ensuring high professional
standards for the legal profession. Id. at 438.
", 381 U.S. at 305, 307.
20 357 U.S. at 464.
"1 106 N.J. Super. at 552-53, 256 A.2d at 302.
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rassment by state agencies either in obtaining the information or in its
later use.
Although the court in Anderson recognized "that plaintiffs and others
may well be subjected to abuse as a result of this intelligence system," 22
the main thrust of its conclusion is that such files are inherently dangerous
since the mere knowledge of their existence tends to inhibit advocation of
social and political change. 3 If any chilling effect similar to that found
in the cases that the court cited is to be found in Anderson, it must rest
on a judicial inference that the police will misuse information contained
in their files or will harrass and intimidate individuals while collecting
it.24 Granting that such an inference may be justified if required for the
protection of first-amendment freedoms, one must still consider whether
it is always necessary or desirable in light of public-policy decisions
favoring police functions of crime prevention and detection.
If police limited their activities to investigation of reported crimes
after the occurrence, their operations would rarely be disturbed by charges
of repression and abuse of power; the first amendment would never be
the gravamen of a complaint against police excesses. Perhaps unfor-
tunately, however, the law arms the police with conspiracy statutes and
expects them to stop crime in its incipiency without furnishing clear-cut
guidelines of acceptable methods of prevention. One of the most effective
crime-prevention tools is the information-collection system condemned in
Anderson.25
The harm caused to first-amendment freedoms by such a system is
twofold: first, the knowledge that the police are noting people's presence
at a particular event may dissuade individuals from participating in legal
political activity and discussion; second, police presence at gatherings
tends to inhibit participants from speaking out as freely as they otherwise
might.26 A more serious problem arises when the police use clandestine
22 Id. at 557, 256 A.2d at 304-05.
Id. at 556-57, 256 A.2d at 304.
2The court obviously gave some credence to this possibility: "[T]he probability
that it [the directive to gather information] will be interpreted by some as re-
questing investigations of political trouble makers is too apparent." Id. at 557,
256 A.2d at 304. "[P]laintiffs and others may well be subjected to abuse as a result
of this intelligence system." Id., 256 A.2d at 305.
2 See Momboisse, supra note 4.
26 This precise deterrent effect came before a federal district court in Local
309, United Furniture Workers v. Gates, 75 F. Supp. 620 (N.D. Ind. 1948).
Following picket-line violence, state and local police began attending-but did not
actively interfere with-union meetings in the county courthouse. The union mem-
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surveillance or infiltration of groups to obtain information. Unless the
presence of the police is realized at some point, there is no inhibition of
the exercise of first-amendment freedoms absent a general, persisting fear
that an informer may be present. Moreover, it is seldom possible to attack
covert surveillance successfully on fourth- or fifth-amendment grounds un-
less there has been some trespass, and this affirmative remedy is not
available if the infiltrator's presence is at least tacitly condoned,2 7 as is the
case at public meetings.
Granting that harm flows from the knowledge that the police are
engaging in information-collecting, is it really essential to impute to
them either bad motives or harrassing tactics to find a judicial basis for
stopping or limiting such activities?28 Since the harm to the plaintiffs
in Anderson was solely in their individual reaction and not in the possi-
bility of affirmative state action against them, the court was, in effect,
protecting a right to exercise in privacy first-amendment rights. By
recognizing a distinction between protecting the freedom to exercise first-
amendment rights and protecting a right of privacy from governmental
intrusion, and accepting Anderson as a case involving the right to privacy,
bers sought and obtained an injunction prohibiting the police from attending the
meetings on the basis that such attendance "restrained and hampered those who
had thus met in lawful and peaceful assembly." Id. at 625.
17 Considering the assiduous efforts of the courts to protect individuals from
invasions of privacy by electronic and mechanical surveillance methods, the un-
restricted leeway given unaided eavesdroppers and informers is surprising. Compare
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S.
41 (1967) with Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966), in which the
Supreme Court upheld a conviction based on testimony from an informer and
did not consider it significant that the police probably had introduced him into
the group. See also Osborne v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966) and Lewis
v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966). The latter decisions have been criticized:
The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARv. L. REv. 69, 193-94 (1967); Note,
.Tudcial Control of Secret Agents, 76 YALE L.J. 994 (1967). The acceptance of
the use of eavesdroppers and informers perhaps stems from the difficulty in formu-
lating a theory placing "overhearing" within any category of state activity presently
held to violate enumerated rights or freedoms, but it should not be overlooked that
the cases permitting eavesdropping did not involve first-amendment freedoms and
might have been decided differently if they had. The Court in Katz held that a
physical trespass was not necessary for finding an illegal search and seizure by
electronic bugging and used language that could be equally applied to unaided
eavesdropping.
" Besides furthering an obvious policy conflict by resting decisions on imputa-
tions of bad faith, courts would seem to be guilty of that old legislative mistake of
overbreadth since this inference, once applied, cannot logically be limited to reports
of the type involved in Anderson, but must be applied to all information-gathering
and use of official records.
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the court could have avoided trying to find a deterrent effect based on
possible police misbehavior. 29
The existence of a right to privacy in exercise of certain first-amend-
ment freedoms has clearly been accepted by the Supreme Court.30 When
an attack on governmental activity is based on a violation of this right
to privacy, plaintiff does not bear the burden of proving an additional
affirmative, deterrent state activity; it is sufficient to show only an in-
vasion of privacy and a lack of justification for that invasion. Indeed,
once an investigation into protected activities is shown, the burden
is then on the state to justify it.31 The court in Anderson came very
close to accepting a right to privacy in the exercise of both actual
and symbolic speech, and the case has been interpreted by one writer as
authority for such a right. 2 If this interpretation is correct, Anderson
brings the judiciary one step closer to accepting the suggestion by Mr.
Justice Douglas3 3 that the proper solution is to adopt a "right to be let
alone" and to establish that until an organization or individual acts
illegally, no governmental unit should be authorized or allowed to investi-
gate. A less drastic suggestion is to place information collected by sur-
veillance and infiltration on the same basis as wiretapping and to require
prior judicial approval by use of warrants84 before evidence obtained as
a result of such police action can be used in any court.
The injunctive remedy granted in Anderson, depending as it does on
11 The court came close to adopting this approach: "[I]t is not too difficult to
imagine the reluctance of an individual to participate in any kind of protected
conduct which seeks publicly to express a particular or unpopular political or
social view because of the fact that by doing so he might now have a record ......
106 N.J. Super. at 556, 256 A.2d at 304. "I conclude that plaintiffs' complaint, that
they do not want to be investigated and the subject of central surveillance as
potential problems, bears merit." Id. at 557, 256 A.2d at 304. But cf. note 24
supra.
"See, e.g., DeGregory v. Attorney Gen., 383 U.S. 825, 829 (1966); Gibson
v. Florida Legis. Inves. Comm'n, 372 U.S. 539, 544 (1963,); Talley v. California,
362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960) ; NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) ; United
States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 57-58 (1953) (concurring opinion). See also Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
S See Gibson v. Florida Legis. Inves. Comm'n, 372 U.S. 539 (1963); cf.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See also Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967) for application of this principle to a fourth-amendment situation.
" Schlam, Police Intimidation Through "Surveillance" May be Enjoined as an
Unconstitutional Violation of Rights of Assembly and Free Expression, 3 CLEAR-
INGHOUSE REV. 130, 157 (1969).
Douglas, The Right of Association, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1361 (1963).
"The Legitimate Scope of Police Discretion to Restrict Ordinary Public
Activity, 4 HIv. Civ. RIGHTs-Civ. LiB. L. REv. 233, 341 (1969).
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affirmative action initiated by the plaintiff, will not provide relief from
pervasive covert collection of information. The combination of an ex-
clusionary evidentiary rule, based on the requirement of a warrant, and
injunctive relief would, however, be a potent weapon for discouraging
police activities likely to stifle the free and open exercise of the rights of
freedom of speech, assembly, and association. Since surveillance would
be permitted only if the need for it could be demonstrated to a judicial
officer, the police would not be forced into illegal conduct to carry out
the investigative and preventive activities demanded of them by society.
DONALD W. HARPER
Constitutional Law-Power of Congress To Exclude Persons
Duly Elected
In the congressional elections of 1966, Adam Clayton Powell was
duly elected to the Ninetieth Congress from the eighteenth congressional
district of New York. When the House of Representatives convened,
Powell was not administered the oath. On the same day, the House pro-
vided for the appointment of a select committee to determine Powell's
eligibility to take his seat.'
The committee found that Powell met the standing qualifications of
article I, section 2 of the Constitution.' The committee further reported,
however, that Powell had misappropriated public funds, had made false
reports on expenditures of foreign currency, and had asserted unwarranted
privilege and immunity from the processes of the courts of New York.'
The committee recommended that Powell be sworn and seated, but that
he be fined 40,000 dollars, censured, and deprived of his seniority.'
When the proposed resolution was presented to the House, an amend-
ment was offered calling for Powell's exclusion and a declaration that
his seat was vacant.5 After heated debate, the amendment was adopted,
1113 CONG. REc. 16 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 1967).
'H.R. REP. No. 27, 90th Cong., lst Sess. 31 (1967). The relevant part of
article I, § 2 declares:
"[n]o person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to
the Age of twenty-five years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United
States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in
which he shall be chosen."
'H.R. REP. No. 27, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 31-32 (1967).
'Id. at 33.
'H.R. Res. 278, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 113 CONG. REc. 4997, 5020 (1967).
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and House Resolution No. 278, in its amended form, was approved by
over a two-thirds margin.
Powell and thirteen voters of the eighteenth congressional district
brought suit requesting injunctive and declaratory relief. They alleged
that the House in voting to exclude Powell violated two specific pro-
visions of the Constitution: article I, section 2, clause 1,6 because the
resolution was inconsistent with the mandate that the members of the
House shall be elected by the people of each state; and Article I, section 2,
clause 2,' which, it was asserted, sets forth the exclusive qualifications
for membership. The district court dismissed the complaint "for want of
jurisdiction of the subject matter."8 The court of appeals affirmed on
somewhat different grounds, with each judge filing a separate opinion.,
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed." The Court passed over
the claim under article I, section 2, clause 1, but held that under article
I, section 2, clause 2 the House had no power to exclude from its mem-
bership any person, duly elected by his constituents, who met the age,
citizenship, and residence requirements specified in the Constitution. In
so holding, the Court insisted that it was not dealing with a non-
justiciable political question."
The impact of Powell on the political-question doctrine is emphasized
through the fact that the Court, had it based its decision on article I,
section 2, clause 1, could have resolved the issue within accepted con-
ceptions of justiciability. The theory embodied in this provision is that
the right of the people in each district to choose their congressional repre-
sentatives is fundamental to a democratic system of government. As stated
' "The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every
second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State
shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch
of the State Legislature."
7See note 2 supra.
'Powell v. McCormack, 266 F. Supp. 354, 360 (D.D.C. 1967).
' Powell v. McCormack, 395 F.2d 577 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Writing for the
court, Judge Burger, now Chief justice of the United States, held that the case
involved non-justiciable political issues. Judge McGowan felt that the decision
by the House that the power to expel included the power to exclude, provided
a two-thirds vote was forthcoming, did not present an impelling occasion for
judicial scrutiny. Judge Leventhal concluded that "[t]he House had legislative
jurisdiction to consider and appraise the activities and fitness of Powell at the
time he presented his credentials." 395 F.2d at 611.
"7 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). For a lengthy analysis of Powelt,
see generally Symposimu--Comments on Powelt v. McCormack, 17 U.C.L.A.L.
REv. 1 (1969).
11395 U.S. at 549.
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by Robert Livingston in his speech before the New York ratification
convention, "The people are the best judges [of] who ought to represent
them. To dictate and control them, to tell them whom they shall not elect,
is to abridge their natural rights. '12 It is this "natural right" that is
the basis for the one man, one vote requirement in congressional dis-
tricting.1 3 Justice Black in Wesberry v. Sanders4 said, "[n] o right is
more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election
of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must
live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote
is undermined."'
The same rationale was later a basis for the Court's decision in Bond
v. Floyd.' Julian Bond had been excluded by the Georgia House of
Representatives for making certain statements opposing the Vietnam War.
Georgia did not argue that Bond's statements violated any laws, but
contended that although such statements by a private person might be
protected by the first amendment, the state may nevertheless apply a
stricter standard to its legislators." The Court rejected this contention:
The interest of the public in hearing all sides of a public issue is hardly
advanced by extending more protection to citizen-critics than to legis-
lators. Legislators have an obligation to take positions on controversial
political questions so that their constituents can be fully informed by
them, and be better able to assess their qualifications for office; also
so they may be represented in governmental debates by the person
they have elected to represent them.'8
When Adam Clayton Powell was elected to the Ninetieth Congress,
it was the twelfth consecutive time that his constituents had chosen him.
11 2 THE REcORDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 292-93 (rev. ed. M.
Farrand 1966) [hereinafter cited as Farrand], quoted in 395 U.S. at 541, n.76.
At the same convention Hamilton stated: "[T]he true principle of a republic is,
that the people should choose whom they please to govern them." Farrand 257,
quoted in 395 U.S. at 540-41.
"3 ustice Douglas, concurring in Powell, stated in regard to the one man, one
vote principle: "When that principle is followed and the electors choose a person
who is repulsive to the Establishment in Congress, by what constitutional authority
can that group of electors be disenfranchised?" 395 U.S. at 553 (concurring
opinion).
"376 U.S. 1 (1964). The complaint alleged that plaintiffs "were deprived of
the full benefit of their right to vote," in violation of art. I, § 2, clause 1. Id. at 3.18376 U.S. at 17.
18385 U.S. 116 (1966).
"Id. at 132-33.
Id. at 136-37 (emphasis added).
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In 1968 he was re-elected to the Ninety-First Congress.10 The citizens
of Harlem have consistently selected Powell despite the well-publicized
allegations against him. In view of the principles stated in such cases
as Wesberry and Bond, surely it follows that the power of the House to
disenfranchise an entire congressional district in violation of the express
terminology of the Constitution is reviewable by the Supreme Court.
But the Court passed over this ready-at-hand basis for disposition of
Powell's claim to resolve the issue under the constitutional clause directly
pertaining to qualifications for membership in the House of Representa-
tives. In so doing, it elected to grapple once again with the doctrine of
"political questions."2 It was not until Baker v. Carr"1 that some
illumination was finally cast upon the enigma of the doctrine of political
questions. That case involved the apportionment of the Tennessee legisla-
ture. All such previous cases had been held "political" and, therefore,
not justiciable.22 In holding that cases involving reapportionment of legis-
lative bodies were not political questions, Justice Brennan, speaking for
the Court, reviewed much case law. His review revealed that "it is the
relationship between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of the
Federal Government [the separation of powers doctrine] ... which gives
rise to the 'political question.' ",23 He then ventured several factors by
which a dispute could be tested for determining whether it was political
in nature:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment
of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially
", This time the House fined him 25,000 dollars, but seated him. H.R. Res. No.
2, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REc. H21 (daily ed., January 3, 1969). This
event brought forth a suggestion of mootness, but that defense was rejected by the
Court in Powell. 395 U.S. at 495-500. See Justice Stewart's dissent, 395 U.S. at
559.
20 See generally, A. BIcKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BUxANcH 183-198 (1962);
H. M. HART AND H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
192-209 (1953); Bickel, The Passive Virtues, foreword to The Supreme Court,
1960 Term, 75 HARV. L. RPv. 40 (1961); Field, The Doctrine of Political Ques-
tions in the Federal Courts, 8 MINN. L. REv. 485 (1924); Finkelstein, Further
Notes on Judicial Self-Limitation, 39 HARV. L. REv. 221 (1925); Scharpf, Jldicial
Review and the Political Question: A Fundamental Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517
(1966); Tollett, Political Questions and the Law, 42 U. DET. L.J. 439 (1965);
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1
(1959); Weston, Political Questions, 38 HARV. L. REv. 296 (1925).
"369 U.S. 186 (1962).
"See, e.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
"369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).
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discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the im-
possibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need
for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or
the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements
by various departments on one question.
Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at
bar, there should be no dismissal for nonjusticiability on the ground
of a political question's presence.
24
From this list two ideas emerge as dominant. First, when a constitutional
power is specifically conferred upon a branch of government other than
the judiciary the exercise of that power is non-reviewable. Second, if there
is a possibility of divergent views between coordinate departments on a
question, or resolution of a problem by one branch may express an em-
barrassing lack of respect due to another branch, then the matter is
political and non-justiciable.
Although there is no precedent directly in point, 5 the principal federal
cases prior to Powell touching on the subject of legislative exclusion seemed
to reinforce the view that Congress has the sole authority to judge
its members. The issue was generally considered political and non-
justiciable. 6 In Sevilla v. Elizalde,7 the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit declared that the power to pass on the qualifications
of legislators is "lodged exclusively in the legislative branch." 28 Similarly,
in Barry v. United States ex rel. Cunningham,2 9 the Supreme Court
"'Id. at 217.
2' "In our entire history, no case has been found where the judgment of either
House has been overruled in a judicial proceeding." Curtis, The Power of the-
Hotse of Representatives to $Tidge the Qualifications of its Members, 45 TEX.
L. Ruv. 1199, 1204 (1967).
20See Powell v. McCormack, 266 F. Supp. 354, 356 (D.D.C. 1967).
112 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1940). This case involved a suit by a citizen of the
Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands seeking a determination that the defendant
did not possess the requisite qualifications for holding the office of Resident Com-
missioner of the Commonwealth to the United States. The court dismissed the
complaint upon the grounds that it raised a political question over which the court
had no jurisdiction and also that the court had no authority to pass upon the
qualifications of a delegate from a territory.
28 Id. at 38.
20 279 U.S. 597 (1929). Barry, upon which the respondents in Powell relied
heavily, involved the power of the Senate to issue an arrest warrant to summon a
witness to give testimony concerning a senatorial election.
19701
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
declared that certain powers had been conferred upon the Houses of Con-
gress that were not legislative, but were judicial in nature, and that
among these judicial powers is that of judging the qualifications of mem-
bers." The Court said that a judgment in exercise of those powers is
"beyond the authority of any other tribunal to review."31 But in Powell
the Court leaped over these apparent hurdles by ignoring Sevilla and
distinguishing Barry.3
The respondents relied on Sevilla and Barry in contending that under
article 1, section 5,33 there was a "textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment" 34 to the House to determine Powell's qualifications. They
argued that the House, and the House alone, has power to judge who
is qualified to be a member. The Court, to determine the merits of the
respondents' arguments, was required to interpret the Constitution:
If examination of § 5 disclosed that the Constitution gives the
House judicially unreviewable power to set qualifications for mem-
bership and to judge whether prospective members meet those qualifica-
tions, further review of the House determination might well be barred
by the political question doctrine. On the other hand, if the Consti-
tution gives the House power to judge only whether elected members
possess the three standing qualifications set forth in the Constitution,
further consideration would be necessary to determine whether any
of the other formulations of the political question doctrine are in-
extricable from the case at bar.
35
Stated differently, if the constitutionally enumerated qualifications are
minimum standards for the House to judge its members, then judicial
30 Id. at 613.31 Id.
81 Barry provides no support for respondents' argument that this case is not
justiciable, however. First, in Barry the Court reached the merits of the con-
troversy, thus indicating that actions allegedly taken pursuant to Art. I, § 5,
are not automatically immune from judicial review. Second, the quoted
statement is dictum; and, later in the same opinion, the Court noted that the
Senate may exercise its power subject "to the restraints imposed by or
found in the implications of the Constitution." Third, of course, the state-
ment in Barry leaves open the particular question that must first be resolved
in this case: the existence and scope of the textual commitment to the
House to judge the qualifications of members.
395 U.S. at 519 n.40 (citation omitted).
" "Each House shall be the judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications
of its own members . .. ."
"' 395 U.S. at 519. If any of the six tests formulated in Baker are met, the case
may involve a political question and therefore be non-justiciable. Powell v. Mc-
Cormack, 395 F.2d 577, 593 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
33 395 U.S. at 520-21.
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review of its determination is a political question since the issue is textually
committed to a coordinate political department. On the other hand, if
those specified requirements are maximum standards, the issue has not
been committed to a coordinate department and the extra-constitutional
action of the House is subject to judicial scrutiny unless any other of
Baker's formulations can be applied to the facts of the case.
The Court held that the standards were maximum: "[0] ur examina-
tion of the relevant historical materials leads us to the conclusion that
... the Constitution leaves the House without authority to exclude any
person, duly elected by his constituents, who meets all the requirements
for membership expressly prescribed in the Constitution." 6 Since article
1, section 5 is a "textually demonstrable commitment" to the House to
judge only the qualifications expressly set forth in the Constitution, the
"'textual commitment' formulation of the political question doctrine does
not bar federal courts from adjudicating petitioners! claims."-' Adam
Clayton Powell was duly elected and was not ineligible to serve under
any provision of the Constitution; therefore the House was without power
to exclude him from its membership.
8
Since there are no cases interpreting the meaning of the phrase to
"judge the qualifications of its members," the Court had to look to the
records of the debates during the Constitutional Convention."9 Early in
the Convention, George Mason of Virginia had moved to include a prop-
erty qualification for members of the legislature. The Convention adopted
this proposal and instructed the Committee of Detail to draft such a
qualification. The committee's report of August 6 provided that: "The
Legislature . . .shall have authority to establish such uniform qualifica-
tions of the members of each House, with regard to property, as to the
said Legislature shall seem expedient." 40
The debate on this proposal is a great source of the Framers' view
of the qualifications issue. James Madison stated that the proposal would
vest
11 Id. at 522. The Court expressed no view on the issue of whether federal courts
could review a factual determination by the House that a member did not meet
one of the prescribed qualifications. Id. at 521, n.42.
37 Id. at 548.
5 Id. at 550.
"Much of the Court's discussion of the Convention proceedings is taken from
C. WAuEN, THE MAINiG OF THE CoNSTITUTIO N 418-26 (1926) [hereinafter cited
as WARREN]. In his arguments before the Supreme Court, Powell's counsel relied
heavily on Professor Warren's analysis.
" Id. at 418. See generally, Farrand 179.
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[a]n improper and dangerous power in the Legislature. The qualifica-
tions of electors and elected were fundamental articles in a Re-
publican Govt. and ought to be fixed by the Constitution. If the
Legislature could regulate those of either, it can by degrees subvert
the Constitution . . . . It was a power also, which might be made
subservient to the views of one faction agst. another. Qualifications
founded on artificial distinctions may be devised, by the stronger in
order to keep out partisans of a weaker faction. 41
It is significant that Madison aimed his argument not at the imposition
of a property qualification per se, but at the delegation to the legislature of
discretionary power to establish any qualifications.42 Referring to the
British Parliament's assumption of the power to regulate the qualifications
of both electors and elected, Madison went on to note that "the abuse
they had made of it was a lesson worthy of our attention. They had made
the changes in both cases subservient to their own views, or to the views
of political or Religious parties. 4 3
The Convention obviously concurred with Madison's views, for both
the proposal to give to Congress power to establish qualifications in gen-
eral and the proposal for a property qualification were defeated. 44 It is
within this context that on the same day (August 10, 1787) the Convention
agreed to article 2, section 5 of the Constitution, which provided that
"Each House shall be the judge of the . . . qualifications of its own
members."45
One additional decision made that day is also important in determining
the meaning of article 1, section 5. When the proposal to empower each
House to expel its members was discussed, Madison observed that "the
right of expulsion . . . was too important to be exercised by a bare
majority of a quorum: and in emergencies one faction might be danger-
ously abused."4 He therefore moved that "with the concurrence of two-
thirds" be inserted. The motion was approved. The Court in Powell
considered this decision highly significant:
[T]he Convention's decision to increase the vote required to expel,
because that power was "too important to be exercised by a bare
"Farrand 249-50; WARREN 420.
"Chief Justice Warren also made note of this fact. 395 U.S. 534.
"J. MADIsoN, NoTEs OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at
429 (A. Koch ed. 1966).
"'WARREN 420-21.
" Id. at 419.
"J. MADIsoN, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at
431 (A. Koch ed. 1966).
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majority," while at the same time not similarly restricting the power
to judge qualifications, is compelling evidence that they considered the
latter already limited by the standing qualifications previously adopted.47
It seems only logical that if the Convention voted to require a two-thirds
vote of a House to expel a member, it was not willing to allow either
House to exclude a member-elect for any reason at all merely by a
majority vote.
48
Another source for examining the intent of the Framers is The
Federalist,49 a series of essays written for the express purpose of explain-
ing the Constitution. Madison, for example, states in one of his papers:
"The qualifications of the elected being less carefully and properly defined
by the State Constitutions, and being at the same time more susceptible
of uniformity, have been very properly considered and regulated by the
Convention."5 Hamilton expressed similar thoughts by saying, "[t]he
qualifications of the persons who may choose or be chosen... are defined
and fixed in the constitution; and are unalterable by the legislature."51
Such authorities are persuasive. 2
There are, of course, arguments that article 1, section 2 establishes
only minimum standards. One such argument, relying on a change by
the Committee of Style in the form of article 1, section 2, was proposed
by the respondents in Powell, but rejected by the Court.5" Another
argument is that in addition to the age, citizenship, and inhabitancy
qualifications of article I, section 2, there are other constitutional dis-
qualifications ;54 thus this provision cannot provide maximum congressional
17 395 U.S. at 536.
This argument is precisely that of Professor Warren. WARREN 424.
"THE FEmALIST (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
O TE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 354 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison).
:THE FEDERA'LIST No. 60, at 409 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
'Professor Warren has concluded:
As the Constitution, as then drafted, expressly set forth the qualifications of
age, citizenship and residence, and as the Convention refused to grant to
Congress power to establish qualifications in general, the maxim expressio
unius exclusio alterius would seem to apply . . . . The elimination of all
power in Congress to fix qualifications clearly left the provisions of the
Constitution itself as the sole source of qualifications.
WARREN 421-22.
" 395 U.S. at 525-26. The respondents argued that the change made by the
Committee of Style in Article I, § 2 from positive statements of qualifications to
the present negative form evidenced a design to give Congress the power to deny
a seat if it deeemed one "unfit" for reasons other than the meeting of the
enumerated requirements. Id.
" Dionisopoulos, A Commentary on the Constitutional Issues in the Powell and
Related Cases, 17 J. PuB. LAw 103 (1968). First, any person convicted after ir-
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standards. But this argument, far from rebutting the theory of express
qualifications, actually strengthens it. For if the Framers saw fit to list
qualifications for office in the Constitution, they must have intended to
preclude the addition of any others by the Houses of Congress.
Having decided that the issue in Powell was not textually committed
to another branch of government, the Court still had to resolve other
considerations. The respondents contended as an alternative theory that
the case presented a political question under the Baker formulations
because judicial resolution of Powell's claim would produce the "potenti-
ality of embarrassment" from a confrontation between equal branches
of the federal government. 5  The Court also had to overcome the sug-
gestion that a determination in his favor would express a "lack of the
respect due" a coordinate department. But the Constitution is the
"supreme Law of the Land" 7 and it is the responsibility of the Supreme
Court to act as the ultimate interpreter of this document."" As stated in
Cooper v. Aaron :9
Article VI of the Constitution makes the Constitution the "supreme
Law of the Land." In 1803, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for a
unanimous Court, referring to the Constitution as "the fundamental
and paramount law of the nation," declared in the notable case of
peachment by the Senate is disqualified not only from serving in Congress, but also
may not "hold and enjoy any Office, of honor, Trust or Profit under the United
States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
A second disqualification is found in article I, § 6: members of Congress may
not hold any other "office under the United States."
The guaranty clause of article IV, § 4 points to another disqualification. This
provision guarantees "every State in this Union a Republican Form of Govern-
ment." In Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849), the Court interpreted
this article to mean that Congress has the unreviewable power to decide what
government is the established one in a state. If Congress can acknowledge that a
state has a republican government and thus accept its representatives, it must also
have the authority to disqualify Congressmen elected in a state not having a
republican form of government. Dionisopoulous supra, at 114.
An additional provision pertaining to qualifications is article VI, clause 3, re-
quiring that all public officials, national and state, "shall be bound by oath or
Affirmation, to support this Constitution . . . ." This Provision was recently in-
terpreted to mean that a "legislator ... can be required to swear to support the
Constitution of the United States as a condition of holding offlce. Bond v. Floyd,
385 U.S. 116, 132 (1966) (dictum) (emphasis added).,
r 395 U.S. at 548.
raId.
"U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2.
58Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
S358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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Marbury v. Madison .... that "It is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." This decision
declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in
the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle
has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a
permanent and indispensable feature of our Constitutional system.60
Determination of Powell's right to be seated by the House thus but re-
quired the Court to perform its duty as ultimate interpreter of the
Constitution. It is not unusual for the federal courts to interpret the
Constitution in a manner at variance with the construction given by
another branch. Such a division occurs whenever congressional acts are
declared unconstitutional. Any conflict between the branches of govern-
ment that such an adjudication may cause cannot justify the courts'
avoiding their constitutional duties.0 '
The major impact of Powell is its effect on the political question
doctrine. The doctrine has, at the very least, been seriously undermined
by the holding in Powell. The formulations in Baker relating to the
potential embarrassment or lack of respect of coordinate branches of gov-
ernment must be considered as having been read out of the doctrine. If the
Supreme Court has the power, indeed the mandate, to hear all questions in-
volving constitutional interpretation, then these bases of the political
question doctrine are no longer viable; judicial review of constitutional
construction of another branch of the government is, by its very nature,
an intrusion upon the traditional concept of separation of powers.
Although the potential embarrassment of a coordinate branch has
been eliminated by Powell as a test for political questions, the textual com-
mitment concept remains. The Court in Powell did not find a textual com-
mitment; however, certain powers do seem textually committed exclusively
to a branch of government others than the judiciary,"2 and in such cases
determinations by that branch would present non-justiciable political
questions.
It is perhaps significant that the Court was unwilling to speculate
what the result might have been had Powell been expelled from the House
00 Id. at 18.
61 395 U.S. at 549.
02 For example, there can be little doubt that the powers given Congress by
Article I, § 8 are exclusively reserved to the legislature. In addition, Article I in
§§ 3 & 4 gives Congress, and not the courts, the power to impeach and to try im-
peacbments.
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rather than excluded.0 Whether the authority of the House under
article 1, section 5 to expel a member "with the Concurrence of two-thirds"
constitutes an unreviewable textual commitment remains to be answered.
Yet surely a legislative body has the authority to police the conduct of
its own members. To hold otherwise is to conclude that it is at the
mercy of its unscrupulous or disruptive legislators.
The specific holding of Powell--that a duly elected legislator cannot
be excluded if he meets the constitutionally specified requirements-is of
little significance in the day-to-day practice of law. Its real importance
to the practitioner is in the partial collapse of the political-question doc-
trine as an aid to a policy of judicial self-restraint. It would seem that
Powell has provided authority for federal courts to hear important con-
stitutional issues previously held to be non-justiciable.
NEILL HOWARD FLEISHMAN
Criminal Procedure-Juries in the Juvenile Justice System?
In re Gault' indicated in dictum that a juvenile hearing must meet
the basic requirements of due process.2 Duncan v. Louisiane held that
trial by jury in non-petty criminal cases is a basic requirement of due
process. The logical completion of the syllogism is: A juvenile hear-
ing must involve a jury if the youth's offense is not petty or his term
0" 395 U.S. at 508. The Court also expressed no view on what, if any, limitation
may exist on Congress' expulsion powers. Id. at 507 n.27.
'387 U.S. 1 (1967).
'The Court in Gault said that in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966),
[w]e announced... that while "We do not mean ... to indicate that the
hearing to be held must conform with all of the requirements of a criminal
trial or even of the usual administrative hearing; . . . we do hold that the
hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treat-
ment." We reiterate that view, here in connection with a juvenile court
adjudication of "delinquency" ....
3,87 U.S. at 30 (footnote omitted). The Court in Gault was silent about trial
by jury: Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), had not yet been decided,
and the facts might not have presented the issue in any event since Gerald
Gault's offense if committed by an adult could not have brought a sentence of
longer than two months. Id. at 8-9. The specific holding of Gault went only
so far as to require notice of the charges, id. at 33-34; the right to be repre-
sented by counsel or by appointed counsel in cases of poverty, id. at 41; the
privilege to remain silent, id. at 55; and the right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses, id. at 56-57.
8391 U.S. 145 (1968). See also Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
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of institutionalization potentially extensive. On the basis of a techni-
cality, however, the United States Supreme Court declined the oppor-
tunity to apply this logic and dismissed the recent case of DeBacker v.
Brainard,4 which squarely presented the issue of the right to a jury in
juvenile hearings.
The state courts are split on the question, both internally and from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Since Gault was handed down, fewer courts
have followed the logic outlined above than not.5 The most recent of
majority persuasion is the North Carolina Supreme Court, which in
deciding In re Burrus' noted that the juvenile (district) court had met all
the narrow Gault requirements,7 that trial by jury was not among them,
and that, therefore, the case was closed.'
The decisions and opinions against the jury requirement in juvenile
proceedings elaborate in detail the theory that gave rise to a separate
system of justice for juveniles at the turn of the century; they point to
the excellence of the goals of the theory; they emphasize the crucial differ-
ences between that theory and the criminal justice system for adults.
At times admitting a certain gap between theory and actuality,9 these
'396 U.S. 28 (1969). In DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968), the
Court held that Duncan and Bloom would have only prospective application.
Clarence DeBacker's juvenile court hearing was held on March 28, 1968; Duncan
and Bloom were handed down on May 20, 1968.
5 Three pre-Duwcan cases interpreted Gault to require trial by jury in the
juvenile hearing: Nieves v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
Peyton v. Nord, 78 N.M. 717, 437 P.2d 716 (1968) ; In re Rindell, 2 BNA CRIm.
L. REP. 3121 (Providence, R.I., Fam. Ct. 1968). See also Hogan v. Rosenberg,
24 N.Y.2d 207, 247 N.E.2d 260, 299 N.Y.S.2d 424, prob. jutris. noted sub zorn.
Baldwin v. New York, 395 U.S. 932, motion to expedite denied sub nom. Puryear
v. Hogan, 395 U.S. 973 (1969). Among the decisions denying trial by jury
before Duncan are: Commonwealth v. Johnson, 211 Pa. Super. 62, 234 A.2d 9
(1967) and Estes v. Hopp, 73 Wash. 2d 272, 438 P.2d 205 (1968); after Duncan:
Dryden v. Commonwealth, 435 S.W.2d 457 (Ky. 1968); In re Johnson, 255 Md.
1, 255 A.2d 419 (1969); DeBacker v. Brainard, 183 Neb. 461, 161 N.W.2d 508
(1968), aff'd per curiam, 396 U.S. 28 (1969); In re State ex rel. J. W., 106
N.J. Super. 129, 254 A.2d 334 (Union County Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1969); and
In re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517, 169 S.E.2d 879 (1969). The rift is most clearly dem-
onstrated with the DeBacker case. Four of the seven judges on the Nebraska
Supreme Court found the confluence of Gault and Duncan a mandate to
reverse that state's policy of excluding the jury from the juvenile hearing. How-
ever, the Nebraska Constitution provides that "[11o legislative act shall be held
unconstitutional except by the concurrence of five judges." NEB. CONsT. art. 5,§ 2.
275 N.C. 517, 169 S.E.2d 879 (1969).
'These requirements are listed in note 2 supra.
8 275 N.C. at 533-34, 169 S.E.2d at 889.
' ln re Johnson, 255 Md. 1, -, 255 A.2d 419, 423 (1969); In re W., 24
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opinions nonetheless indicate a belief that interjecting the jury would
mean a retrogression to the "ordinary criminal trial."'" The theory
favored can be expressed in this fashion: The wayward child is not
to be examined with regard to the act he might have committed; but
rather the judge, as the child's surrogate parent, is benignly to inquire
into the totality of circumstances impinging on the child and do the best
for him; official stigma is to be washed away. Strict procedures would
be antithetical to such a non-retributive process. The process, in fact,
would be wholly civil, simply an extension of the equity court's traditional
jurisdiction over neglected children. Not so exuberantly stated, the theory
was nonetheless thriving handsomely in 1969: "The delinquency status
is not made a crime; and the proceedings are not criminal. There is,
hence, no deprivation of due process . . ." in disallowing jury trial."
The argument is that aside from weighing down the juvenile proceed-
ing with a criminal-trial aura, the presence of the jury would cramp the
judge's flexibility in the essential "whole-child" analysis. Contentiousness
would be promoted. The cherished informality that engenders a sense
of cooperation and does not overly frighten the child would be destroyed.
Implicit in this argument is the notion that the traditional secrecy of the
N.Y.2d 196, 198, 247 N.E.2d 253, 254, 299 N.Y.S.2d 414, 416, prob. juris. noted
sub norn. In re Winship, 396 U.S. 885 (1969) ; Commonwealth v. Johnson, 211 Pa.
Super. 62, 70-71, 234 A.2d 9, 13-14 (1967). On March 31, 1970, the United States
Supreme Court, deciding In re Whiship, reversed the New York court and held that
the Constitution requires as high a standard of proof in juvenile courts as in courts
trying adults. N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1970, at 24, col. 1.
10 387 U.S. at 75 (dissenting opinion). The phrase is Justice Harlan's, used in
the specific context of Gault, but typical of the "theorist" approach.
" In re W., 24 N.Y.2d 196, 203, 247 N.E.2d 253, 257, 299 N.Y.S.2d 414, 420
(1969). The theorists are not at all chary of quoting the old cases. The successful
dissent to the majority's decision in DeBacker at the state level, for example,
quoted Laurie v. State, 108 Neb. 239, 242-43, 188 N.W. 110, 111 (1922), quoting
Wisconsin Indus. School for Girls v. Clark County, 103 Wis. 651, 664-65, 79
N.W. 422, 426-27 (1899):
"'The proceeding is not one according to the course of the common law
in which the right of trial by jury is guaranteed, but a mere statutory
proceeding for the accomplishment of the protection of the helpless, which
object was accomplished before the Constitution without the enjoyment of
a jury trial. There is no restraint upon the natural liberty of children
contemplated by such a law-none whatever; but rather the placing of
them under the natural restraint, so far as practicable, that should be, but
is not, exercised by parental authority. It is the mere conferring upon them
that protection to which, under the circumstances, they are entitled as a
matter of right."'
183 Neb. at 472-73, 161 N.W.2d at 514. For an explanation of why the dissent
was successful under Nebraska law, see note 5 supra.
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juvenile proceeding would be compromised by the presence of a jury,
thus increasing the stigma felt by the child. Presumably, the argument
goes, the jury is an inadequate fact-finder-at least, no better a fact-
finder than the judge. And the question is put: Could there be any petty-
serious distinction made as called for by the rationale of Duncan?
Juveniles may normally be committed to a training school for an in-
definite period, not to exceed their minority, even though the given
offense if committed by an adult might involve a maximum sentence of
less than six months. Finally, it is argued that the jury's inefficiency
would promote delay at great economic cost and also at great cost in
terms of crippling the more immediate implementation of the theory.
It takes no imagination to prophesy that the increase in percentage
of jury trials could easily delay a case for several years, which in the
case of growing children whose personalities and learning change
daily, is much more critical than in the case of adults.1
2
This note will attempt to show that each of these arguments against
the jury fails; it will not attempt affirmatively to argue on behalf of the
jury as an institution. Trial by jury is not "the mainstay and bulwark
upon which truth and liberty rest"'" nor "the most cherished right
awarded to man."' 4 But Duncan v. Louisianu stands as a constitutional
mandate, however strong or weak its logical underpinnings. If the juvenile
proceeding is not meaningfully different from the adult proceeding in its
form or consequences, Gault and Duncan demand that trial by jury be
granted when requested.
The fundamental analytical blunder of the contra-jury theorists has
been the failure in their reasoning to separate the adjudicatory from the
dispositional aspects of the juvenile proceeding; as will be shown later,
the need for flexibility exists primarily on the dispositional side where
the jury has no place. Another error, or perhaps a knowing technique
for avoiding confrontation of the real issues, has been the intoning of
catch-phrases such as "parens patriae" or "civil, not criminal." "Form
[has] swallowed substance, and semantics [has] disposed of the consti-
tutional rights of juveniles . . . ."' The Supreme Court indicated in
Gault that it is not tricked by these words:
1 Brief for Appellee at 12, DeBacker v. Brainard, 396 U.S. 28 (1969).
"In re Rindell, 2 BNA C1imI. L. REI. 3121 (Providence, R.I., Fain. Ct. 1968).
1,Id. at 3126.
DeBacker v. Brainard, 183 Neb. 461, 466, 161 N.W.2d 508, 511 (1968).
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The Latin phrase [parens patriae] proved to be a great help to those
who sought to rationalize the exclusion of juveniles from the consti-
tutional scheme; but its meaning is murky and its historic credentials
are of dubious relevance. 16
Before other grounds for excluding the jury from the juvenile hear-
ing are examined, a basic point-which will appear too obvious-must
be made. One gets the impression from the cases that there is a fear
that the unknowing juvenile will be forced into having a jury and thus
will be unduly intimidated. "[T]he short answer is that if an accused
juvenile and his counsel do not want a jury trial, they do not have to
have one.'
17
The plea for informality fails to take into account the salutary effect
that the solemnity of the courtroom has in increasing respect for the
law." Furthermore, the idea of informality in the courtroom or even
the judge's chambers (where the judge "can on occasion put his arm
around [the child's] shoulder and draw the lad to him")" is a hoax.
The process may be less formal from the judge's point of view, but it
is not the judge's "alienation" about which there is concern. The process
cannot be informalized from a child's point of view.
2 0
A noble aim of the juvenile court theory has been "to save [the
child] from the brand of criminality, the brand that sticks to it for
life .... ,,1' Yet how much violation of secrecy is really going to occur
10 387 U.S. at 16.
Dorsen & Rezneck, In Re Gault and the Future of Iuvenile Law, 1 FAM.
L.Q. 1, 23-24 (Dec. 1967) [hereinafter cited as Dorsen & Rezneck]. N.C. CONST.
art. 1, § 13, guaranteeing trial by jury in criminal cases, has been interpreted to
require trial by jury for all adults accused of any crimes except petty mis-
demeanors. State v. Holt, 90 N.C. 749 (1884). If a youthful offender is to be
treated in the same way as an adult in regard to the right to trial by jury, as this
note indicates Gault and Duncan require, then it may be argued that a North
Carolina juvenile, in the same way as a North Carolina adult, will not be allowed
to waive the jury. This argument has the advantage of consistency, but it also
ensures that the judge can never play the role attributed to him by the theorists
even when all parties are willing for him to attempt it.18Dorsen & Rezneck 23.
19 Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 H. v. L. REv. 104, 120 (1909) [hereinafter
cited as Mack]."0 [I]nformal handling appears informal only to the officials charged with
execution of certain responsibilities; to those caught up in the net of the
juvenile justice system, it is impressively authoritative and formal ....
THE PRESIDENT'S CoMMIssIoN ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 10
(1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REP.]. The Commission recognized
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by including twelve strangers in the juvenile adjudicatory process? Al-
ready exclusion of the general public from a juvenile hearing is dis-
cretionary with the judge, at least in North Carolina. 2 Moreover, the
Court in Gault called the claim of secrecy, with regard to the perhaps more
telling area of court records, "more rhetoric than reality."'
The possibility that some petty offenses might be tried by jury in
juvenile court along with offenses serious by adult standards is certainly
an unsubstantial reason for denying the right to jury. The maximum
possible adult sentence could furnish one test for determining whether
the given offense was serious or petty.2' However, a juvenile offender
when committed to a reformatory remains incarcerated at the discretion of
the institution's administrators for a period that typically may not extend
beyond the youth's eighteenth or twenty-first birthday. Gerald Gault,
for example, could have been institutionalized for as many as six years
since he was only fifteen years old at the time of his hearing; however,
had he been an adult, he could not have received a sentence of more than
two months. 5 In this sense, no offense committed by a youth is ever
"petty."
To the fact-finding and economic arguments against the jury, the
answer is that these may also be directed against the adult trial system;
thus they were refuted in Duncan. In that decision the Court relied on
a "recent and exhaustive study" by Messrs. Kalven and Zeisel,26 which
"concluded that juries do understand the evidence and come to sound
conclusions in most of the cases presented to them. .. "'I, The efficiency-
economy argument seems particularly inappropriate in a state such as
North Carolina, which has one of the highest annual (adult) criminal
jury trial rates in the nation.2
22 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-285 (1969).
28387 U.S. at 24. This observation is one further example of the disparity
between theory and reality.
In theory the court's action was to affix no stigmatizing label. In fact a
delinquent is generally viewed by employers, schools, the armed services--
by society generally-as a criminal.
TASK Fo CE REP. 9.
" The maximum adult sentence was accepted as the test by the losing, though
majority, faction of the Nebraska Supreme Court in DeBacker v. Brainard, 183
Neb. 461, 469-70, 161 N.W.2d 508, 513 (1968).25 387 U.S. at 8-9.
I2 H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AmERICAN JuRy 494 (1966).
27391 U.S. at 157.
2 In the year 1955 there were 3,950 criminal jury trials in North Carolina; this
number was exceeded only in Georgia (5,300), California (4,940), and Alabama
(4,270). If. KAvEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AmEmCAN JuRY 502-03 (1966).
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It is perhaps true that delay is a more serious matter with regard to
juveniles than to adults, especially in light of the frightening upsurge of
juvenile delinquency in the last decade 9 and the general belief that more
"can be done with" a child than an adult if only he can be "got to" soon
enough; but delay is endemic throughout the judicial system and is a
serious blackmark against it no matter what the defendant's age. Against
the economy argument must be balanced the constitutional right that
is involved. 0 Moreover, gross delay may in the end be a good thing:
perhaps the people and the legislatures will be forced to give more attention
to these problems.
The theorists' intricate rationale against jury-inclusion in juvenile
proceedings rests upon a tenuous foundation consisting of certain in-
correct assumptions: that a juvenile court judge always uses his un-
hampered discretion in the most intelligent and benevolent way; that
the dispositional alternatives open to a judge are genuinely rehabilitative;
and that instituting the jury must necessarily deprive the judge of any
flexibility with which he might sensitively employ rehabilitative plans, if
available. These assumptions will be considered in turn.
One state court judge recoiled angrily against the statement in Gault
that "the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court"81;
he called this "an implied criticism of juvenile judges that is wholly un-
warranted."82 Other judges are not so defensive, but they exhibit a no
less unqualified faith in the juvenile court judge. 8 However, the image
of the amiable, well-meaning, tender-hearted, fatherly juvenile court
judge is no more realistic than the conception of the judge as overworked,
hardened, insensitive, and prosecution-oriented. The mere possibility of
the latter is sufficient ground for requiring determination of guilt by a
jury. This ancient reason for having trial by jury is no less compelling
because the defendant is under the age of sixteen. To the contrary, it
" TASK FoRcE REP. 1.
o See In re Rindell, 2 BNA CEIm. L. REP. 3121, 3125 (Providence, R.I., Faro.
Ct. 1968).
387 U.S. at 28.
"DeBacker v. Brainard, 183 Neb. 461, 476, 161 N.W.2d 508, 516 (1968)
(dissenting opinion). The judge declared, "I am not so naive as not to recognize
that Kent, Gault, and Duncan point to the eventual destruction of the juvenile
court acts existing in most of the states of the union." Id. at 480-81, 161 N.W.2d
at 518. "But I shall neither bend the knee nor bow the head on mere inferences,
speculations, or probabilities as to what [the United States Supreme Court]
will eventually do." Id. at 482, 161 N.W.2d at 519.
8 See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 211 Pa. Super. 62, 76-77, 234 A.2d 9, 16-17
(1967). .
[Vol. 48
JURIES AND JUVENILE JUSTICE
has been said that "juvenile judges have the most difficult job in the
whole legal system"-a job demanding intelligence and empathy; yet it
is a job generally without prestige.34 Moreover, "[a]s often as not the
judge acts as prosecutor-a depressingly unjust practice. Or he assigns
the job to a probation worker who later is supposed to win the child'
confidence to help him change his ways." 5 If a juvenile court has
pre-judicial machinery for screening out numerous youthful offenders,
those sent into court cannot but be "tainted" in the judge's eyes; a jury
would not be as likely to feel such a prejudice.
If the juvenile justice system worked, the argument for exclusion
of the jury from the hearing and, indeed, for deprivation of procedural
due process generally, would seem much stronger-even though the argu-
ment is not stronger from a purely logical point of view. The inference
from the court opinions opposing inclusion of the jury, even when they
acknowledge a degree of failure in the system, is that it is successful
to a greater or lesser degree. But the truth is startlingly the opposite. 6
In 1909 Judge Mack described juvenile penal-corrective conditions
prior to the inception of the theory of the juvenile justice system as
follows:
[I]nstead of the state's training its bad boys so as to make of them
decent citizens, it permitted them to become the outlaws and outcasts
"James, Do Children Get Their Day in Court?, The Christian Science
Monitor, April 12-14, 1969, at 10, col. 4.
" Id., col. 1.
O No discussion of juvenile delinquency would be complete without the much-
quoted statement from the Supreme Court's first juvenile delinquency case, Kent v.
United States:
[T]here may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of
both worlds: that he gets neither the protections afforded to adults nor the
solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children.
383 U.S. at 556 (footnote omitted). The Task Force Report of the President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of justice leaves no doubt
about the failure of the system:
[T]he postulates of specialized treatment and resulting reclamation basic
to the juvenile court have significantly failed of proof, both in implementa-
tion and in consequences. The dispositions available for most youths adjudi-
cated delinquent are indistinguishable from those for adult criminals: Pro-
bation with a minimum of contact... or institutionalization in what is often,
as a result of overcrowding and understaffing, a maximum security ware-
house for youths. The vaunted intermediate and auxiliary measures--com-
munity residential centers, diversified institutions and institutional pro-
grams, intensive supervision-with which youth was to be reclaimed have
come to pass only sporadically, hampered by lack of money, lack of staff,
lack of support, lack of evaluation.
TAsK FORCE REP. 23.
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of society; it criminalized them by the very methods that it used in
dealing with them.
3 7
His statement perfectly describes conditions today, long after implementa-
tion of the theory. Probational officers or juvenile counselors, where they
exist, have "caseloads typically .. .so high that counseling and super-
vision take the form of occasional phone calls and perfunctory visits
instead of the careful, individualized service that was intended" 8 ; salaries
being meagre, naturally the most intelligent and dynamic persons are not
drawn into the field. State institutions for juvenile delinquents are regi-
mented and often brutal 9 festering grounds for hardening youths un-
alterably into criminals.4"
Mack 107. Judge Mack's conception of the ease with which juveniles could
be rehabilitated was perhaps grossly overly optimistic. Yet he realized that
despite the great ultimate financial saving to the state through this method
of dealing with children, a saving represented by the value of a decent
citizen as against a criminal, the public authorities are nowhere fully alive
to the new obligations that the spirit as well as the letter of this legislation
imposes upon them.
Id. 115. He was aware that the system could not work without meaningful re-
habilitative alternatives, and he warned:
If a child must be taken away from its home, if for the natural parental
care that of the state is to be substituted, a real school, not a prison in
disguise, must be provided.
Id. 114.
" TASK FORcE REP. 8.
"9 See James, Do Children Get Their Day in Court?, The Christian Science
Monitor, April 12-14, at 9, col. 1.
"' According to Mr. George F. McGrath, head of the New York City prison
system:
The public should be told that correctional agencies contribute enorm-
ously to the crime rate . . . . There is a direct relationship between the
growing crime rate and our institutions.
The people do not understand that. Public officials do not understand
that. But it is unquestionably true.
James, Reach a Child Early Enough, The Christian Science Monitor, April 19-21,
at 9, col. 3. Mr. Milton Luger, president of the National Association of State
Juvenile Delinquency Program Administrators, has said: "[W]ith the exception
of a relatively few youths, it [would be] better for all concerned if young de-
linquents were not detected, apprehended, or institutionalized. Too many of them
get worse in our care." James, "Too Many of Them Get Worse it Our Care,"
The Christian Science Monitor, April 26-28, at 9, col. 4.
. . . Oliver J. Keller, who recently took over as head of the Florida
Division of Youth Services [has said]:
"We are working in a terribly primitive field. Primitive. Punitive.
Brutal. I don't like large institutions. I don't like what happens to children
in them. One of my men says living in a training school is as cozy as living
in a wash bay of a filling station. I agree. The child is returned to the
streets with none of his family problems solved. And he's more sophisti-
cated in crime."
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Despite the imperfections of the present system of juvenile justice,
without any doubt "the ideal of separate treatment of children is still
worth pursuing."' 41 Just as obviously, the traditional jury is not equipped
to know the best dispositional alternatives for each individual child,
no matter how effectively the opposing counsel argue for given disposi-
tions. The fallacy in mourning the demise of the juvenile justice system
because of the intrusion of the jury is in the failure to distinguish the
adjudicatory, or "fact," and dispositional, or "whole-child," aspects of a
proceeding.42 A jury centers only upon the question of whether a specific
act was committed. The Supreme Court was careful to make this dis-
tinction in Gault:
[W] e are not here concerned with the procedures or constitutional
rights applicable to the pre-judicial stages of the juvenile process, nor
do we direct our attention to the post-adjudicative or dispositional
process. . . . We consider only . . . proceedings by which a deter-
mination is made as to whether a juvenile is a "delinquent" as a result
of alleged misconduct on his part, with the consequence that he may be
committed to'a state institution.
4 3
As the Court explained:
We do not mean by this to denigrate the juvenile court process or
to suggest that there are not aspects of the juvenile system relating
to offenders which are valuable. But the features of the juvenile
system which its proponents have asserted are of unique benefit will not
be impaired by constitutional domestication.44
One more among the catalogue of reasons given for excluding the
jury is that the jurisdiction of the juvenile court extends beyond juveniles
who have committed adult crimes and includes suzerainty over juveniles
who have violated laws peculiar to children (e.g., truancy), who are
dependent (because their parents are economically unable to take care of
41 TASK FoRcE REF. 9.
"Technically, both fact and whole-child analyses are adjudicatory, the dis-
positional being yet another step. However, the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of justice has used the adjudication-disposition
terminology.
Perhaps the height of the juvenile court's procedural informality is its
failure to differentiate clearly between the adjudication hearing, whose
purpose is to determine the truth of the allegations in the petition, and the
disposition proceeding, at which the juvenile's background is considered in
connection with deciding what to do with him.
Id. 35.
"387 U.S. at 13.
"Id. at 22.
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them), or who are neglected (since their parents wilfully refuse to take
care of them)." Partly because of this argument, the President's Com-
mission's Task Force Report, written before Gault and Duncan were
handed down, opposed the jury:
Inequality and disparate decisions are invited by giving these formu-
lae [neglect, dependency, incorrigibility, truancy, etc.] to ad hoc juries
for application rather than to judges, who tend inevitably to develop
concrete meanings for such terms.48
The simple answer to this objection is that since juries do not decide
such matters in adult trials, they need not decide them in juvenile hear-
ings. The marriage of Gault and Duncan would not require it.
So far as adjudication of guilt is concerned, there are no additional
adjudicatory problems presented merely because the defendant is a child.
The issues in the delinquency trial of a law violation are the same
as in a criminal trial of the same offense. The jury function of weighing
the evidence, evaluating the credibility of witnesses, and finding the
facts are [sic] no harder with respect to whether a juvenile com-
mitted a criminal act than whether an adult did.
4 7
It will still be argued, however, that since juvenile proceedings are
wholly rehabilitative in spirit, the adjudication of the fact of guilt vel non
is unimportant and irrelevant. The New York Court of Appeals said on
March 6, 1969: "[A] child's best interest is not necessarily, or even
probably, promoted if he wins in the particular inquiry which may bring
him to the juvenile court."4 Of course, the major goal of the juvenile
court movement was to get away from the mere "specific act" determina-
tion of the traditional criminal trial. But this last-ditch argument pays
no heed to the quotidian realities of judicial technique. A child whom
the juvenile court judge finds to be wholly innocent of any type of offense
is not likely to be retained and sent through the remaining channels of
the juvenile penal-corrective process simply because he has once come to
'"The new North Carolina statute typifies the generally loose formulations.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-278 (1969).
"' TAsK FORCE REP. 38. The Commission also opposed the jury on the basis
of formality. It must be noted that the Commission was gravely skeptical over
the possibility of youths being sent to training schools for acts that are not
offenses when committed by adults. Id. 25-28.
' T Dorsen & Rezneck 23.
"i% re W., 24 N.Y.2d 196, 199, 247 N.E.2d 253, 255, 299 N.Y.S.2d 414,
417 (1969).
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the judge's attention. The jury assailants are put in the position of argu-
ing that a judge presented with four children-one innocent of any act,
though peevish or melancholy; one guilty only of having parents who
do not want him; one who has stolen a piece of candy; and one who has
murdered the town's most distinguished citizen-will look only to each
child's emotional and developmental needs in fashioning a plan for his
behavior modification.
On the one hand, it cannot be denied that the act a child has com-
mitted is inseparable from the child's personality; his act has become
a part of his personality in the eyes of all who view the child.
However advanced our techniques for determining what an indi-
vidual is, we have not approached the point at which we can safely
ignore what he has done. What he has done may often be the most
revealing evidence of what he is 49
On the other hand, neither can it be denied that the judge is the em-
bodiment of society, and as such he must and will-even -if not con-
sciously-protect society from threatening conduct, no matter if that
conduct is committed by a fourteen-year-old or by a twenty-four-year-old.
While statutes, judges, and commentators still talk the language of
compassion, help, and treatment, it has become clear that in fact the
same purposes that characterize the use of the criminal law for adult
offenders-retribution, condemnation, deterrence, incapacitation-are
involved in the disposition of juvenile offenders, too.5"
Simply put, there is a punitive as well as a rehabilitative element in the
juvenile process; to this extent the adjudication of the fact of guilt is
important, and the jury has a place in the juvenile hearing.
HAYWo0D RANKIN
10TAsi FORCE REP. 30, quoting ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL
JusTIcE 19 (1964).
11 TASK FORCE RI'. 8. The Commission accounted for nonrecognition of the
punitive aspect of the juvenile process in the following way:
One explanation of the general failure to admit the court's social pro-
tection function is, of course, the traditional view that the juvenile court
must and does act always and only in the child's best interest, regardless of
any interest society may have. A second and, perhaps, more significant
reason lies in the fact that most juvenile courts are legislatively provided
with mechanisms [e.g., waiver to adult court] for evading the social pro-
tection responsibility in its ... most public posture.
Id. 24.
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Criminal Procedure-Right To Defend Pro Se
In Seale v. Hoffman,' the defendant Seale, one of eight charged in a
much-publicized Chicago trial2 with conspiring to violate the recently-
adopted federal antiriot act,- sought injunctive relief and a declaratory
judgment to test the constitutionality of those proceedings. One of Seale's
primary contentions was that he was denied his constitutional right to
appear and to defend pro se in his trial. The federal district court dis-
missed the complaint on its own motion on the ground that the action
should properly have been brought to a higher court on appeal or in a
mandamus proceeding because a district court is without authority to
review the rulings and procedures of another federal trial court.'
Moreover, the court concluded that Seale's claim of a right to defend
himself, under the circumstances, raised no constitutional issue conferring
jurisdiction over the subject matter. Seale, it was noted, had been
represented by an attorney who had cross-examined sixteen government
witnesses on his behalf, Seale had exhibited gross contempt of court, and he
had been on trial on a charge of considerable legal complexity. As the right
of a criminal defendant to dismiss his counsel during trial in order to
appear pro se is qualified by the trial court's discretionary assessment of
the extent of potential disruption, delay, confusion of the jury, and
prejudice to the defendant, the denial of Seale's request was not errone-
ous.
5
Seale's asserted right to defend pro se is by no means novel. The right
of a 6riminally accused not to have a lawyer pre-dates the Bill of Rights.0
Currently, the right to defend pro se in the federal courts is guaranteed by
congressional statute. Section 1654 of title twenty-eight of the United
States Code provides: "In all courts of the United States the parties may
plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel .... "7 Thirty-
seven states provide constitutionally for the right to appear pro se; some
allow the accused the right to be heard, or to defend, in person and by
counsel,8 others grant the right for a defendant to defend in person or by
'306 F. Supp. 330 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
United States v. Dellinger, - F. Supp. - (N.D. Ill. 1970).
18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2101, 2102 (Supp. 1970).
306 F. Supp. at 331-3-2.
rId. at 332.
'See United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271, 274 (2d Cir. 1964).
728 U.S.C. § 1654 (1964).
'ARIz. CoNsT. art. 2, § 24; ARK. CONsT. art. 2, § 10; CA. CoNsT. art. 1, § 13;
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counsel,' and the remainder provide the right for an accused to defend
either by himself, by counsel, or both.1" Statutes guarantee the right in
other states.'
1
The Supreme Court has considered the right of a criminally accused
to defend pro se, but in an indirect and somewhat equivocal fashion.
Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann'2 seemingly held the right to be
of constitutional stature:
The right to assistance of counsel and the correlative right to
dispense wth a lawyer's help are not legal formalisms. They rest on
considerations that go to the substance of an accused's position before
the law. The public conscience must be satisfied that fairness dominates
the administration of justice . . . Essential fairness is lacking if an
accused cannot put his case effectively in court. But the Constitution
does not force a lawyer upon a defendant .... 13
Speaking in a different case, the Court later held:
Neither the historic conception of Due Process nor the vitality it
derives from progressive standards of justice denies a person the
right to defend himself or to confess guilt . . . . the Constitution
.. . does not require that under all circumstances counsel be forced
upon a defendant.14
The Court's position in the above case seems to indicate that concepts of
due process and assistance of counsel allow, but do not positively confer,
the right to defend pro se. In yet another case the Court intimated that
the right is basically statutory.'5
CoLo. CONST. art. 2, § 16; CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 9; DEL. CONST. art. 1, § 7; IDAHO
CONST. art. 1, § 13; ILL. CoNsT. art. 2, §9; IND. CoNsT. art. 1, § 13; Kyr. CONST.
Bill of Rights, § 11; Mo. CONST. art. 1, § 18(a); MONT. CONST. art. 3, § 16; NEv.
CONST. art. 1, § 8; N.H. CONST. Bill of Rights, art. 15; N.M. CoNST. art. 2, § 14;
N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6; N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 13; OHio CoNsT. art. 1, § 10; OxLA.
CONST. art. 2, § 20; ORE. CoNsT. art. 1, § 11; PA. CONST. art. 1, § 9; S.D. CoNsT.
art. 6, § 7; TENN. CoNsT. art. 1, § 9; UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 12; VT. CONST. ch. 1,
art. 10; Wis. CONST. art. 1, § 7. See LA. CONST. art. 1, § 9.
'KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 10; MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 12; NEB. CONST.
art. 1, § 11; WAsH. CONsT. art. 1, § 22.
'0 ALA. CONST. art. 1, § 6; FLA. CONST. Declaration of Rights, § 11; ME. CONST.
art. 1, § 6; Miss. CONST. art. 3, § 26; S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 18; TEX. CONST. art. 1,
§ 10.
"E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-11 (1969).
" 317 U.S. 269 (1942).
" Id. at 279.
"Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 174-75 (1946).
"Price v. Johnson, 334 U.S. 266, 285-86 (1948).
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Relying upon Adams several federal appellate courts have held that
the right is constitutionally protected, either by the sixth amendment
as correlative to right to counsel, 16 or as implicit in both the fifth and
sixth amendments, 17 or by the fifth amendment's due process clause alone.1 8
Further support for the constitutional position has been found in section
thirty-five of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which states that parties might
"plead and manage their own causes personally."10 Because this Act pre-
dated the sixth amendment, it has been asserted that the sixth amendment
was intended to include the guarantee to defend pro se as well as to enjoy
assistance of counsel.20 However, the more prevalent position, both federal
and state, holds that although the Constitution allows the criminally
accused the right to manage and conduct his defense personally, neverthe-
less "the right is statutory in character and does not rise to the dignity
of one conferred and guaranteed by the Constitution. 2 1
One problem that arises because of a finding that the right is a consti-
tutional one concerns the proper disposition by an appellate court of a
case in which that right had been denied. Before Chapman v. California,
22
10 Juelich v. United States, 342 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1965).
United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1964).
MacKenna v. Ellis, 263 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1959) (semble).
1 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789). The substantial equivalent of that statute is currently
28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1964).
o United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271, 274 (2d Cir. 1964).
21 Brown v. United States, 264 F.2d 363, 365 (D.C. Cir. 1959). This position
seems buttressed by analogy to the right to jury trial. Clearly, the right to jury
trial and the right to counsel are similar in that in given situations one might
reasonably elect to his advantage not to exercise his constitutional privilege. In-
deed, in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1967), holding the right to jury trial
for non-petty crimes binding upon the states, the Court acknowledged that a
"jury trial has 'its weaknesses and the potential for misuse.'" Id. at 156. None-
theless, it was early held on both federal and state levels that a defendant could
not waive his right to jury trial. E.g., Low v. United States, 169 F. 86 (6th Cir.
1909); Cancemi v. People, 18 N.Y. 128 (1858).
In 1930 it was held that a defendant could waive jury trial consistent with the
United States Constitution (Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930)), but it
was much later before most states decided that a waiver was possible under their
constitutions. E.g., People v. Spegal, 5 Ill. 2d 211, 125 N.E.2d 468 (1955); People
v. Carroll, 7 Misc. 2d 581, 161 N.Y.S.2d 339 (King County Ct. 1957). In Singer
v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965), an undivided Court rejected the claim that
the right to waive a jury trial is guaranteed by the Constitution and found it
"difficult to understand how the petitioner can submit . . . that to compel a
defendant . . . to undergo a jury trial against his will is contrary to . . . due
process." Id. at 36. Indeed, "[t]he ability to waive a constitutional right does not
ordinarily carry with it the right to insist upon the opposite of that right." Id. at
34-35.
22386 U.S. 18 (1967).
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which announced a reasonable-doubt test for harmless constitutional error,
the breach would have required automatic reversal regardless of the ab-
sence of prejudice to the defendant.23 It could be argued that, despite
Chapman, automatic reversal is still necessary since the degree of prejudice
suffered by the defendant through a denial of this right could be esti-
mated only inferentially and rarely, if ever, proved harmless beyond reason-
able doubt."' Presumably this result need not follow were the right of
non-constitutional origin.25 It is not unreasonable to expect that courts
might more narrowly define the circumstances in which one might appear
pro se in order to minimize the possibility that defendants, afforded effec-
tive assistance of counsel, would receive the windfall of a new trial by
proving a denial of the right while not proving any prejudice.26
Another problem suggested by the constitutional position is waiver.
If the right to defend pro se is a constitutional one "correlative" to that
of assistance of counsel, it could be contended that it too would require
competent and intelligent waiver.2 To the extent that an intelligent
waiver means that the defendant was at least cognizant of his right, the
requirement would violate the admonition of one court that "if notice of
the right [to defend pro se] had to be given, the task of administering
the overriding constitutional policy in favor of granting a lawyer to
every person accused of a serious crime would become unduly treacher-
ous."
2 8
A final problem with the constitutional position concerns one of logic.
No doubt a creditable argument could be advanced that the right to
defend oneself is inherent in the concept of due process. 9 But the argu-
23 See, e.g., United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271, 273 (2d Cir. 1964).
21 See United States v. Guerra, 334 F.2d 138, 146 n.4 (2d Cir. 1964). The Court
in Chapman seemingly recognized that certain classes of constitutional error still re-
quire automatic reversal and cited Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
(right to counsel) as an example. 386 U.S. at 23 n.8.
"E.g., Juelich v. United States, 342 F.2d 29, 33 (5th Cir. 1965); Butler v.
United States, 317 F.2d 249, 258 (8th Cir. 1963); Brown v. United States, 264
F.2d 363, 366 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
20See Brown v. United States, 264 F.2d 363, 366 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). At least one court placing the right
to defend pro se on a constitutional level did so impliedly by requiring that the trial
court "by recorded colloquy" apprise the accused of his alternate rights to defend
by counsel or pro se. United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271, 276 (2d Cir. 1964).
. 8United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 16 (2d Cir. 1965).
At common law the right actively to be represented by counsel was extremely
limited; the attorney acted primarily as advisor to the defendant on points of law.
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). The heightened stature of the right to be
defended by counsel does not necessarily dictate for purposes of due process a
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ment that this right is based on the sixth amendment as "correlative" to
the right to assistance of counsel produces a questionable corollary itself.
After all, to defend pro se is, for whatever reason, not to defend through
counsel. These procedures are related only in that they are antagonistic
to each other in the usual situation if the rationale of the numerous cases
supporting right to counsel is accepted." Thus, if the right to counsel is
indeed "one of the safeguards... deemed necessary to insure fundamental
human rights of life and liberty"'" and is binding upon the states8 2 as
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"33 it is difficult to conceive
how the right to defend pro se, necessarily not "one of the safeguards,"
could, by virtue of this opposite relationship alone, be a constitutional right
and, moreover, could emanate from the same source, the sixth amend-
ment.34 As the holdings of the Supreme Court hardly command the finding
that the right is constitutional, 5 and as there is little on policy grounds
to recommend such a stance, the non-constitutional position is preferable.
Aside from the problem of whether the right to defend pro se has a
constitutional basis, the case treatment of it has been relatively uniform.
The typical statement is that a criminal defendant who is sui juris and
mentally competent possesses this right, 6 , and it has been termed "in-
corresponding diminution of the privilege to be heard personally, particularly when
the element of individual autonomy is weighed in the balance.
"'E.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) ; Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45 (1932).1 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938).
"2 See cases cited note 30 supra.
" Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). Quaere whether the right
to defend pro se if more extensively held to be a guarantee of the Bill of Rights
would be "absorbed" through the fourteenth amendment's due process clause? At
least one state court decision already holds that it is. Capetta v. State, 204 So. 2d
913 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
"' This argument is perhaps unwittingly suggested in Juelich v. United States,
342 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1965). Upon denial of a motion to vacate a prior conviction,
the defendant alleged as error the denial of his motion to dismiss appointed counsel
and to appear pro se in the hearing on the motion. Though the court held that
the right was constitutionally protected, it was thought inapplicable in this pro-
cedural context because a movant under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1964) was not within
the meaning of the sixth amendment "accused" in a "criminal prosecution." More-
over, recognizing that fifth-amendment due process might make the right to counsel
mandatory anyway to insure a "fair and meaningful hearing," the court reasoned that
In such Fifth Amendment cases, it can hardly be argued that there is any
"correlative right to dispense with a lawyer's help" for that would imply
the reductio ad absurditon that a hearing not "fair and meaningful" is a
constitutionally protected right. The courts have not yet gone so far.
Id. at 31.
8 See text at notes 12-15 supra.36 Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 1233 (1961).
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herent,"37 "unqualified,""8 and "as basic and fundamental as [the] right
to be represented by counsel."39 Of course, such statements are misleading
since defending pro se will inevitably involve a waiver of the right to
counsel. Therefore, the right is initially curtailed to the extent that the
defendant must be capable of effecting a competent and intelligent waiver. °
This capability cannot alone be inferred from the defendant's capacity to
stand trial since there is a recognized distinction between competency
to stand trial and competency to defend personally,41 and "an adjudication
by the trial court that an accused is capable of going to trial and aiding
his counsel, is not a determination of his competency to act as his own
counsel."4 Thus if it is found that a particular defendant through lack
of knowledge or skill is incapable of comprehending legal issues and con-
ducting his own defense, the court must appoint counsel, even over his
protests, to prevent judicial deterioration;4 to this extent, at least, the
Constitution does indeed force a lawyer upon a defendant.
Whatever his competency, it is clear that a defendant appearing pro se
need not possess any particular legal skills.44 Conversely, in terms of
the consequences of defending himself, an accused does so at his peril
and acquires as a matter of right no greater privileges or latitude than
would an attorney acting for him. Thus a defendant appearing pro se
does not become a ward or client of the court,45 nor must the court give
the defendant legal advice, explain potential defenses,46 or advise the
defendant of the right to ask instructions,47 nor generally allow him to
proceed differently than would his attorney.48 The usual caveat holds
that such a defendant "assumes for all purposes connected with his case,
s Coleman v. Smyth, 166 F. Supp. 934, 937 (E.D. Va. 1958).
United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1965).
People v. Sinko, 21 11. 2d 23, 25-26, 171 N.E.2d 9, 10 (1960).
"23 C.J.S. Crim. Law § 979(3) (1961).
'1 E.g., Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105, 108 (1954).
"State v. Kolocotronis, - Wash. 2d -, -, 436 P.2d 774, 781 (1968).
,1 Id. Accord, People v. Burson, 11 Ill. 2d 360, 143 N.E.2d 239 (1957) ; McCann
v. Maxwell, 174 Ohio St. 282, 189 N.E.2d 143 (1963).
" E.g., People v. Linden, 52 Cal. 2d 1, 18, 338 P.2d 397, 405 (1959). Un-
doubtedly, the fact that the defendant is an attorney is a relevant consideration
when the right is evoked before trial as well as during trial. However, even in the
latter context, defendant's status is not controlling. See, e.g., Duke v. United States,
255 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1958).
"Burstein v. United States, 178 F.2d 665, 670 (9th Cir. 1949).
"Michener v. United States, 181 F.2d 911, 918 (8th Cir. 1950).
' State v. Miller, 292 S.W. 440 (Mo. 1927).
,sO'Brien v. United States, 376 F.2d 538 (1st Cir. 1967).
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and must be prepared to be treated as having, the qualifications and re-
sponsibilities concomitant with the role he has undertaken." 4
Once the obstacles of competency and waiver of counsel are met,
the right to defend pro se is relatively unqualified, at least if expressly
asserted before trial."0 However, a further limitation is found in the
rule that a defendant must make an election to appear either pro se or
through counsel and if represented, has no right personally to conduct
all or any part of the case.51 The rights in this context are thought
alternative and distinct-not correlative. A defendant having made the
initial election to proceed in either fashion is not entitled to a hybrid of
the two rights.5"
Illustrative of the distinction is a holding that a defendant appearing
personally has no residual right under the sixth amendment for appoint-
ment of counsel in an advisory capacity and that the aforementioned
section 1654," which states the rights alternatively, is not unconstitutional
for this reason."4 A parallel case on the state level reached a similar con-
clusion despite the fact that the asserted constitutional guarantee was
conjunctive, allowing the right to defend in person and by counsel.55
Though a court might permit a defendant represented by counsel to
participate actively in his trial, the practice has been termed undesirable.50
Even in jurisdictions in which the state constitution guarantees the right
to be heard personally, by counsel, or both, there is no absolute right for
a defendant represented by counsel to conduct personally part of his
defense, such as addressing the jury or examining witnesses, the matter
being one of the court's discretion.57 The factors held pertinent to this
discretionary decision include the potential interference with orderly
"People v. Mattson, 51 Cal. 2d 777, 794, 336 P.2d 937, 949 (1959); accord,
People v. Harmon, 54 Cal. 2d 9, 351 P.2d 329, 4 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1960).
" United States ex rel. Davis v. McMann, 386 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1967) ; United
States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1965); United States v.
Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1963).
1 E.g., Egan v. Teets, 251 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1957) ; People v. Mattson, 51 Cal.
2d 777, 336 P.2d 937 (1959) ; People v. Northcott, 209 Cal. 639, 289 P. 634 (1930);
People v. Glenn, 96 Cal. App. 2d 859, 216 P.2d 457 (Dist. Ct. App. 1950).
" Duke v. United States, 255 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1958); State v. Phillip, 261
N.C. 263, 268, 134 S.E.2d 386, 391 (1964).
0028 U.S.C. § 1654 (1964).
" Shelton v. United States, 205 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1953).
People v. Mattson, 51 Cal. 2d 777, 336 P.2d 937 (1959).
Brasier v. Jeary, 256 F.2d 474, 478 (8th Cir. 1958).
"Thompson v. State, 194 So. 2d 649 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Foster v.
State, 148 Tex. Crim. 372, 187 S.W.2d 575 (1945).
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trial practice, the capacity of the accused to conduct his defense, and the
gravity of the offense.5"
The position that a defendant represented by counsel should not be en-
titled to reap the advantages of both rights by alternating between actively
participating and passively accepting assistance, with the concomitant
disadvantages to the court and prosecution, is probably justified. However,
there remains another context in which the exercise of the right to defend
pro se is similarly cloaked with judicial discretion, but for which the
rationale is less evident. The defendant, as in Seale v. Hoffman,59 pro-
ceeds to trial with counsel, but at a later date, for reasons sufficient to
himself if not the court, seeks to dismiss the attorney and to defend pro se
for the balance. In this situation the defendant typically finds, as did
Seale, that a court formerly willing "that he be allowed to go jail under
his own banner if he so desires,"60 had he clearly asserted the right before
trial, is vested with considerable discretionary power to refuse his wishes
because "there must be a showing that the prejudice to the legitimate
interests of the defendant overbalances the potential disruptions of the
proceedings already in progress. '61 In short, if the right to dispense with
a lawyer's help is almost absolute when evoked before trial, it is less so
thereafter and, regardless of its arguably constitutional dimensions, need
not be recognized if doing so would disrupt the court's business.
62
The potential disruption and the possible prejudice to the defendant's
interests if his request is denied are the primary factors to be weighed in
this discretionary decision. 3 Applying these principles to Scale, the court
felt that the defendant's generally contemptuous demeanor and the com-
plexity of the legal issues in his trial militated against a finding of abuse
of discretion.' But it is interesting to note, regarding the question of
"8 State v. White, 86 N.J. Super. 410, 419, 207 A.2d 178, 183-84 (Super. Ct.
1965).
" 306 F. Supp. 330 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
" United States ex rel Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1965).
01 Id.
02 United States v. Private Brands, 250 F.2d 554, 557 (2d Cir. 1957). Accord,
United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1963); United States v. Dennis,
183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950). But see United States v. Burkeen, 355 F.2d 241
(6th Cir. 1966); United States v. Johnson, 333 F.2d 1004 (6th Cir. 1964).
"' United States v. Davis, 260 F. Supp. 1009 (E.D. Tenn. 1966).
" Seale v. Hoffman, 306 F. Supp. 330, 332 (N.D. Ill. 1969). Generally speak-
ing, would it ever be possible to find that a defendant had been prejudiced by
denying him the right to defend himself ? The classic statements argues that
[t]he right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and edu-
cated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If
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potential prejudice by not allowing the defendant to proceed pro se, that
Seale's attorney of record was later sentenced to what may be the longest
prison sentence for contemptuous behavior ever imposed in an American
court.65
While Seale appears secure on the precedents, the case raises the larger
question of the validity of the process by which a right formerly "abso-
lute""" becomes subject to the discretion of the court. One explanation
is that by proceeding to trial with counsel, appointed or retained, the
defendant legally waives his right to later defend pro se. While a few
cases explicitly take this position,67 apparently the more prevalent view
is that the right is merely "qualified" or "sharply curtailed," not waived,
once trial begins.0 8 It is certainly arguable, however, that the right has
effectively, if not legally, vanished at this point.0 9
Apart from the matter of waiver, the "absolute-discretionary" dicho-
tomy seems to be based on the assumption that there is an additional
quantum of trial delay and confusion that would likely result beyond what
would be occasioned had the defendant evoked his right to defend per-
charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself
whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of
evidence. Left without aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a
proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrele-
vant to the issue or otherwise inadmissable. He lacks both the skill and
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a
perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the
danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his inno-
cence.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
If the defendant were prejudiced by a denial of the right to defend himself, is
not the actual source of error more likely to reside in a lack of effective counsel
than in a denial of the right to defend pro se? See, e.g., Von Moltke v. Gilles, 332
U.S. 708 (1948); Glasser v. United States, 3,15 U.S. 60 (1942). Of course, there
may be certain practical advantages to defending pro se-for example, the oppor-
tunity to make unsworn statements to the jury under the aegis of examination of
witnesses without waiver of the immunity against self-incrimination-but it seems
clear that these are not legitimate considerations in the sense that a defendant is
entitled to such advantages. See text at notes 44-49 supra. The cynic might
suspect, not unreasonably, that there is no "balancing" (see text at note 61 supra)
involved at all regarding the discretionary decision of whether to allow a defendant
to discharge his attorney and to appear pro se since all the factors support its
refusal, and that a defendant, having appeared with counsel, has at least de facto
waived his right to dispense with a lawyer's help.
"News and Observer, Raleigh, N.C., Feb. 18, 1970, at 8, col. 6.
as See text at notes 36-39 supra.
"E.g., People v. Ephraim, 411 IIl. 118, 122-23, 103 N.E.2d 363, 365-66 (1952).
E.g., United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1965).
, See note 64 supra.
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sonally before trial. Clearly this supposition is valid were there an
absolute privilege to discharge counsel for purposes of substituting an-
other. Such a privilege might easily be abused and continuances and
mistrials made necessary in order not to violate the highly-regarded right
to effective counsel."° But it is less clear that discharge of one's attorney
in order to defend personally would necessarily yield the same result
because this right, unencumbered by the constitutional policy attaching
to the right to counsel, might be conditioned precisely to that extent rather
than disallowed altogether.71 Should the defendant's attempt to defend
personally prove confusing to the jury, the defendant, not the prosecution,
likely would be prejudiced. When the court is confronted with an unruly
and contemptuous defendant, the contempt power, judiciously exercised,
should prove a sufficient tool for preserving order and decorum.
One thing for certain can be said about the "absolute-discretionary"
dichotomy. As currently enunciated, it imparts to the right to defend
pro se an evanescent quality not entirely consistent with the actual and
alleged constitutional underpinnings of the right, nor with notions of in-
dividual autonomy.
RICHrAD A. LEIPPE
Evidence-Admissibility of Computer Business Records As an
Exception to the Hearsay Rule
Modem businesses have begun increasingly to rely on the electronic
digital computer1 as in integral part of their regular operations. 2 Com-
puters are used to make numerical calculations, to store and process
information on business transactions, to keep personnel records, to per-
form various accounting tasks, and to summarize many types of informa-
tion needed for management decisions-in short, they are admirable
receptacles for all types of traditional business records.
'o United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1943).
7'Id. at 1011-12 (dissenting opinion). Cf. United States v. Abbamonte, 348
F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1965); Relerford v. United States, 309 F.2d 706 (9th Cir.
1962); United States v. Arlen, 252 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1958); United States v.
Paccione, 224 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1955).
'For a general discussion of the admission of computer business records into
evidence, see Annot., 11 A.L.R.3d 1377 (1967). The admission of ordinary business
records into evidence is dealt with in Annot., 21 A.L.R.2d 773 (1952).
'Freed, Computer Print-Outs as Evidence, in 16 Am. JuR. PROOF OF FACTS § 1,
at 274 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Freed].
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Inevitably, printed-out business records are offered as evidence in
litigation. A recent example is King v. State ex rel. Murdock Acceptance
Corp.' King, a notary public, was sued for damages because of his false
notarial certificate of acknowledgment to a deed of trust.4 To establish
damages, the plaintiff corporation had to prove the balance due on certain
conditional sales contracts and a note. This proof was made by intro-
ducing both the original contracts and computer print-outs showing the
payments made and the balance due on the contracts and the note. The
original records of payments were made in the branch offices of the
plaintiff and then forwarded to the home office where the information
was fed into a computer.5 The court found that the computer records
were "originals" sufficient to satisfy the best evidence rule even though
the real "original" records of the transactions were available in the
branch offices.' The court, without benefit of a statute on the subject,
admitted the computer records as business records:
In sum, we hold that print-out sheets of business records stored on
electronic computing equipment are admissible in evidence if relevant
and material, without the necessity of identifying, locating, and pro-
ducing as witnesses the individuals who made the entries in the
regular course of business if it is shown (1) that the electronic
computing equipment is recognized as standard equipment, (2) the
entries are made in the regular course of business at or reasonably
near the time of the happening of the event recorded, and (3) the
foundation testimony satisfies the court that the sources of information,
method and time of preparation were such as to indicate its trust-
worthiness and justify its admission.7
The leading case admitting computer business records into evidence
is Transport Indemnity Co. v. Seib," in which plaintiff insurer used a
computer to calculate premiums due on an insurance contract made with
the defendant. The formula used for fixing the premiums was contained
in the contract between the parties; one component of the formula con-
sidered claims made by the defendant for earlier losses. Plaintiff proved
the amount of these prior claims by computer records printed out
especially for the litigation. Defendant argued that the original claim





- 178 Neb. 253, 132 N.W.2d 871 (1965).
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files and reports should have been produced. The court held the com-
puter evidence was properly admitted since the reports had been made
to plaintiff and fed into the computer in the regular course of business.,
The decision is sound: there is no reason to compel production of the
original claim files unless defendant proposed to prove the inaccuracy of
a particular loss figure, in which case he could produce his own records
on the claim.
Computer records such as those in King and Transport, if offered
to prove the truth of the statements contained therein, are hearsay'0
because they are extra-judicial assertions whose reliability cannot be
checked by cross-examination. The primary reason for the hearsay rule
is to exclude evidence of the assertions of an absent declarant, whose
perceptive skill, memory, and sincerity are not subject to cross-examina-
tion. Of course, a business record cannot be cross-examined, but it is
admissible without that imagined safeguard because of a presumed in-
herent trustworthiness due to internal business reliance on its accuracy."
The common-law exceptions to the hearsay rule for the admission of
business records was quite narrow ;12 it is unlikely that most of today's
computer records would qualify. But most states, faced with contemporary
commercial reality, desired to amplify statutorily the miserly common-law
exception; businessmen needed a reasonable means of proving debts owed
them."" Several "uniform" codfiications evolved. In 1927, the Model
Act for Proof of Business Transactions was proposed;14 it has been
0Id. at 259, 132 N.W.2d at 875." See Transport Indem. Co. v. Seib, 178 Neb. 253, 259, 132 N.W.2d 871, 875
(1965). See also the definition of hearsay in the PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE
FOR THE UNITED STATES DisRicT COURTS AND MAGISTRATES rule 8-01 (c), at 159
(Prelim. Draft March 1969).
" The real guarantee stems from the nature of business operations themselves:
Modern business and professional activities have become so complex, in-
volving so many persons, each performing a different function, that an
accurate daily record of each transaction is required in order to prevent
utter confusion. An inaccurate and false record would be worse than no
record at all.
Sims v. Charlotte Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 257 N.C. 32, 35, 125 S.E.2d 326, 329
(1962).
" For a discussion of common-law rules and exceptions, see 5 J. WGMORE,
EVIDENCE §§ 1517-1519, at 347-61 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE].
"' The business-record exception to the hearsay rule is a manifestation of judicial
conformity to sound business practice. Cf. Transport Indem. Co. v. Seib, 178 Neb.
253, 259, 132 N.W.2d 871, 875 (1965). Thus, the guarantee of trustworthiness
may not be the only reason for the exception.
"' 5 WIGMORE § 1520, at 362 (footnote omitted). The Commonwealth Fund sub-
sidized a committee to draft the Model Act, and its report is contained in Morgan,
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adopted by Congress and the legislatures of several states." In 1933, the
Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act emerged;1 it has been
adopted in several states.' Besides the Model Act and the Uniform Act,
the admissibility of business records has been provided for in the Model
Code of Evidence,' the Uniform Rules of Evidence,' 9 and the proposed
federal rules of evidence.2°
The Model Act and the Uniform Act have produced the same
standards of admissibility for both computer and conventional busi-
ness records.21 Computer records, just as other business records, must
The Law of Evidence: Some Proposals for Reform (1927). Green, The Model
and Uniform Statutes Relating to Business Entries as Evidence, 31 TuL. L. REV.
49 n.9 (1956).
Ir 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1964) is the federal statute. Connecticut, Georgia, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, and Rhode
Island have passed statutes based on the Model Act. Green, The Model and Uni-
from Statutes Relating to Business Entries as Evidence, 31 TUL. L. REV. 49 n.9
(1956). The text of the Model Act provides:
Any writing or record, whether in the form of an entry in a book or other-
wise, made as a memorandum or record of any act, transaction, occurrence
or event shall be admissible in evidence in proof of said act, transaction,
occurrence, or event, if the trial judge shall find that it was made in the
regular course of any business, and that it was the regular course of such
business to make such memorandum or record at the time of such act,
transaction, occurrence or event or within a reasonable time thereafter. All
other circumstances of the making of such writing or record, including lack
of personal knowledge by the entrant or maker, may be shown to affect its
weight, but they shall not affect its admissibility....
Reprinted in 5 WIGmORE § 1520, at 362.
The Uniform Act reads in part as follows:
A record of an act, condition or event shall, in so far as relevant, be
competent evidence if the custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its
identity and the mode of its preparation, and if it was made in the regular
course of business, at or near the time of the act, condition or event, and if
in the opinion of the Court, the sources of information, method and time of
preparation were such as to justify its admission.
Reprinted in 5 WIGMORE § 1520, at 363.
"7 California, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Vermont,
Washington, and Wyoming have passed the Uniform Act. Misc. Acts, 9 UNIFORM
AcTs ANNOT. 506 (1951). See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4310 (1953); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:82-34 to -40 (1952); WAstH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5.45.010-.920.
(1963).
'- MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 514 (1942).
'9 UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE rule 63(13).
"oPROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
AND MAGISTRATES rule 8-03(b) (6) (Prelim. Draft March 1969).
" North Carolina is one of the states that has adopted neither the Model nor the
Uniform Act. A law review writer recommended that North Carolina adopt the
Model Act in Proposals for Legislation in North Carolina, 9 N.C.L. REV. 1, 47
(1930). However, by judicial decision North Carolina appears to have accom-
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meet the basic requirements of the act in question. The record must
be made in the regular course of business at or near the time of the act
or transaction recorded, or within a reasonable time thereafter.2" The
Uniform Act specifies further that the custodian of the record, or some
other qualified witness, must testify as to its identity and mode of
preparation and that the circumstances must justify to the court its
admission.2 3 The regular course of business must require the making of
such records even though the record sought to be admitted was, in fact,
made in the regular course of business.2 Some jurisdictions may require
satisfaction of the best evidence rule, but at least one federal court of
appeals has eliminated any such requirement in applying the federal busi-
ness records statute.2 5 In New York the best evidence rule is satisfied
by non-original records if the originals were destroyed in the usual course
of business.2"
A record may be denied admissibility because of a lack of assurance
that sources of information for it are accurate. The source may have had
plished virtually the same result as the Model and Uniform Acts. See Sims v.
Charlotte Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 257 N.C. 32, 125 S.E.2d 326 (1962); Smith
Builders Supply, Inc. v. Dixon, 246 N.C. 136, 97 S.E.2d 767 (1957) ; Dairy & Ice
Cream Supply Co. v. Gastonia Ice Cream Co., 232 N.C. 684, 61 S.E.2d 895 (1950).
D. STANSBURY, THE NORTH CAROLINA LAw OF EVIDENCE § 155, at 390 (2d ed.
1963) states:
It is no longer necessary that the person making the entries be dead, or even
that he be identifiable, and he need not have had personal knowledge of the
transaction entered. If the entries were made in the regular course of busi-
ness, at or near the time of the transaction involved, and are authenticated
by a witness who is familiar with the system under which they were made,,
they are admissible.
(Footnote omitted.)
North Carolina has adopted the UNIFoRm PHaOTOGRAPrIC COPIES OF BUSInESs.
AND PUBLIC RECORDS AS EVIDENCE ACT. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 8-45.1 to -45.4
(1953). See State v. Shumaker, 251 N.C. 678, 111 S.E.2d 878 (1960).
"2See the text of the Model and Uniform Acts, notes 15 & 16 supra.
2'5 WIGMOR § 1520, at 363. See Transport Indem. Co. v. Seib, 178 Neb.
253, 132 N.W.2d 871 (1965).
" Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943) ; Comment, Computer Print-Outs
of Business Records and their Admissibility in New York, 31 ALBANY L. REv.
61, 63-64 (1967). See also Johnson v. Lutz, 253 N.Y. 124, 170 N.E. 517 (1930).
2 United States v. Kimmel, 274 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1960). The proposed federal
rules of evidence would confer the status of an original record upon any computer
print-out. PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURTS AND MAGISTRATES rule 10-01(c), Comment (Prelim. Draft March 1969).
" Comment, Computer Print-Outs of Business Records and their Admissibility
in New York, supra note 24 at 70 (footnote omitted) (original emphasis deleted).
"' Cf. Owens v. City of Seattle, 49 Wash. 2d 187, 194, 299 P.2d 560, 564 (1956).
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to make subjective and now unknown judgments about objective data. In
such a situation the business record is inadmissible without his testimony.2"
A business record may also be excluded from evidence because sources of
information are insufficient to make a reliable record."0 The business rec-
ord may be denied admissibility because the information therein was hap-
hazardly collected from random sources whose reliability is difficult to
evaluate.3" But the lack of a motive by any of the sources to falsify may
justify admissibility. 1
Although a series of business records may not be complete enough
to prove the non-occurrence of a certain event,3 2 when considered to-
gether, they may be complete enough to prove a positive fact. 8 A record
such as that in King would, for example, be complete enough to prove both
the absence of a particular payment and that certain other payments were
made.
Business records will not normally be excluded for the reason that
they are "self-serving."3 Indeed, their presumed trustworthiness is based
on the self-interest of the businessman in the systematic and accurate com-
pilation of his record.35 A more worthy inquiry is whether the preparation
of the record was "inner-directed" or "outer-directed"; that is, whether
the nature of it is such that the business must rely on its accuracy in its
daily transactions."0
The record must, of course, be relevant to an issue involved in the
' Cf. Hartzog v. United States, 217 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1954).
" Allen v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 365 Mo. 677, 681 n.1, 285 S.W.2d 663, 666
n.1 (1956); Watson v. Clutts, 262 N.C. 153, 161, 136 S.E.2d 617, 622 (1964)." United States v. Grayson, 166 F.2d 863, 869 (2d Cir. 1948).
" Freedman v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 342 Pa. 404, 21 A.2d 81 (1941); cf.
Woodward v. United States, 185 F.2d 134 (8th Cir. 1950), aff'g 88 F. Supp. 152
(S.D. Mo. 1949). But cf. Taylor v. B. Heller & Co., 364 F.2d 608 (6th Cir.
1966).
" Bowman v. Kaufman, 387 F.2d 582, 587-88 (2d Cir. 1967).
"See Doyle v. Chief Oil Co., 64 Cal. App. 2d 284, 292, 148 P.2d 915, 919
(Dist. Ct App. 1944). In some cases, incompleteness of the record may go to
weight rather than to admissibility. United States v. Kimmel, 274 F.2d 54, 57 (2d
Cir. 1960).
"'New York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 F.2d 297, 306 (D.C. Cir. 1945) ; Owens
v. City of Seattle, 49 Wash. 2d 187, 190, 299 P.2d 560, 564 (1956). But con-
ceivably there are cases in which such an objection might legitimately be raised.
See, e.g., Douglas Creditors Ass'n v. Padelford, 181 Ore. 345, 182 P.2d 390 (1947).
"See Weis v. Weis, 147 Ohio 416, 425-26, 72 N.E.2d 245, 250 (1947).
"' As the size of a business increases, the necessity of an accurate record for
internal reliance increases. But the possibility of error also increases if the record
is the product of several human sources. Of course, it only takes one person who
is careless or of bad motive to make an inaccurate entry, and the likelihood of his
doing so unnoticed increases as the size of the business increases.
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litigation. 7 Even if the business record is admissible, parts of it may
not be3s because they contain information that is not trustworthy, such
as unsubstantiated subjective opinions.39 There may also be reason to
suspect the trustworthiness of records when they deal with loans or pay-
ments of money4° or when the first entry on a balance sheet is a state-
ment of money owed with no itemization or other indication of the origin
of the stated figure.
41
Even if the business record otherwise qualifies under the Uniform
or Model Act, the trial court must still determine whether the record
appears accurate and trustworthy.4 In making this determination, the
court should insist on some underlying guarantee in the record-making
process that the data is trustworthy.43
Occasionally, the party against whom a business or computer record
is offered may be estopped by his conduct to object to its admission,
or he may be deemed to have admitted the truth of its contents by his
silence in an out-of-court situation. In State v. Veres44 the defendant was
charged with passing checks while having insufficient funds to cover them.
The trial court over the defendant's objection admitted bank records that
were inadequately qualified because the qualifying witness testified that he
was not familiar with the mechanical operation of the automatic machine
817 Hancock v. Crouch, 267 S.W.2d 36, 40-41 (Mo. App. 1954); Freedman
v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 342 Pa. 404, 414, 21 A.2d 81, 86 (1941). See also
Ostrov v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 260 F. Supp. 152, 168 (E.D. Pa. 1966),
vacated on other grounds, 379 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1967).
M aggi v. Mendillo, 147 Conn. 663, 667, 165 A.2d 603, 605 (1960).
o See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 F.2d 297, 299-303 (D.C. Cir.
1944). But see Allen v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 365 Mo. 677, 681-83, 285 S.W.2d
663, 666-67 (1956).
"' The reason is that the payee has it within his power to take a note or receipt
for the money as independent evidence of the transaction. Douglas Creditors Ass'n
v. Padelford, 181 Ore. 345, 357, 182 P.2d 390, 396 (1947). However, under
modem business statutes it now appears that evidence of loans or payments of
money are usually admissible just as any other business entry. Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d
284 (1967). See Olson v. McLean, 132 Mont. 111, 313 P.2d 1039 (1957); Mahoney
v. Minsky, 39 N.J. 208, 188 A.2d 161 (1963).
" This problem was presented in Merrick v. United States Rubber Co., 7 Ariz.
App. 433, 440 P.2d 314 (1968), in which the court held that the stated unproven
balance and subsequent transactions must constitute separate counts and could not
be joined in the same action. At first blush this holding may seem unrealistic, but
it has the merit of providing protection for the businessman while encouraging the
jury to evaluate separately the proof of each count. But cf. Thompson v. Machado,
78 Cal. App. 2d 870, 178 P.2d 838 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947).
' Bowman v. Kaufman, 387 F.2d 582, 587 (2d Cir. 1967).
" See United States v. Grow, 394 F.2d 182, 205 (4th Cir. 1968) ; Hartzog v.
United States, 217 F.2d 706, 710 (4th Cir. 1954).
"7 Ariz. App. 117, 436 P.2d 629 (1968).
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making the records.45 On appeal, admission of the evidence was upheld
on the ground that the defendant had testified both that his bank account
was not in good condition and that at the time of the writing of the
checks he had requested that they not be negotiated. 4 This holding is
unsound. The state had the burden of proof and should have had to
qualify the record regardless of the defendant's testimony.
In Thompson v. Machado,47 a suit on an open-book account, plaintiff-
businessman had repeatedly mailed to the defendant monthly statements
of an amount due. The plaintiff's original business records had been
detroyed in a fire, and the trial court admitted "secondary" records. 48
The appellate court affirmed, saying that the defendant could not deny the
truth of the amount due because he could not prove that he had pro-
tested the accuracy of the monthly statements after he received them.4
The application of estoppel or admission by silence is more justifiable in
this case: the defendant's objections were more properly directed to the
weight to be given the "secondary" records, not to their admissibility.
Computer print-outs as business records lead to unique evidentiary
problems. Qualification of computer records is one. The witness qualify-
ing computer records should have a substantial knowledge of the equip-
ment used and the ability to explain its operation in detail.50 He should
testify as to the procedure of the business5 in using the equipment and
explain just how the record in question was made. Any deviation from
the usual practice of the business in making the record should be dis-
closed. In particular, a witness should describe any procedures-com-
puter or human-used to check for error in the record-making process. 2
The opponent of the evidence's introduction may attack the equip-
ment or "hardware" and show, if possible, that it is unreliable. This
attack may be accomplished by testimony regarding the malfunctions of
the specific machine that made the record or the general unreliability
"Id. at--, 436 P.2d at 637.
"Id. at -, 436 P.2d at 638.
,778 Cal. App. 2d 870, 178 P.2d 838 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947).
"Id. at -, 178 P.2d at 841.
9Id.
o But business records have been qualified even though the witness admitted a
lack of familiarity with the electronic equipment. Merrick v. United States Rubber
Co., 7 Ariz. App. 433, -, 440 P.2d 314, 316 (1968).
1The procedures of the business at the time the record was made are the
ones to which testimony ought to be directed. Mutual Fin. Co. v. Auto Super-
markets, Inc., 383 S.W.2d 296, 299 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964).
"' Comment, Compieter Print-Outs of Business Records and their Admissibility
in New York, supra note 24 at 71.
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of that brand or type of computer. The opponent might also assert that
the controls over error were insufficient and seek to destroy any guaran-
tee of trustworthiness.
Qualifying the "software" is equally essential; the witness supporting
introduction of the records should explain the programming methods
used53 since the program furnishes the computer with its instructions.
The opponent may attempt to show that the program was inadequate
to make an accurate record. The opponent should be allowed to examine
the program and present his own expert witness to challenge the pro-
gram's reliability.
When computerized information is used at trial, normally it is a
print-out from data fed earlier into the computer. The objection has
arisen that the computer record was prepared for the litigation and
hence is not to be trusted.54 This argument is, of course, specious; the
focal point of inquiry should be the initial making of the record rather
than its appearance in printed form for trial.55
Both the Model Act and Uniform Act require the business entry to
be made at or near the time of the event or transaction recorded.5" A
business record made years after the transaction or event that it seeks to
prove does not qualify for admission.57 The date of an entry in an
account book can usually be determined by its relationship to other entries.
In dealing with a computer, however, it is not usually possible to fix
the date of the input of data. Such information would be available only
in those rare cases in which the source of the input was saved, stored, and
dated or the date of entry was entered with the other data fed into the
computer. To require proof of the time between the transaction or event
and the time of the computer input would be unrealistic. The business
must still prove that the inputs were made as a part of its day-to-day
operations58 before computer records are admissible. Statutes based on
the Model Act and Uniform Act should be amended or interpreted
to allow the introduction as business records of undated and non-time
sequenced computer data. If a business has switched from conventional
to computer recordkeeping, its print-outs should be admissible even if
" Id. "Faulty programming is [a] frequent source of inaccurate output." Freed,
supra note 2, § 15, at 298.
5 4See Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
Transport Indem. Co. v. Seib, 178 Neb. 253, 260, 132 N.W.2d 871, 875 (1965).
See notes 15 & 16 supra.
Fuller v. White, 33 Cal. 2d 236, 201 P.2d 16 (1948).
Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 113-14 (1943).
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some time has elapsed between the transaction and its recordation by
computer. Businesses should not be penalized for automating and
modernizing their operations.
The authentication of computer data may also present a problem.
Clearly a business record must be identified and authenticated by a proper
witness for the proponent of its introduction."' If data stored in the
computer is printed out without any processing by the arithmetical unit,
no serious authentication problem normally will arise. In such a situation,
the authentication requirements are the same as are required in cases
involving conventional business records. The only additional factor is the
qualification of the computer system as being reliable in reproducing the
record.
More serious authentication problems arise when the computer's
arithmetical function alters the stored input data. The witness may then
be required to reconcile the accuracy of the original stored data with the
processed figures shown on the computer business record. 0 Normally
authentication is a simple task, but cases may arise when it is virtually
impossible. The computer can process data at speeds much faster than a
man can perform the same operation. Computers also deal more accurately
with complicated formulas. It could take hours of testimony to authenti-
cate computer data in some cases. If the accuracy of the system and
procedures used to make the record have been established to the trial
judge's satisfaction, he should be given the discretion to dispense with
authentication of the processed data.
Despite the general reliability of computer business records, in certain
controversies there is a need for independent evidence not produced by
computer of the underlying transaction. The following is an example.
Customer A receives from a large department store B a bill for one-
thousand dollars for goods allegedly purchased on a certain date. B offers
its computer record as evidence of the purchase along with an unsigned
computer input card impressed with A's name and account number.
It is apparent that A is in a very poor position to defend himself and that
B very easily could have fabricated the unsigned input card. A should
be protected from such possible fabrication by the court's requiring non-
computer-produced evidence of the original transaction by B with A.
" Sims v. Charlotte Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 257 N.C. 32, 35, 125 S.E.2d 326, 329
(1962).




Once the purchase is established, subsequent payments may properly be
proved solely by computer records. A's cancelled checks or cash receipts
should offer him sufficient protection in contesting the amount of pay-
ments. But there is a real need for protecting the consumer by requiring
independent evidence of the sale because a reasonable businessman would
make an independent record of the transaction that would bear the cus-
tomer's signature.
The decisions in King and Transport show that computer records can
and will be admitted into evidence as routinely as conventional business
records have been in the past. But as fewer "conventional" records remain
in use to support the computer's product, courts will have to be more dili-
gent in examining whether the computer business record is satisfactorily
qualified and authenticated for admission. The impersonal and automatic
computer, which is the servant of the businessman, must also be the
servant of justice and not the master of men and their laws.
NORMAN E. SMITH
Federal Estate Taxation-Application of the Reciprocal Trusts
Doctrine Under the New Objective Standard
A typical reciprocal or crossed trusts situation occurs when A sets
up an irrevocable trust to pay B the income for life, remainder to C, and
B does likewise for the benefit of A for life with the remainder to C (or
D). In the usual situation A and B are members of the same family. At
one time it was thought that such an arrangement would avoid taxation
under the retained-interest rule of section 811(c) (1) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1939-now section 2036 of the 1954 Internal Revenue
Code. These sections provide that certain transferred property in which
the decedent has retained a life interest is to be included in his gross
estate. The general purpose underlying both sections is to insure taxation
of transfers that are essentially testamentary-that is, transfers in which
the transferor retained a significant interest or control over property trans-
ferred during his lifetime.
But the reciprocal trusts doctrine, which was advanced in Lehman v.
Commissioner,1 dissolved the belief that creation of reciprocal trusts held
the answers to successful evasion of estate taxes.' Though the reciprocal
± 109 F.2d 99 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 637 (1940).For a complete history of the development of the reciprocal trusts doctrine
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trusts situation did, in form at least, fall outside the literal terms of
section 811 (c) (1) (since the transferor had transferred away all of his
interest in the trust property), the court in Lehman recognized that each
settlor remained in exactly the same economic position in which he would
have been had he created a trust with himself as life beneficiary. Under
the rationale of the court in Lehman, each settlor is transposed and
treated as the grantor of the trust over which he holds various incidents
of ownership, at least to the extent that the two trusts are equal in value.'
"The fact that the trusts were reciprocated or 'crossed' is a trifle, quite
lacking in practical or legal significance . . . . The law searches out the
reality and is not concerned with form."4 The court in Lehman based
its holding on statements made by leading commentators on trusts that
said, "A person who furnishes the consideration for the creation of a trust
is the settlor, even though in form the trust is created by another person."'
Thus in the example, A is treated as the settlor of the trust actually
created by B, and vice versa. Since A is treated in this way,' the trust
over which A is seen as the settlor (the trust actually created by B) must
be included in A's gross estate under section 811 (c) (1)-today section
2036-because under this view A is considered to have retained a life
estate.7
As the reciprocal trusts doctrine developed,' two divergent views
see Colgan & Molloy, Converse Trusts-The Rise and Fall of a Tax Avoidance
Device, 3 TAx L. REv. 271, 273-76 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Converse Trusts].
3 If reciprocal trusts are created with one trust being larger than the other, the
amount of the trust created by B which is greater than the trust created by A
is taxable as a gift of B under § 2511(a), INT. REV. CODE of 1954. C. LOWNDES &
R. KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES 605 (2d ed. 1962) [hereinafter
cited as LOWNDES & KRAMER].
' 109 F.2d at 100.
'2 A. ScOTT, TnE LAW OF TRUSTS § 156.3 (3d ed. 1967); 1 G. BOGERT, TRUSTS
AND TRUSTEES § 41 (2d ed. 1965).
e "By switching the grantors of reciprocal trusts, the courts also escape the
objection that the transfers were not taxable because they were made for an ade-
quate and full consideration in money or money's worth." LOWNDES & KRAMER
193 n.36 citing Converse Trusts, supra note 2, at 275.
"[l]t is important to notice that the fact that trusts are reciprocal does not
make them taxable under the estate tax unless after switching grantors there is
the basis for such a tax." LOWNDES & KRAMER 193.
" The reciprocal trusts doctrine was given congressional approval in the Tech-
nical Changes Act of Oct. 25, 1949, ch. 720, § 6, 63 Stat. 893. "Congress has,
in effect, approved the doctrine's effort to close the loophole. In the Technical
Changes Act... it permitted those who had used the device prior to 1940 to give
up their control over a reciprocal trust without paying a gift tax on the relinquish-
ment." Estate of Grace v. United States, 393 F.2d 939, 950-51 n.4 (Ct. Cl. 1968)
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arose as to what was the proper test for invoking it. One group of cases,'
coming mainly from the third and seventh circuits, held that before the
reciprocal trusts doctrine could be invoked, it must be shown that each
of the crossed trusts was established as the quid pro quo consideration for
the other; that is, each trust must have been established in return for the
creation of the other trust. A second theory, advanced mainly in the second
and eighth circuits, 10 was that the presence of consideration need not
be shown explicitly but can be inferred from certain objective factors
such as the establishment of two similar trusts at about the same time,
the presence of a tax-avoidance motive, or the fact that the same attorney
drafted both trust instruments. 1 With each of these distinctions, the
(dissenting opinion). For a discussion of the effects of this section of the Technical
Changes Act, see 48 MicH. L. REv. 688 (1950).
' Estate of Moreno v. Commissioner, 260 F.2d 389 (8th Cir. 1958); Guenzel
v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 248 (8th Cir. 1958); McClain v. Jarecki, 232 F.2d
211 (7th Cir. 1956); Newberry's Estate v. Commissioner, 201 F.2d 874 (3d Cir.
1953); lit re Leuder's Estate, 164 F.2d 128 (3d Cir. 1947).
"0 Orvis v. Higgins, 180 F.2d 537 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 810 (1950);
Hanauer's Estate v. Commissioner, 149 F.2d 857 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S.
770 (1945); Cole's Estate v. Commissioner, 140 F.2d 636 (8th Cir. 1944).
" The case of Newberry's Estate v. Commissioner, 201 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1953),
presents a good example of the divergent views. Newberry and his wife at the
same time set up identical trusts of identical amounts for the benefit of their chil-
dren. Each settlor was given certain interests and powers over the other settlor's
trust. Periodically these powers were amended so that at the time of Mrs. New-
berry's death each settlor had only the power to shift interests in the other settlor's
trust among their children and certain charities. When Mrs. Newberry died, the
Commissioner contended that the trusts were reciprocal and should be taxed accord-
ingly. Before the Tax Court, Mr. Newberry testified that he and his wife were
independently wealthy and that they had created these trusts for the benefit of
their children and not to obtain any personal benefit. He further testified that
he would have set up his trust even if his wife had not created her trust. The
Tax Court upheld the Commissioner and included Mr. Newberry's trust in Mrs.
Newberry's gross estate.
[T]he basis of the Tax Court's decision seems to have been that the objective
facts of the trusts, the identity of their terms, amounts and times of creation,
and the fact that husband and wife got the same reciprocal advantages from
each other's transfer raised such a strong inference that they were created
in consideration of each other that viewing the evidence as a whole the
estate had failed to prove that they were not.
LOWNDES & KRAmER, supra note 3; at 195. This reasoning has been followed mainly
in the second and eighth circuits.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit took the other view and held that
the reciprocal trusts doctrine should not have been applied in this case. It held
that since Mr. Newberry would have established his trust without regard to what
Mrs. Newberry did and that since the purpose of the trusts was to benefit the
children rather than the settlors, the consideration for Mr. Newberry's trust was
not the trust of his wife and his trust was not, therefore, taxable to her estate.
Id. at 194.
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doctrine, which had been intended to fill a tax loophole, was narrowed and
thus made less effective in preventing avoidance of estate taxes. In an
effort to resolve the conflicts between the circuits and to establish con-
crete rules for the application of the reciprocal trusts doctrine, the Supreme
Court recently decided United States v. Estate of Grace.1"
On December 15, 1931, the decedent, Joseph Grace, executed a trust
(the Joseph trust) that was to pay the income and any of the principal
the trustees might deem advisable to decedent's wife, Janet Grace, for
life. Janet was given the power to designate, by will or deed, the manner
in which the trust estate remaining at her death was to be distributed to
Joseph and their children. Joseph appointed himself as one of the three
trusteees.
On December 30, 1931, Janet Grace executed a trust (the Janet trust)
that was virtually the same as the Joseph trust. All the property in this
trust had been conveyed to Janet during the preceding twenty-three years
by the decedent. 3 Both trusts were prepared by one of the decedent's em-
ployees in accordance with the decedent's plan, and Janet executed her
trust in accordance with the decedent's wishes.
The Joseph trust was terminated by Janet Grace's death in 1937.
Janet Grace's federal estate tax return showed the Janet trust but reported
it as a nontaxable transfer.' 4 The Commissioner asserted that the Janet
and Joseph trusts were "reciprocal" and asserted a deficiency to the
extent of the mutual value. Compromises on unrelated matters15 resulted
12395 U.S. 316 (1969).
'3 That the property was given to Janet by her husband should have been
irrelevant in deciding whether the reciprocal trusts doctrine applied. However,
the Supreme Court mentioned this fact several times in its opinion, probably
because the lower court considered it important to show a pattern of family giving
that dispelled an inference of consideration. The Court, by hearing a case in which
there was a pattern of family giving and by asserting the reciprocal trusts doctrine
in the face of it, emphasized that the doctrine will be applied regardless of the
presence of consideration.
"But see Justice Douglas' dissent in Grace in which he asserts that the Janet
trust should have been included in Janet Grace's gross estate. 395 U.S. at 325-26.
1 During the course of these negotiations, the representatives of the estate
countered the contention of the Internal Revenue Service by contending that
the gross estate should be adjusted by (1) a reduction in value . . . of
[certain] shares of stock ... owned by Janet Grace at the date of her death
. and (3) elimination from the assets shown on the return as Janet
Grace's property of certain household effects which ... [allegedly] belonged
to the decedent.
Estate of Grace v. United States, 393 F.2d 939, 963-64 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
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in fifty-five per cent of the value of the Janet trust being included in Janet
Grace's gross estate."8
Joseph Grace died in 1950. His federal estate tax return also dis-
closed both trusts. The Joseph trust was shown as a non-taxable transfer;
the Janet trust was reported as a trust under which the decedent held a
limited power of appointment."' Neither trust was included in the de-
cedent's gross estate. The Commissioner determined that the trusts were
"reciprocal" and included the amount of the Janet trust in the decedent's
gross estate. This deficiency was paid by the estate and a claim for refund
was filed.
The United States Court of Claims held that the reciprocal trusts
doctrine should not have been applied. Using certain language in Lehman
and decisions'8 from the Courts of Appeals for the Third and Seventh
Circuits, the majority of the court held that the crucial factor was
whether the decedent had established his trust as consideration for the
establishment of the trust of which he was the beneficiary. The court
then held that each trust had not been established as the quid pro quo
for the other trust but that they were merely part of an established pattern
of family giving. 9 The plaintiff, decedent's estate, was thus entitled to
recover the amount of overpayment plus interest.
The Supreme Court, rather than adopting either of the two major
views regarding reciprocal trusts, advanced an objective test that dis-
11 In discussing the issue as to the reciprocity of the Janet Grace trust
and the Joseph Grace trust . . . the negotiators believed that the value of
the Janet Grace trust was less than the value of the Joseph Grace trust,
and that if the doctrine of reciprocal trusts were applicable, it would be the
value of the lesser trust, i.e., the Janet Grace trust, that would be taxable as
part of the estate of Janet Grace.
Id. at 964 (emphasis added).
" The power of appointment given to Joseph Grace in the Janet trust is not
taxable since it is not a general power as defined by INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2041
(b) (1). Property over which decedent holds a power of appointment is includable
in his gross estate only if he holds a general power of appointment. As defined in
section 2041 (b) (1), a general power of appointment is a power that is exercisable
in favor of the decedent, his estate, his creditors, or the creditors of his estate.
Since Joseph Grace could only appoint the remainder of the trust among his wife
and children, this power does not fall within the definition of a general power.
" McLain v. Jarecki, 232 F.2d 211 (7th Cir. 1956); Newberry's Estate v.
Commissioner, 201 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1953); It re Leuder's Estate, 164 F.2d 128
(3d Cir. 1947).
"o The court rejected the "inferred consideration" test, but said in passing that
if this test had been used, inference of consideration was rebutted by the evi-
dence in the case. 393 F.2d at 946-47.
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regards consideration completely. 20 The Court concluded that the Court
of Claims had placed too much emphasis on the decedent's subjective
intent and had thus hindered the proper application of the federal estate
tax laws. The Court again stressed what it said in Estate of Speigel v.
Commissioner: "any requirement [of] a post-death attempt to prove
the settlor's thought in regard to the transfer, would partially impair the
effectiveness of [section 811 (c)] as an instrument to frustrate estate tax
evasion."" Therefore, it is important that the courts look not to the
settlor's motives but to the nature and operative facts of the trust transfer.
The Court found that it was particularly important that the objective
facts control in the reciprocal-trust situation because (1) inquiries into
subjective intent, especially in interfamily transfers, are particularly
perilous; (2) there is a high probability that such a trust arrangement
is for a tax-avoidance motive;23 (3) even if there is no tax-avoidance
motive, the settlor did actually retain an economic interest while pur-
porting to give away his property; (4) and, finally, it is unrealistic to
think that the settlors of trusts such as this, usually members of the same
family, would create a trust as the bargained-for consideration for the
other trust since such traditional consideration does not normally enter
into intrafamily transfers.24 For all of these reasons the Supreme Court
held that there was no need to show that each trust was created as the
quid pro quo for the other because such a showing of consideration would
require too great a delving into the settlor's subjective intent. The Court
" This test, which was advocated by Judge Davis in his dissenting opinion to
the Court of Claims decision in Grace, 393 F.2d at 948-54, had been advanced by
Professor Lowndes. Lowndes, Consideration and the Federal Estate and Gift
Taxes: Transfers for Partial Consideration, Relinquishment of Marital Rights,
Family Annuities, the Widow's Election, and Reciprocal Trusts, 35 GEO. WAsH. L.
REv. 50, 76-81 (1966).
[T]esting the taxability of the transfers by any doctrine of consideration
which depends on the subjective intentions of the transferors to bargain at
the time they made the transfers is completely unrealistic. It is impossible
to determine what the transferors actually had in mind. . . . It would be
more sensible to impose a tax upon the basis of the objective operation of
reciprocal transfers. . . . [If the transferor ends up in the same economic
position] there is no obvious inequity in treating him as though he made the
transfer in which he acquired a taxable interest.
Id. at 80.2-335 U.S. 701 (1949).
22 Id. at 705-06.
" In fact, "[I]t is hard to see why anyone would indulge in this sort of trans-
action except to avoid taxes .... ." LOWNDES & KRAMER, supra note 3, at 200.
2' See Lowndes, supra note 20, at 79-80.
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determined for the same reason that there was no need to show a tax-
avoidance motive.
The Supreme Court in Grace required that only two tests must be met
before the reciprocal trusts doctrine can be applied. First, the trusts must
be interrelated. 5 Second, the arrangement, to the extent of mutual value,
must leave the settlors in approximately the same economic position in
which they would have been had they created trusts naming themselves
as life beneficiaries.
Applying these principles to the facts of Grace, the Court held that
the value of the Janet trust must be included in the decedent's gross
estate. The two trusts were obviously interrelated. They were identical
in terms and were created at approximately the same time. They were
part of a single transaction designed and carried out by the decedent.
Second, the two trusts objectively left each settlor, to the extent of mutual
value, in the same economic position. "Joseph Grace's estate remained un-
diminished to the extent of the value of his wife's trust and the value of
his estate must accordingly be increased by the value of that trust."26
While the Court's decision is laudable in that it requires objective
factors be used in determining when the reciprocal trusts doctrine is to
be invoked, it is regretable that the Court selected Grace in which to
present this holding. Justice Douglas seems correct in his analysis that
"the use of a reciprocal trust device to aid the avoidance of an estate tax
is simply not presented by this case."
27
The purpose in setting up reciprocal trusts is to evade federal estate
taxation by having a settlor rid himself of all taxable power over the
trust that he has created while he remains in the same economic position
because of the trust set up in his favor by the other settlor. In Grace,
though the trusts were reciprocal under the standards enunciated, neither
settlor ridded himself of all taxable powers over the trust he himself had
created. Each trust could have been included in the gross estate of the
actual settlor under section 811(d) (2) of the 1939 Code-section 2038
25In determining whether there is an interrelation, it is important to look only
to objective factors. An examination of the settlor's subjective intent must be
avoided or the courts will find themselves in the same dilemma that existed before
Grace. A few appropriate factors (but by no means a complete listing) to be
considered include: whether the terms, amounts, or times of creation of the trusts
are nearly identical; whether the trusts were drafted by the same attorney; and
whether both trusts were created as part of a single transaction.
20 395 U.S. at 325.
1 Id. at 326 (dissenting opinion).
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(a) (2) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code. Under these sections the
gross estate must include the value of all property transferred by the
decedent over which he had at his death the power to alter, amend,
revoke, or terminate the enjoyment, alone or in conjunction with any other
person. Since Janet Grace as one of the trustees of the trust she had
created (or Joseph Grace as one of the trustees of the trust he had
created) could pay, with the approval of one of the other trustees, any of
the principal of the trust to the main beneficiary, section 811(d) (2)
(now section 2038(a) (2)) would apply to include this trust in her (or
his) gross estate. Without invoking the reciprocal trusts doctrine, each
trust could have been taxed to the estate of the actual settlor .2  There
being no tax evasion possible in this case, the use of the reciprocal trusts
doctrine must be seen as inappropriate.
If the use of the reciprocal trusts doctrine was inappropriate in
Grace, when exactly should it be invoked? It should be used only in
those cases in which tax evasion would be made possible merely because
crossed trusts were used. The original purpose of the reciprocal trusts
doctrine was to make tax evasion in the crossed trusts situation impossible,
and this purpose should still be given effect. Justice Douglas believed
that the reciprocal trusts doctrine should not have been invoked in Grace
because it may have been possible to tax the trusts to the respective
estates under a statutory provision. If this reasoning is followed, it
would mean that in any crossed trusts situation in which the settlors have
retained taxable powers over their own established trusts, the reciprocal
trusts doctrine is to be abandoned and the statute applied. However,
Justice Douglas' reasoning should not be utilized so broadly, for to do
so would open, in certain situations, the possibility for estate-tax avoidance.
"However, if the reciprocal trusts doctrine was not applied in this case, neither
trust could have been included in Joseph Grace's gross estate. This exclusion would
have occurred because Joseph Grace had only a non-taxable interest in the Janet
trust (see note 17 supra) and because completion of the transfer of the Joseph
trust before Joseph Grace's death left him with no taxable power over it.
Justice Douglas pointed out in his dissent that Janet Grace held at her death
a reserved power to amend the trust that she had created and, therefore, that this
trust should have been included in her gross estate under § 811 (d) (2). Id. at 325-
26 (1969). There was a similar provision in the Joseph trust, and if the transfer
set up there had not been completed before Joseph Grace's death (if Janet Grace
had not predeceased him), the Joseph trust could have been included in his gross
estate for the same reasons. Thus, except for these factors, the trusts could have
been included in his gross estate without invoking the reciprocal trusts doctrine.
That they would not have been included is the result not of a tax-evasion plan, but
of permissible methods of minimizing estate taxation that Congress has written
into the federal estate tax laws.
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There are many situations today in which settlors intentionally retain
a taxable power over property that they have transferred but still set up
their estates in such a way that estate taxes are avoided. Such schemes
obviously defeat the purposes of the federal estate tax. In dealing with
crossed trusts, the courts, therefore, should insure that the purposes of
the estate tax are met by applying the reciprocal trusts doctrine rather than
the statutory scheme when by such action estate-tax evasion can be
thwarted. When taxation under the statutory scheme would adequately
meet the policies behind the estate tax, this method should be followed,
just as justice Douglas has suggested, even though the reciprocal trusts
doctrine could be invoked. But when following the statutory scheme
would result in estate-tax avoidance, Justice Douglas' reasoning should
be abandoned and taxation imposed under the reciprocal trusts doctrine.
It is important to realize that application of the above principles
does not require a consideration of possible tax-avoidance motives of the
settlor-a line of inquiry ruled out in Grace as a controlling factor in
deciding when the reciprocal trusts doctrine should apply. Rather, adop-
tion of these principles would be in accordance with the majority's
admonition to look to the objective factors in the case. One of these
factors should be whether there are tax-evasion consequences because
the trusts are reciprocal. If there are no tax-evasion consequences, and
taxation is possible under the statutory scheme, courts should not invoke
the reciprocal trusts doctrine, but should allow taxation under the
applicable statute. J. DAVID JAMES
Federal Jurisdiction-Suits Against Federal Officers for Violation
of the Fourth Amendment
When an individual is injured at the hands of federal officers con-
ducting an unlawful search and seizure in violation of the fourth amend-
ment, what redress does the law provide for injuries to his person and
to his property? Clearly, the Federal Tort Claims Act1 would not provide
compensation for the plaintiff because immunity to the government from
suit2 is specifically granted by the Act for the very injuries that a plaintiff
The Federal Tort Claims Act is scattered throughout 28 U.S.C. (1964).
2 Cf. West v. Cabell, 153 U.S. 78 (1894), a case in which a United States
marshal was sued on his bond. A violation of the fourth amendment's proscription
that a warrant shall particularly describe the person to be seized was deemed a
breach of the bond. Id. at 87.
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suffers .as the result of an unlawful search and seizure.3 In order to
avoid dismissal because of tort immunity, a plaintiff should not sue the
United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for the acts of one of
its agents. Rather, he must forego the "deep-pocket" approach and sue
the officer as a private individual.4
If the plaintiff elects to hold the federal officer privately accountable
for the injuries that he has suffered, he may bring suit in a state court of
appropriate jurisdiction and rely on the common-law causes of action for
trespass and false imprisonment. However, a federal officer, naturally
desirous of placing himself in a more favorable forum, can easily have
the case removed to a federal district court.' The removal statute perhaps
provides a federal officer with an unassailable haven. It allows the officer
to remove not only when he is sued directly in a state court' but also
when he is sued as a third-party defendant.' Because any one federal
officer can cause the suit to be removed to a federal court, it is not
necessary that other defendants join in the removal petition.' Upon
removal of the case to a federal court, the parties to the suit will be
governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure although the federal
court will adjudicate the plaintiff's claim according to state substantive
law.
The primary reason that Congress authorized removal in suits against
federal officers was fear of prejudicial application of local laws.f In
Tennessee v. Davis,"0 Justice Strong reasoned that the operations of the
'Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §2680(h) (1964), provides tort im-
munity for "[a]ny claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false
arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation,
deceit, or interference with contract rights."
'Presumably, by suing the officer as a private individual rather than suing the
United States, the plaintiff deprives the officer of the tort immunity provided by
the Act. However, the officer can still plead that he was acting under color
of federal law as an affirmative defense.
128 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (1) (1964), provides in part:
A civil action or criminal prosecution commenced in a State court
against any of the following persons may be removed by them to the
district court of the United States... (1) Any Officer of the United States
. .. for any act under color of such office or on account of any right, title
or authority claimed under any Act of Congress for the apprehension or
punishment of criminals or the collection of the revenue.
'E.g., Camero v. Kostos, 253 F. Supp. 331, 335 (D.N.J. 1966).
Goldfarb v. Muller, 181 F. Supp. 41, 43 (D.N.J. 1959) (petition for removal
denied for other reasons).
'Bradford v. Harding, 284 F.2d 307, 310 (2d Cir. 1960).
'Strayhorn, The Immunity of Federal Officers Front State Prosecutions, 6
N.C.L. REv. 123, 124 (1927).
0100 U.S. 257 (1879).
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federal government might well grind to a halt if federal officers could
be tried in state forums without the benefit of federal judicial inter-
vention.11 Chief Justice Taft believed that "[t]he constitutional validity
of [the removal statute] rests on the right and power of the United
States to secure the efficient execution of its laws and to prevent inter-
ference therewith ...."2 It should be noted that the federal officer must
demonstrate in his petition for removal that he was acting under "color
of office."'- However, one can expect a liberal application of the "color-
of-office" test recently enunciated by the -Supreme Court ;14 as a practical
matter, a motion for remand will not be granted even in the most doubtful
of cases. 15
Given the likelihood that a federal court will ultimately adjudicate a
suit brought against a federal officer, the issue naturally arises whether
the plaintiff may bring suit directly in a federal court alleging that a
violation of the fourth amendment creates a federal claim for relief.
It is clear that if diversity of citizenship exists, suit can be brought under
the appropriate jurisdictional statute,:' but diversity seldom is present in
the typical case. Obviously suit cannot be brought in a federal court on
the bare allegation of a state claim. In such a situation, the federal court
would dismiss for lack of a substantial federal question. Hence, it is
necessary to allege some federal ground in order to generate subject-
matter jurisdiction at the federal level.
In Bell v. Hood,17 the United States Supreme Court dealt with the
question of whether a federal court had jurisdiction to entertain a civil
action alleging a violation of the fourth amendment. The Court held
:11 Id. at 263."'Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9, 32 (1926).
1 3See note 5 supra.
In Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402 (1969), the Court stated that:
[T]he right of removal . .'. is made absolute whenever a suit in a state
court is for any act "under color" of federal office, regardless of whether
the suit could originally have been brought in a federal court.
The federal officer removal statute is not "narrow" or "limited." ... At
the very least, it is broad enough to cover all cases where federal officers
can raise a colorable defense arising out of their duty to enforce federal
law.
Id. at 406-07.
1 Compare City of Norfolk v. McFarland, 143 F. Supp. 587, 589 (E.D. Va.
1956) with Tennessee v. Keenan, 13 F. Supp. 784, 791 (W.D. Tenn. 1936).
'- 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1964), provides in part: "The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy ...
is betiveen-(1) citizens of different States ..
1 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
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that there was jurisdiction under section 1331 of title 28 of the United
States Code." On remand the district court dismissed the suit for
failure to state a claim even though it had jurisdiction to hear the case.10
The district court reasoned that the purpose of the fourth amendment
is to protect an individual from governmental action; that whenever
a federal officer exceeds his authority, he no longer represents the
government, but acts in a private capacity; that inasmuch as the fourth
amendment does not apply to private conduct, the violation of the amend-
ment by individuals acting in a private capacity could hardly form the
basis of a claim for relief.20
In the recent case of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed-
eral Bureau of Narcotics,2 federal officers entered the home of Webster
Bivens without a search warrant. After a thorough search, Bivens was
arrested for an alleged narcotics-law violation. At the federal court
building he was photographed, fingerprinted, interrogated, and detained
against his will. However, the United States commissioner dismissed
the charges against him. Bivens then brought suit in a federal district
court against the individual officers alleging that his fourth amendment
rights had been violated and that he was entitled to money-damages as a
consequence of this unwarranted federal action. The district court dis-
missed both for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. On appeal the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held, on the basis of Bell, that there was jurisdiction to
adjudicate under section 1331 of title 28 of the United States Code.
However, the court affirmed the district court's determination that Bivens
failed to state a claim.22 The court held that in the absence of a statute
permitting suit in a federal district court, there was no federally created
claim for money-damages inherent in the fourth amendment.-
It is notable that the court in Bivens explicitly disagreed with the
rationale of the district court in Bell concerning governmental action.24
The court concluded that action by federal officers in violation of the
fourth amendment amounts to governmental action by any definition of
1828 U.S.C. §1331(a) (1964), provides in part: "The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy ...
arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
"9Bell v. Hood, 71 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. Cal. 1947).
20 Id. at 817.
"1409 F.2d 718 (2d Cir. 1969).
2 Id. at 720.238 Id. at 719.
21 Id. at 720-21.
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the term. Although this conclusion might indicate a predilection on the
part of the court in favor of allowing the suit to be maintained, it chose
to abstain in light of Congressional silence on the subject. Arguably, the
court was correct in its decision not to create a claim for relief in an area
in which Congress had not acted. However, Congress has acted to
impose criminal sanctions for abuse of the fourth amendment 5 and, more
recently, has created a remedy specifying money-damages for unauthorized
interception of private communications by electronic eavesdropping de-
vices.2 6 Congress should certainly continue this trend by passing legislation
allowing an individual to bring suit against a federal officer for violation of
the fourth amendment. Not only will firm guidelines thus be established,
but uniformity in the law will be achieved.
In Bivens, the Second Circuit held that the case was not one in which
federal common law should be applied. Rather, the court felt that until
Congress did act, the exclusionary rule, the possibility of injunctive
relief, and resort to the state courts served to vindicate the plaintiff's
interests. While it is beyond the scope of this discussion to propose a
judicially-created claim for relief for violation of the fourth amendment
by a federal officer, the court's rationale concerning vindication of the
plaintiff's interests cannot withstand close scrutiny.
Although the exclusionary rule operates to prevent a person from
being convicted due to the fruits of an unlawful search, it is only
applicable in criminal prosecutions. It does not secure a person's property
from future seizure, nor does it recompense one for damages occasioned
by the distraint. Similarly, while injunctive relief may prevent future
intrusions, it does not remedy the wrong that has been suffered due to
the past actions of federal officers. The court seemingly disregarded that
at the heart of a complaint alleging an infringement of fourth amendment
rights is the probability that there has been an illegal seizure of the
person; i.e., the plaintiff has been the victim of a false imprisonment
and has undergone the consequent humiliation and attendant mental
suffering characteristic of such an experience. It is difficult to see how
" E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2234 (1964) (executing a search warrant with unnecesary
force); 18 U.S.C. § 2235 (1964) (procuring the issuance of a search warrant with
malice and without probable cause); 18 U.S.C. § 2236 (1964) (searching an
occupied private building without a warrant).
" See generalIy Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18
U.S.C.A. § 2520 (Supp. 1970).
"' Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
409 F.2d 718, 722 (2d Cir. 1969).
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the exclusionary rule and the injunctive device would provide proper relief
for a plaintiff so injured.
In the absence of diversity of citizenship and a federal statute giving
plaintiffs a substantive claim for relief for violation of the fourth amend-
ment, and in light of the courts' refusal to apply federal common law, is
there still some method by which an individual can bring suit initially
in a federal forum to litigate his state-created claim for relief? Perhaps
one solution would be for Congress to pass a federal jurisdictional statute
under the guise of "protective jurisdiction."2  Such a statute would
allow a plaintiff to bring suit directly in federal court whenever he wishes
to litigate a state-created claim for relief against a federal officer. The
statute would correct two present imbalances. On the one hand, it would
serve to put a plaintiff on an equal footing with a federal officer who can
claim the benefits of the present removal statute. On the other, it would
serve to equalize the plaintiff in a non-diversity of citizenship situation
with the plaintiff who can sue under the diversity statute.
Until Congress does act an alternative solution would be the utiliza-
tion by the federal courts of the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction in the
interest of judicial economy. Rather than perpetuating inefficiency by
forcing the plaintiff to sue in a state court, only to have the federal officer
remove to a federal court, the concept of pendent jurisdiction could have
been used by the federal courts to retain the case and dispose of it on
state grounds.29
It should be emphasized that, after Bell, the problem facing the
plaintiff is not jurisdictional,"0 but basically one of asserting a claim
upon which federal relief can be granted. Thus the concept of pendent
jurisdiction becomes particularly important and can be used effectively.
The basic theory underlying pendent jurisdiction was set forth by the
"8 In Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957),
justice Frankfurter said:
Called 'protective jurisdiction,' the suggestion is that in any case for which
Congress has the constitutional power to perscribe federal rules of decision
and thus confer 'true' federal question jurisdiction, it may, without so
doing, enact a jurisdictional statute, which will provide a federal forum
for the application of state statute and decisional law.
Id. at 473 (dissenting opinion).
" It is interesting to note that the dissenter in Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678
(1946), recognized this possibility. "For even though it be decided that peti-
tioners have no right to damages under the Constitution, the district court will be
required to pass upon the question whether the facts ...give rise to a cause of
action for trespass under state law." Id. at 686 (dissenting opinion).
"As previously noted, jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (a) (1964).
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Supreme Court in Hurn v. Oursler: ' "[A] case where two distinct
grounds in support of a single cause of action are alleged, one only of
which presents a federal question .. . "32 could properly invoke federal
jurisdiction as to both claims. The Court went on to say that "where
the federal question averred is not plainly wanting in substance, the fed-
eral court, even though the federal ground be not established, may never-
theless retain and dispose of the case upon the non-federal ground. . .. "33
Taking this statement by itself, it is arguable that pendent jurisdiction
might not be available in a case such as Bivens due to the rigid require-
ment that a substantial federal question is necessary to justify retention
and disposition of the controversy on non-federal grounds.34 However,
the requirements of Hur have been broadened by the Court's latest
exposition of the doctrine. In United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 5
the Court pointed out that the concept of pendent jurisdiction was
grounded "in considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness
to litigants ... ."'I' The Court further stated:
Pendent jurisdiction, in the sense of judicial power, exists whenever
there is a claim "arising under [the] Constitution, the Laws .. . , and
Treaties . . ." and the relationship between that claim and the state
claim permits the conclusion that the entire action before the court
comprises but one constitutional "case." The federal claim must have
substance sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the
court . . . . The state and federal claims must derive from a com-
mon nucleus of operative fact.
3 7
One can only conclude after Gibbs that the standards for the legitimate
exercise of pendent jurisdiction are not as rigid as those set forth in
Hum. Quite certainly the Court still requires that the federal claim have
81289 U.S. 238 (1933).
Id. at 246.
"Id.
,The district court in Bell v. Hood, 71 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. Cal. 1947), thought
that the concept of pendent jurisdiction could not be invoked to dispose of that
case on state grounds because the concept had been applied only in equity cases.
Further, the court held that it could assume jurisdiction over the state claim only
if there was also a federal claim alleged. Id. at 820. This construction of the
doctrine of pendent jurisdiction is clearly erroneous. See generally Mishkin, The
Federal "Question"' In The District Courts, 53 CoLum. L. Rxv. 157, 167 (1953).
See also Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 657 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
"383 U.S. 715 (1966).
"Id. at 726.
'7 Id. at 725 (footnotes omitted).
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substance. However, more emphasis is placed on judicial economy and
the overriding consideration of complete disposition of a case before a
single tribunal. It may well be that the requirement of substance can
be rather easily satisfied, as the Court indicated, by simply alleging
a claim arising under the Constitution. The Court acknowledged that
there may "be situations in which the state claim is so closely tied
to the questions of federal policy that the argument for exercise of pendent
jurisdiction is particularly strong."3  The situation encountered in
Bivens presents just such a state claim. The federal courts should utilize
the concept of pendent jurisdiction to dispose of such a matter at the
federal level in the interest of judicial efficiency and overall fairness.8"
Pendent jurisdiction is not a panacea for every problem presented by
a case such as Bivens. Admittedly there are some drawbacks to the
doctrine that serve to limit its effectiveness. Primarily, it is a dis-
cretionary tool that a federal court can invoke as it sees fit.4" Moreover, an
adverse decision on the state claim by the court can have the preclusive
effect of res judicata. Thus the plaintiff is required to gamble if he
wishes to invoke the concept in a federal court. It is far more advisable
initially to bring suit in a state court since one knows that the federal
officer almost certainly will remove to federal court. The advantage of
this procedure, from the plaintiff's standpoint, is that state law will
definitely apply to the case. The disadvantage is found in the pro forma
8 Id. at 727.
Perhaps one of the reasons that a federal court is reluctant to act in the
absence of congressional legislation authorizing a suit for a violation of the fourth
amendment is the fear of having to establish federal common law. The basis of
the decision in Erie R.R. v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), was to alleviate the
forum-shopping opportunity spawned by the existence of federal common law.
However, in cases such as Bivens, this fear is unfounded because the tort law of
trespass and false imprisonment varies little from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. See
generally, W. PROssER, LAw oF TORTS 54-89 (3d ed. 1964). In any event, it
would seem that in pendent-jurisdictibn cases, state law should be dispositive of
state claims. Although the Erie doctrine is arguably limited to diversity actions,
it has been suggested that the doctrine has been applied by federal courts to state
claims in pendent-jurisdiction cases. See Note, Problents of ParaUel State And
Federal Remedies, 71 HARv. L. REv. 513, 517 (1958).
Another facet of pendent jurisdiction often overlooked is the necessity that
the plaintiff plead his alternative state grounds for recovery. Presumably, this
step was not taken in Bivens. However, had the federal court desired to invoke
the doctrine, it could have allowed amendment of the pleadings in keeping with
the liberality of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
0 E.g., Massachusetts Universalist Convention v. Hildreth & Rogers Co., 183
F.2d 497, 501 (1st Cir. 1950).
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legal maneuvers in which the plaintiff must indulge."' Congress should
act in this situation to allow an individual to sue directly in a federal
court. However, until Congress does act, a suit that is brought directly
in a federal court should be retained by the court and disposed of on
non-federal grounds under the concept of pendent jurisdiction.
JOSEPH E. ELROD III
Torts-Responsibility of Landlords for Criminal Acts of Third Persons
In Ramsay v. Morrisette' the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
decided that it was appropriate to re-evaluate the scope of a landlord's
duty to protect his tenants from the criminal acts of third persons. The
plaintiff, a tenant in the defendant's apartment house, was assaulted by a
man who broke into her apartment. She alleged that the landlord was
negligent in not taking reasonable steps to protect his tenants in light
of his knowledge of prior criminal activity. Specifically, she alleged that
the defendant-landlord was negligent for his failure to supply a full time
resident manager, to lock the front door, and to prevent intruders from
sleeping in the halls of the apartment house.' The trial court granted the
landlord's motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed,
" Although no pattern has been discerned that will support a hard and fast
rule, a caveat is appropriate at this point. It is notable that in cases in which
removal was allowed, none was found in which the federal officer was found
liable on the claim against him. It would be erroneous to conclude, however, that
the "color-of-office" requirement necessary for removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442
is sufficient to give a federal officer tort immunity, i.e., to conclude that if the
federal officer was acting under "color of office" sufficient to allow removal, then he
was acting under "color of office" sufficient to allow tort immunity. While a federal
officer can be acting under "color of office" sufficient to allow removal, it is
recognized that his acts may be so in excess of his authority that he can be
held individually liable for them. See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce
Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949), wherein the Court stated:
[T]he action of an officer of the sovereign (be it holding, taking or other-
wise legally affecting the plaintiff's property) can be regarded as so
"illegal" as to permit a suit for specific relief against the officer as an indi-
vidual only if it is not within the officer's statutory powers or, if within
those powers, only if the powers, or their exercise in the particular case,
are constitutionally void.
Id. at 701-02.
See also Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402 (1969), in which the Court said
that "one of the most important reasons for removal is to have the validity of the
defense of official immunity tried in a federal court." Id. at 407 (emphasis added).
1252 A.2d 509 (D.C. App. 1969).
'Id. at 512.
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holding that the tenant's allegations of negligence were sufficient to
preclude summary judgment.'
In deciding whether a landlord should be held responsible for the
criminal acts of third persons, the court could have approached the
problem in various ways. There is case law holding that the landlord
has a duty to use reasonable care in keeping safe for his tenants those
areas over which he has retained control.4 However, mere ownership
of the premises does not make the landlord an insurer of tenants' safety.
Instead, the standard is one of due care in light of the circumstances.
Liability based upon the principle of retained control has generally been
confined to responsibility for physical defects in the premises.' The acts
of third persons was the central issue in Ramsay, and, arguably, the
principle of retained control should not be extended to include liability
for the criminal acts of third persons:
That liability predicated on the "dangerous conditions" theory should
be limited to defects in the land becomes clear when one examines
the considerations which gave rise to a duty in such situations: Where
repair is necessary, it is only the landlord who is able to remedy such
defects .... His control and ability to remedy are exclusive. Where
the source of injury is not inherent in the land and where control is
not exclusive-where the considerations involved are not those of land
ownership but rather those of social relationships-the essential
meaning of the principle of control is inapplicable.
7
A second approach often used by the courts faced with a criminal
act by a third person is an inquiry into "proximate causation." The
traditional rule is that one is not bound to anticipate the criminal acts
of others8 unless he could have foreseen such a result as the consequence
8 Id.
'E.g., Kay v. Cain, 154 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1946). See generally W. PROSSER,
LAw OF ToRTs 418 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as PRossER].
E.g., Elmar Gardens, Inc. v. Odell, 227 Md. 455, 177 A.2d 263 (1962).
'E.g., Taneian v. Meghrigian, 15 N.J. 267, 104 A.2d 689 (1954); see PROSSER
418-21. But cf. Mayer v. Housing Authority, 84 N.J. Super. 411, 202 A.2d 439
(App. Div. 1964), in which the court relied upon the theory of retained control
in finding a landlord liable for the act of a third person. In Mayer a child was
hit by a rock while playing on the housing authority's playground. The court held
that the jury could find the housing authority had been negligent in failing to
provide adequate supervision for the playground and consequently was liable for the
child's injury.
'20 RUTGERS L. Rsv. 140, 143 (1965). The note criticizes the application of
the retained-control theory in Mayer.
'E.g., Andrews & Co. v. Kinsell, 114 Ga. 390, 40 S.E. 300 (1901); see
PROSSER 173-79.
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of his own actions. For example, in McCappin v. Park Capitol Corp.,10
in which the tenant sued the landlord to recover money stolen from the
tenant's apartment, the court denied recovery on the grounds that the
tenant-plaintiff had failed to establish proximate cause. The thief had
apparently stolen a key to the tenant's apartment from the landlord. The
court, in basing its decision on proximate cause, did not affirmatively
decide whether the landlord had been negligent in the first instance.
Consideration of proximate cause before negligence serves only to
obscure the real issue." Legal responsibility or proximate cause deals with
the issue of liability of a negligent actor and in proper analysis does not
arise until the negligence of the actor has been established. More spe-
cifically, proximate cause analysis entails determination of the various
policy considerations that go together to define the scope of the negligent
defendant's responsibility for his actions. Courts seizing upon proximate
cause as a means for disposing of cases similar to Ramsay assume without
proper evaluation of the facts that the defendant has been negligent.
Few cases have dealt with whether a landlord owes a duty of pro-
tection to his tenants in a factual context closely analogous to that in
Ramsay.2 The majority of courts that have reached the issue have
found no duty on the part of the landlord.13 One of the major reasons
behind this conclusion is the long prevailing argument that the tenant
can have in his lease provisions for protection by the landlord against
third persons. In DeKoven v. 780 West End Realty, 4 for example, the
court held that the landlord was under no duty to provide a doorman for
his apartment building in the absence of a contractual obligation. The
'See PRossan 178.
1042 N.J. Super. 169, 126 A.2d 51 (App. Div. 1956).
" See Mosley v. Arden Farms Co., 26 Cal. 2d 213, 220, 157 P.2d 372, 376 (1945)
(Traynor, J., concurring); Green, Merlov v. Public Service Co.-A Study in
Proximate Cause, 37 ILL. L. REv. 429 (1943); Note, 24 MI.NN. L. REv. 666
(1940).
2The court in Ramsay cited Kendall v. Gore Properties, Inc., 236 F.2d 673
(D.C. Cir. 1956), as supporting a finding of a duty to protect. The case involved
a landlord's employee with a criminal record killing a tenant. The court in KendaU
held that the landlord was negligent in not checking the employee's past criminal
record. In reaching its decision the court stated that the tenant, under her lease,
paid for both shelter and protection. However, this case is clearly distinguishable
since it deals with the crime of an employee.
"8 Applebaum v. Kidwell, 12 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1926) ; De Foe v. Sloane, 99
A.2d 639 (D.C. App. 1953); Goldberg v. Housing Authority, 70 N.J. Super. 245,
175 A.2d 433 (App. Div.), rev'd, 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291 (1962). But see Bass
v. City of New York, 38 U.S.L.W. 2345 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Dec. 10, 1969).U 48 Misc. 2d 951, 266 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).
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landlord had brought an action against various tenants for nonpayment
of rent, and the defense offered was that various criminal activities by
third persons had been committed within the apartment building because
the landlord negligently failed to provide a doorman. The court stated:
[I]ncidents of crime, perpetrated by third persons within the premises,
impose no obligation upon the landlord to provide doorman service,
especially where there has been no contractual obligation or obligation
imposed by statute to provide the same.' 5
Ransay, at least implicitly, rejected the theory that if the tenant
desires protection from the landlord, he can provide for it in the lease.
This theory is clearly unrealistic in the modern world. The landlord is
almost always in a superior bargaining position vis-A-vis the tenant.
Because the demand for adequate housing continues to rapidly fall farther
behind the available supply, it is clear that the tenant will probably never
be able to insist on a provision in his lease requiring protection by the
landlord. Furthermore, the landlord is in a better position to take pro-
tective measures and to absorb their cost through redistributing it. Ob-
viously, judges do not have to close their eyes to the realities of present-
day life. They can and probably should take judicial notice of the overall
shortage of available housing and the inequality of bargaining power
between landlord and tenant.
The fact that the prospective tenant has no power over the lease offered
him supports the position taken in Ransay--that it is now time to impose
a duty of reasonable care on the landlord to protect his tenant-in short,
to make him liable for negligence. Judicial determination that one party
" Id. at -, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 466. There are several cases that implicity rely
upon the view that any duty to protect must be imposed by the lease or not at all.
This consideration seemingly underlies the reasoning that the landlord has not
committed a wrongful act by his failure to take reasonable steps to protect his
tenants. Applebaum v. Kidwell, 12 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1926); De Foe v. Sloane,
99 A.2d 639 (D.C. App. 1953). The landlords in both cases were held not liable
for criminal activity despite the fact that they had inadvertently provided the
opportunity for the crime.
In DeKoven, Applebaum, and De Foe the landlords did not have notice of
prior criminal activity; thus the cases can arguably be distinguished from the
situation in Rainsay where the landlord-defendant had notice. However, the ques-
tion of notice may be a distinction without a difference. See Goldberg v. Housing
Authority, 70 N.J. Super. 245, 175 A.2d 433, rev'd, 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291
(1962), in which notice of prior criminal activity was disregarded by the court.
But see Mayer v. Housing Authority, 84 N.J. Super. 411, 202 A.2d 439 (App. Div.
1964), in which the court apparently found notice to be a significant factor in im-
posing liability on the landlord.
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owes a duty of protection to another is certainly not novel. Over time
the courts have found various social relationships to be of such a nature
that public policy justifies the imposition of a duty to protect. These
relationships include: carrier and passenger, innkeeper and guest, business
proprietor and invitee, school district and pupil, and employer and em-
ployee.16
The real issue in Ramsey and similar cases is whether the landlord
breached the duty of reasonable care. The ultimate decision in the deter-
mination of negligence is reached by balancing the burden to be imposed
on the landlord with the extent of the risk to the tenant."' Applying such
an analysis, most courts will either direct a verdict for the landlord or
will submit the question to the jury for determination. Submission to
the jury raises the question of its competence to pass on the various policy
questions involved in such cases. Therefore, the jury should be fully
informed of those questions either by court instruction or by counsel in
argument to the jury.
In considering the application of the formula of due care, it is worth
looking to some of the more obvious aspects of a landlord's actions or
non-actions that may well be found to fall short of the standard of reason-
able care. It is such narrowly defined behavior to which the court and
jury must look in determining whether the landlord has in fact exercised
due care.
For example, the failure of the landlord to supply adequate locks for
apartment doors should be sufficient to show a lack of reasonable care.
Provision of adequate lighting, both inside and outside the building,
may also be considered a minimum burden for the landlord. Further, a
failure to provide a manager (perhaps a resident manager) may also be
a failure to use due care in protecting tenants. A manager would have
the authority to supervise common areas and prevent the situation that
existed in Ramsay.
In determining the extent of care that the landlord must exercise to
fulfill the duty to protect, it also seems reasonable to consider the loca-
tion of the apartment house. Landlords in neighborhoods with past his-
tories of criminal activity should be held to a stricter standard of protection
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It is obvious that any substantial requirement of protection will result
in a proportionate increase in rents charged tenants. In other words, the
burden of any duty likely will fall on those who can least afford it. This
adverse economic consequence undoubtedly will result primarily from
increased liability insurance costs and the costs of protective measures.
Another factor that must be considered in weighing the economic
consequences of imposing a duty of protection on the landlord is the fact
that some areas are subject to rent control. In those areas a landlord
will not be able to increase his rents to cover the increase in costs by
spreading the risk among all tenants. To conpensate for the increased
costs, the landlord may reduce maintenance or other essential services.
Moreover, all other things being equal, the decreasing profit margins
will undoubtedly lead to a decrease in the supply of housing, clearly an
undesirable result."8
The importance of the economic ramifications from the imposition
of a duty on the landlord to protect his tenants against criminal actions
of third persons militates against permitting the jury to decide the ques-
tion of duty. The jury is simply not prepared to receive and comprehend
the economic factors that should be considered thoroughly. The courts
are obviously more qualified. The question arises, however, whether
even the courts are sufficiently qualified; for it may well be that the
resolution of this problem requires the type of intensive inquiry that only
the legislatures can provide. The legislature of a state can provide a
uniform policy that its courts cannot. If the proper solution of the prob-
lem involves governmental expenditures, the legislature is clearly the
proper body to consider such measures.
While the actual end-solution to the problem of crime in the cities, if
there is one, will depend upon legislative processes, it is not unreasonable
for the courts to require a landlord to take some protective measures on
behalf of his tenants, especially if he has notice of prior criminal activity
on the premises. At the least, tort law should require landlords to provide
some forms of minimum protection for individual tenants.
MICHAEL R. BECKER
"See P. SAMUELSON, EcoNomIcs 385-89 (6th ed. 1964).
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